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Introduction: Institutional 
Innovations in Peace Processes 
This book confronts the challenges of institutional design and innovation in 
contemporary conflict management. It bridges a gap in the peace and conflict 
literature by integrating understudied and apparently unrelated institutional 
innovations into a coherent body of transferable knowledge for divided soci-
eties. While focusing on Cyprus, it also draws on the experience of Bosnia, 
South Africa, and Northern Ireland to explore themes of intractability and 
institutional design, emphasizing institutions that sustain power- sharing, 
federalism, and reconciliation under ostensibly prohibitive conditions. It ar-
gues that seemingly unimportant institutional changes could have major ef-
fects on the durability of peace agreements, including their endorsement by 
the indigenous leadership and the wider public. Finally, it identifies effective 
support mechanisms for victim groups, including displaced persons and rel-
atives of missing persons, noting strategies to maintain grassroots support 
for peace. 
About 40 percent of the world’s population currently live in countries 
that can be considered or claim to be federal (Watts 2002). The global spread 
of federal and consociational arrangements (i.e., power- sharing) has trig-
gered a burgeoning literature across various disciplines. Yet little attention 
has focused on how conflict- ridden societies come to endorse power- sharing 
settlements or other conflict- mitigating institutions, including federal ar-
rangements. What is particularly puzzling is the wide variation in the global 
distribution of such settlements, the distinctiveness of alternative institu-
tional designs, and the curious absence of power- sharing arrangements from 
certain parts of the globe facing acute conflict. Why do some societies choose 
federal or consociational institutions to accommodate ethnic or religious di-
versity while others fail to do so? How do postconflict societies combine such 
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arrangements with reconciliation and other institutional mechanisms to sup-
port victim groups? What lessons can be learned across cases? 
The book addresses these questions through an in- depth examination of 
the Cypriot case and other peace processes facing comparable challenges. 
Conventional wisdom assumes that properly designed institutions not only 
increase the chances of reaching a settlement in the first place but also offer 
better guarantees for durability, implementation and stable interethnic rela-
tions. However, there is little knowledge so far as to which institutions and 
when could best overcome prohibitive conditions on the ground. Drawing 
on specific examples from Bosnia, South Africa, and Northern Ireland, as 
well as successful confidence- building measures in Cyprus, Designing Peace 
enumerates the criteria for effective institutional design and demonstrates 
how conflict- ridden societies have framed, endorsed, and sustained novel 
ideas and institutions, succeeding against conditions that initially seem pro-
hibitive. The book identifies institutional innovation as key in designing 
peace processes in such situations and demonstrates how institutional les-
sons from elsewhere could be modified and applied in future mediations in 
Cyprus and its broader region. 
With few exceptions, the peace and conflict literature has failed to exam-
ine innovation in institutional design and how it could positively influence 
prospects for durable peace. Admittedly, it is hard to define the concept of 
institutional innovation, as by its very nature, it takes novel and unpredict-
able forms that frequently contradict conventional wisdom and predeter-
mined criteria. Broadly defined, according to Nobel laureate Elenor Ostrom, 
institutions are “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of 
repetitive and structured interactions including those within families, neigh-
borhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and 
governments at all scales” (2005: 3). Following Ostrom, the book focuses on 
how different governance systems enable individuals to solve problems by 
modifying rules at various levels (29) paying particular attention to how 
solutions to such problems are reached in novel ways. Homer- Dixon (2000) 
uses a related term, “ingenuity,” to subsume not only new ideas (innovations) 
but also ideas that, though not fundamentally novel, are nonetheless useful. 
And as O’Leary et al. (2005) point out, even if there is evidence of past use, it 
seems appropriate to use the term “institutional innovation” if a particular 
governance system is not well known, even among the specialists in the field.
The way institutional innovations are presented in this book presupposes 
a causal relationship between the proposed institutional design and a 
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successful outcome in a contested peace process. Divided societies offer suit-
able grounds for the study of institutional innovation, particularly in cases 
where such innovations overcome prohibitive conditions. Positive outcomes 
should not be overdetermined by background conditions and should occur 
in “least likely”’ (to succeed) case studies as defined by Eckstein (1975) and 
Gerring (2007), thereby rendering institutional design the major cause of 
conflict transformation. In other words, institutional innovations are partic-
ularly noteworthy if they occur in difficult settings and during tough times. 
The accompanying theoretical justification (of how a conflict- ridden society 
has reached a positive outcome) should eliminate alternative explanations, 
whether these are related to the structural context or other case- specific 
factors. 
Another problematic aspect in the broader literature is the lack of schol-
arly work on the failures to negotiate power- sharing arrangements in divided 
societies aspiring to become federations and/or consociations. This is odd, 
given the growing scholarly awareness of the merits and prospects of power- 
sharing arrangements in postconflict societies (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004; 
Norris 2008; Haklai 2011). According to one account, of the 38 civil wars that 
ended through negotiations between 1945 and 1998, only the short- lived 
1989 Gbadolite Accord in Angola did not include provisions for power- 
sharing (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 319). Federations and consociations 
could balance the concerns of conflicting majorities and minorities, elimi-
nating the worst- case scenarios of deadly violence, secession, or state repres-
sion (Lijphart 1979; McGarry and O’Leary 2009b). Experts embracing such 
institutional arrangements have even pointed out that increasing the level of 
power- sharing enhances the likelihood of an enduring peace settlement 
(Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 319). More recently, two renowned economists, 
Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012), have also demonstrated that 
inclusive political and economic institutions underlie economic success (or 
the lack of it). Yet mediations for power- sharing often fail to materialize, even 
in stable and economically developed areas within the European Union, as 
suggested by Cyprus, the Basque country, and Northern Ireland (until 1998), 
or in wider Europe, as in the cases of Moldova or Georgia. 
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Institutional Innovations in Peace Mediations
Why does this happen, if power- sharing is a win- win situation? Although not 
the sole consideration, the ways novel ideas and institutions are framed in 
peace mediations is crucial. A minimum degree of innovation is necessary to 
transcend a protracted stalemate, particularly if societies that have rejected 
previous peace proposals are to accept a renewed mediation package. Admit-
tedly, this is not the first work to identify the importance of institutional in-
novation in conflict management and federalism (Bermeo 2002; Hartzell and 
Hoddie 2003; Burgess 2012), power- sharing settlements (O’Leary et al. 2005; 
McGarry and O’Leary 2009a) or addressing the needs of victim groups (Black 
2001; Kovras 2014). While some contemporary research has advocated inno-
vative approaches to institutional design, the book goes farther, integrating 
seemingly unrelated innovations across a diverse set of challenges facing di-
vided societies, from power- sharing to reconciliation and displacement. 
The book adopts a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution in 
deeply divided societies. Most contemporary scholars tend to focus only on a 
narrow aspect of peace processes, although it is generally recognized that ne-
gotiated settlements require a comprehensive agreement in all areas; progress 
is usually conditional on drawing novel linkages among issues previously 
seen as unrelated (e.g., territorial concessions for one group in return for 
power- sharing for its ethnic antagonists). Thus, the book aims to create a new 
body of institutional knowledge that can be accessed by aspiring federations 
and consociations like Cyprus and other cases, not only in wider Europe but 
elsewhere in the world, from Nepal to Colombia and more recently Egypt, 
Yemen, and Syria, in their respective efforts to end deadly violence through 
negotiated power- sharing arrangements. The rise of the Islamic State in Syria 
and Iraq and the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014 further demon-
strate the need for comprehensive and transferable institutional designs to 
prevent increasing polarization and inspire durable solutions to complex dis-
putes with potential devastating consequences for the entire planet. 
Institutional innovation is not a panacea for the problems of divided so-
cieties, of course, but if properly adjusted to local conditions, the innovations 
suggested in the following chapters could transcend obstacles to peace medi-
ations across a multiplicity of cases, thus improving the lives of millions. 
There is little doubt among social scientists that political institutions mat-
ter (Hall and Taylor 1996; Weaver and Rockman 1993; Acemoglu and Robin-
son 2012). Yet critics might argue that this influence should be less visible in 
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protracted stalemates, given the perceived “irrationality” of ethnic conflict. 
In emotionally driven confrontations that are rooted in history and everyday 
reality, elites and masses might understandably fail to respond to “rational 
incentives” (Kaufman 2006; Petersen 2011; Mock 2012). The book recognizes 
these limitations. For one thing, its main case study, Cyprus, provides multi-
ple examples of how societies fail to respond to positive incentives, including 
European integration (see for instance, Anastasiou 2008; Diez et al. 2006, 
2008). For another, the book’s main theoretical framework incorporates the 
importance of psychological and ideational factors, especially framing, de-
fined by Klandermans as “a process in which social actors, media, and mem-
bers of a society jointly interpret, define, and redefine states of affairs” (1997: 
44). Ethnonationalist frames become embedded in domestic institutions and 
symbolic politics, constraining compromise in already contested peace pro-
cesses. They also build on a pre- existing cultural stock drawn from the sym-
bolic politics of a community (Desrosiers 2011; Kaufman 2011; Ross 2007), 
setting the limits for institutional design and innovation. 
 At the same time, the book challenges conventional wisdom on the limits 
of institutional change by noting cases that have been both successful and 
counter- intuitive. For one thing, identities and politics in divided societies 
are not fixed; in fact, the enormous suffering inflicted on populations has 
often enabled institutional change and guided leaders such as Nelson Man-
dela (in South Africa), Leymah Ghowee (in Liberia), and John Hume (in 
Northern Ireland) to seek innovative solutions to address conflict. For an-
other, institutional design could address even the most intractable or emo-
tional aspects of a particular conflict. The examples highlighted here suggest 
that a society’s choice of narratives and institutions could frequently over-
come structural and historical constraints, signifying that neither elites nor 
the broader society should be held hostage to the past. 
As shown here, properly designed institutions could perform a number of 
important functions, such as providing alternative options for early consulta-
tion, safeguarding broad inclusivity, and incentivizing improved human rights 
standards. First, institutions could encourage inclusivity in the mediation pro-
cess and the formation of power- sharing executives. As Hartzell and Hoddie 
argue, groups are more likely to commit to peace if they are assured that their 
opponents will not be able to seize power and use it at their expense (2007: 3). 
Second, institutions could engage the civil society and the public earlier in the 
peace process and initiate confidence- building measures while addressing 
highly emotional questions of reconciliation. Inclusive consultation and 
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ratification processes could increase the legitimacy and durability of a negoti-
ated settlement. Likewise, institutions in the form of cross- issue linkages 
could effectuate mutually beneficial compromises. Such compromises sup-
porting victims, whether displaced persons or relatives of missing persons, are 
likely to help initiate a process of reframing symbolic politics and building 
trust. Particularly if human rights are addressed in a reciprocal manner, public 
support for the peace process could increase across the communal divide. 
Finally, institutions in divided societies could increase incentives for 
peace and reduce critical uncertainties. As Margaret Levi argues, institutions 
are sets of rules and sanctions that structure social interactions defining the 
choices of strategic actors so as to produce outcomes that nobody has the 
incentive to change (1997: 25). Admittedly, institutional design in divided 
societies cannot eliminate risks entirely, but nonetheless, it could allow lead-
ers to take essential but “calculated risks,” whether these involve accommo-
dating hardliners in power- sharing agreements, granting amnesties to former 
paramilitaries or consulting the public in a referendum. Equally, institutions 
could stabilize cooperation among previously divided communities by speci-
fying the expected benefits from a negotiated settlement, including the key 
areas of autonomy for each side, as well as deadlock- resolving mechanisms 
on issues of shared rule. 
On the one hand, intelligently designed institutions could acknowledge 
the existence of ethnic antagonisms, and on the other, they could combine 
community autonomy with broadly negotiated mechanisms to reduce ten-
sions over time (McGarry and O’Leary 2009a). Overall, the study of institu-
tions in divided societies can have major policy implications for peacekeeping 
and provide new insights into theorizing comparative politics. 
Why Cyprus and Divided Societies? 
Geographically, Cyprus is located at the intersection of three continents as 
well as the Balkans and the Middle East, presenting an appropriate setting 
to evaluate commonalities in the experience of failed and aspiring federa-
tions or consociations. Cyprus, as a divided society, can also draw extensive 
lessons from elsewhere, particularly from divided places that have engaged 
in comparable peace arrangements under arguably similar or more difficult 
conditions. The book is one of the first to situate the island’s conflict within 
the comparative literature. It also addresses a novel question for the broader 
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region, namely, the relative absence of successful federal and consociational 
arrangements among societies evolving from the “post- Ottoman space” 
(see Chapter 2). With civil wars escalating in Syria and Iraq and power- 
sharing disputes resurfacing in Lebanon and Bosnia, any debate on institu-
tional design in Cyprus has arguably broader regional implications and vice 
versa. 
Equally, the Cypriot case itself provides exceptional grounds for the study 
of innovation in peace processes. To begin with, the United Nations has pro-
posed several peace proposals to reunite the island that have been publicly 
debated between the two communities for decades, most notably in the 2004 
referendums. The Cypriot mediations provide a wealth of empirical data on 
what could be negotiated for a set of inherently complicated issues, including 
power- sharing, displacement, settlers and security provisions, with general-
izable implications and lessons for other divided communities. Revisiting 
these old ideas can be useful (particularly through comparative lenses), and 
as Horowitz argues, “making peace from scraps off the negotiating table” 
might help a future settlement (2002b). At the same time, the book empha-
sizes new proposals for institutional change, aiming for significant improve-
ments compared to previous peace plans for Cyprus. While inevitable to 
some extent, recycling old ideas could also be detrimental for Cyprus; over- 
reliance on past peace plans will alienate the two communities further and 
bring a quick end to any future mediation. 
Institutional innovation is therefore an essential component of peace me-
diations for a reunited Cyprus. Both communities in the island have main-
tained high expectations as to the functionality, human rights, and security 
that will derive from a future settlement. Although these high (and opposi-
tional) expectations are admittedly an obstacle in reaching a Cypriot settle-
ment, they nonetheless motivate innovation. Inevitably, comparative lessons 
learned from other cases become extremely important in justifying future 
choices for the institutional make- up of a future federal Cyprus. 
Of course, this need for innovation is not limited to Cyprus. To effect 
lasting and positive change, stakeholders in divided societies must be pre-
pared to identify, redesign, and implement innovative new institutions. Ex-
amining successful peace mediations across selected cases can inform the 
tackling of the Cyprus problem. At the same time, identifying the shared ex-
perience and commonalities between Cyprus and other divided societies will 
provide transferable knowledge with broader implications for the fields of 
peace studies and conflict resolution. 
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To this end, Designing Peace puts forward four major and potentially 
transferable institutional innovations across divided societies: 
•  The d’Hondt process, a Northern Irish innovation on power- sharing 
through which membership in the executive is automatically deter-
mined by electoral strength (rather than post- election negotiations), led 
to unprecedented political stability in the province after 2007. Although 
relatively understudied, even among scholars of power- sharing, the 
d’Hondt executive in Northern Ireland has the potential to inspire sim-
ilar arrangements across divided societies through its principles of in-
clusivity, automaticity and proportionality (see also McEvoy 2006, 2014; 
McGarry and O’Leary 2009a). 
•  The property, policing, and electoral design provisions (e.g., remote vot-
ing) for the victims of ethnic cleansing in post- Dayton Bosnia empow-
ered community mobilization for peaceful voluntary return. Bosnia and 
the post- 1999 policies that facilitated peaceful voluntary return among 
the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country deserve serious 
consideration, particularly the counter- intuitive variations in IDP expe-
rience following the wars in the western Balkans (Bieber 2006; Belloni 
2008; Petersen 2011). 
•  The early mandate referendum in South Africa enabled F. W. De Klerk 
to preempt outbidding challenges in 1992 while concluding a peace 
agreement with Mandela (see Strauss 1993; Sussman 2004; Kersting 
2010). Early ratification processes can increase the legitimacy and con-
fidence of leaders aiming for a negotiated settlement; they also safe-
guard the peace process from reversals in public opinion. 
•  Finally, in Cyprus, in the groundbreaking work of the Committee for 
Missing Persons (CMP), humanitarian issues were delinked from the 
political settlement, thus enabling exhumations for the missing persons. 
This was described by Ban Ki- moon as “a model of successful coopera-
tion between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities” 
(Kovras 2014).1 
These innovations identify the fine line between human rights and political 
priorities while expanding constructive options for vulnerable groups di-
rectly affected by protracted conflicts. This is particularly relevant in a future 
unified federal polity, such as Cyprus, which aims to build common values, 
solidarity and shared responsibility among its citizens. Therefore, this book 
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situates federal studies within the broader human rights literature. While 
most studies on federalism and consociationalism implicitly assume the need 
of prioritizing human rights, little academic work has touched on this spe-
cific issue.
The Cypriot Context and Its Terminology 
Decades- long negotiations in Cyprus have taken place in a conceptual vac-
uum, and in this, Cyprus is not alone. Politics are inevitably contested in di-
vided societies, but at an even more basic level, so too are definitions and 
terminologies. Equally, key concepts are often purposely distorted to serve 
political interests by framing public debates against or in favor of negotiated 
settlements. Even the broader academic literature can fail to distinguish 
among interrelated concepts such consociationalism, federalism and power- 
sharing (Lijphart 1979; McGarry and O’Leary 2005). These terms are ger-
mane to what follows, so let me be clear about meaning.
Consociationalism, among other key features, stipulates that power be 
shared by majorities and minorities, and it implies formal or informal veto 
rights for all parties (Lijphart 1977, 1979; McGarry and O’Leary 1993). Con-
sociationalism involves power- sharing at the center, for instance, through the 
collective presidency in Bosnia or the allocation of certain key posts to mem-
bers of specific groups as in Lebanon. Federalism refers to situations where 
authority is territorially divided between central and provincial governments, 
with both enjoying constitutionally separate competencies (O’Leary 2001a: 
49– 52). Federations could be also consociations, as in Belgium and Switzer-
land, but not all federations are consociations, as in the United States and 
Australia. In addition, it could be argued that some federations function as 
semi- consociations, as in Canada and India (Lijphart 1979: 513). Semi- 
consociations include some elements of consociations but not others, for in-
stance proportionality and community autonomy but not guarantees for 
long- term power- sharing or fully effective veto rights (McCrudden and 
O’Leary 2013: 9– 10). There are also consociational agreements with territori-
ally intermingled populations that do not take a federal form, such as post– 
1960 Cyprus, Lebanon, and Northern Ireland after the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement (O’Leary 2001b: 44). Power- sharing could take either territorial 
or non- territorial forms through the inclusion of ethnic minority parties in 
the central government and guaranteed veto rights. Following McGarry and 
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O’Leary (2009a: 16– 17), the book treats power- sharing as an umbrella term 
encompassing both federal and consociational forms of accommodation. 
Since 1974, UN proposals and resolutions for a negotiated settlement in 
Cyprus have included federal and consociational provisions. It has been gen-
erally assumed that a prospective negotiated settlement will incorporate two 
federal units and a shared administration at the central government. Terms 
such as “bizonal” and “bicommunal” federation (BBF), as well references to 
“political equality” included in already signed framework agreements and 
joint statements by the leaders of the two communities (see Chapter 1), point 
to a convergence of shared power, although, admittedly, the details and sub-
stance of a future settlement remain to be resolved. 
Be that as it may, as early as the late 1970s, Cypriot leaders on both sides 
signed two High Level Agreements signifying initial convergence towards a 
bicommunal federal compromise. However, the 1977– 1979 Agreements were 
not clearly defined; for instance, they emphasized adherence to human rights 
for all citizens, but the issue of Greek Cypriot resettlement in the North be-
came subject to overcoming the “practical difficulties” of the Turkish Cypriot 
community (Ker- Lindsay 2011: 49– 51). Moreover, the decision on whether 
the two communities should be territorially reintegrated to meet Greek Cy-
priot expectations or whether federal boundaries would assume a more “eth-
nic form” to satisfy the Turkish Cypriot positions was left for the future peace 
settlement. As for power- sharing, the degree of consociationalism versus in-
tegrationism has long been debated by the leaders of the two communities, 
providing useful material to assess how majority and minority leaders frame 
and endorse related peace proposals (see, e.g., McGarry 2011). 
International experience suggests that federalism can be adapted for ei-
ther consociational or integrative/centripetalist purposes;2 as Sisk demon-
strates, the opportunities for innovation are so extensive that federalism can 
be structured to serve both needs within an aspiring federation (1996: 49; 
see also Jarstad and Sisk 2008). But regardless of the promise of federalism, 
despite the absence of major incidents of violence following the de facto 
partition of 1974, and in defiance of UN mediation attempts, negotiations 
have failed in Cyprus. The divided island has not managed to reunifly, al-
though 2015 has seen an unexpected movement and optimism toward a 
settlement.
Oddly enough, both communities have at times rallied in support of the 
reunification of the island. For example, the Turkish Cypriots demonstrated 
support for a federal settlement in massive rallies in 2002– 2004. They 
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frequently voted for moderates such as Mehmet Ali Talat, while in 2015 
Turkish Cypriots brought to power leading pro- reconciliation figure Mustafa 
Akıncı in a resounding electoral breakthrough. Likewise, two- thirds of the 
Greek Cypriot public have historically voted for pro- settlement politicians 
hailing from either the nominally communist AKEL (Progressive Party of the 
Working People) or the center- right DISY (Democratic Rally). Yet these par-
ties have failed to articulate a shared agenda on the Cyprus issue due to the 
history of intragroup antagonism going back to the Cold War, the 1955– 1959 
EOKA struggle, and the 1974 coup against Archbishop Makarios summa-
rized in the next chapter. 
Nor has the prospect of cooperating on issues such as energy and oil and 
natural gas exploration positively influenced the Cyprus peace talks; in fact, 
this could lead to worsening crises in the Eastern Mediterranean in the next 
decade. More important, in contrast to other parts of wider Europe, the in-
centives of EU- accession for both Cyprus and Turkey have failed to effect a 
comprehensive settlement in the island (Demetriou 2004; Tocci 2007; Ker- 
Lindsay 2012a). Overall, the Cypriot experience poses puzzles as to why soci-
eties choose or fail to negotiate peace settlements. Signs point to settlement 
and progress, and this might highly achievable in the next few years, but the 
larger picture so far says otherwise.
Alternative Explanations: How Societies 
Choose to Succeed or Fail
To explain the Cypriot stalemate, we should explore the structural, ideational, 
and institutional preconditions of peace settlements, both in general and as 
these could apply to the island. Until now, little critical attention has been 
paid to societies’ choice of peace or conflict, how majorities opt to share 
power with significant minorities, or why the latter give up conflictual seces-
sionist claims. The book builds on an established tradition, linking its case 
studies with the study of comparative ethnic conflict. Earlier studies on the 
Netherlands (Lijphart 1968), South Africa (Horowitz 1991; Guelke 1999, 
2005), Israel/Palestine (Lustick 1993), and Northern Ireland (O’Leary and 
McGarry 1993; McGarry 2001) have shaped influential debates by bridging 
the gap between the social sciences and case- specific studies. 
Yet few comparative studies feature Cyprus in this light despite a growing 
number of insightful single- case study contributions across the social 
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sciences (Papadakis 2005; Anastasiou 2008; Bryant 2010; Hadjipavlou 2010). 
Much of the comparative literature on power- sharing has dealt with the is-
land merely in passing, while Cypriot experts have drawn less than what 
might be expected from the burgeoning literature of federalism and consoci-
ationalism studies.3 Aiming to balance case- oriented and comparative analy-
sis, the book offers a theory- driven explanation of why and how some 
conflict- ridden societies opt for peace arrangements while others do not. 
Designing Peace suggests a five- factor framework to determine why 
conflict- ridden societies opt for peace settlements, inspired by Jared Dia-
mond’s work on societal collapse and how societies choose to fail or succeed 
(2006; see also Kalyvas 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). The aim in 
adapting Diamond’s rationale was to identify more clearly why divided soci-
eties develop differently as well as to integrate institutional choice with other 
interrelated variables, particularly framing processes and structural imbal-
ances among actors. When the book was first conceptualized, the analogy 
with Diamond’s framework had an important limitation, as collapse per se 
was not even a remote possibility for Cyprus or the two “motherlands” 
Greece and Turkey at the time. But societal collapse, like wars or ethnic vio-
lence, is difficult to predict. As the post– 2008 sovereign debt crisis took on 
global dimensions and caused unprecedented misery in Greece, eventually 
also devastating the Cypriot post– 1974 “economic miracle,” Diamond’s 
framework became frighteningly more relevant. 
As stated above, five factors noted in Diamond’s modified framework 
apply to Cyprus and other societies in ethnopolitical transitions. These are 
(1) the state of ethnic relations, especially how communities might have al-
ready damaged these relationships; (2) key changes in the local socioeco-
nomic environment; (3) hostile neighbors; (4) support from friendly outside 
actors; and (5) the society’s responses to its ethnopolitical make- up and spe-
cific problems. 
While debating all relevant factors, the book emphasizes the importance 
of the last of these; a society’s choice of narratives and institutions frequently 
determines the direction and intensity of causality in the first four. And al-
though Diamond (2006) and more important Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012) recognize the significance of inclusive institutions, their analysis tends 
to be framed in socioeconomic terms, leaving little space for the impact of 
alternative political systems particularly formal power- sharing in negotiated 
settlements. Societies respond differently to similar problems and, therefore, 
the choice and framing of innovative institutions in peacemaking is critical, 
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not only to secure the long- term survival of these institutions but also to en-
sure that a peace settlement is framed as negotiable in the first place. 
Framing Institutional Designs
Goffman (1974) introduced the concept of framing to denote schemata of 
interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label 
occurrences in their life space and the world at large. Like picture frames, 
cognitive frames reflect existing public perceptions while restricting certain 
“realities,” including noteworthy institutional designs and innovations, from 
public attention. Frames focus attention “by bracketing what in our sensual 
field is relevant and what is irrelevant, what is ‘in frame’ and what is ‘out- of- 
frame’ in relation to the object of orientation” (Snow 2007). Ethnocentric 
frames constrain institutional innovation while cooperative frames could act 
as catalysts in conflict transformation despite prohibitive conditions prevail-
ing in a divided society.
Frames also rely heavily on the use of analogies from the past. Jervis, for 
instance, maintains that analogies provide a useful shortcut to rationality by 
making insights derived from previous events accessible (1976: 220). Such 
analogies frequently convey shared understandings on the fairness and via-
bility of peace settlements, leading to a society’s entrapment when compro-
mises are desirable and necessary. Recent contributions point to the 
relationship of frames and ethnic violence (Desrosiers 2011; Kaufman 2011) 
or the extent to which frames constrain actions by directing people to per-
ceive and interpret an event in a particular way (Gamson and Herzog 1999; 
Loizides 2015). But as this book demonstrates, peace frames propagated by 
the civil society and moderate politicians also enable conflict resolution by 
transforming the symbolic landscape of ethnic relations. The cases discussed 
in Chapters 3– 6 demonstrate how institutional innovations could neutralize 
the impact of ethnonationalist frames or coexist with them in a stable symbi-
otic relationship, allowing ethnic communities to adapt their narratives at 
their own pace and in their preferred direction as the peace process evolves. 
14 Introduction
Methods and Sources 
The book supports its arguments by turning to the Cypriot experience and 
comparing it to other divided societies, contrasting the island’s power- 
sharing mediations to “most similar” and “most different” cases while identi-
fying variations within Cyprus at the level of communities, institutions and 
political parties. The broader conflict studies literature focuses on extremists 
and spoilers (Ignazi 1992; Stedman 1997; Haklai 2007; Ellinas 2010) and, in 
the case of Cyprus, on how the “hawks” rallied the Greek community against 
the 2004 Annan Plan (Anastasiou 2008; Yakinthou 2009; Michael 2009). The 
book takes a different direction by considering positive transformation 
among unlikely peacemakers, not just in Cyprus, but also in Northern Ire-
land, Bosnia, and South Africa. 
As Lijphart sees it (1968: 2), these deviant cases have considerable theo-
retical significance because of the light they shed on the social conditions 
sustaining stable and effective power- sharing engagements. And as discussed 
above, the book primarily relies on “least likely” (to succeed) case studies as 
defined by Eckstein (1975) and Gerring (2007). According to Eckstein (1975), 
a case could be crucial when it is “most” or “least likely” to fulfill a theoretical 
prediction (see also Gerring 2007). Crucial cases of peace transformation are 
those that initially demonstrate high levels of ethnic mobilization, extreme 
human rights violations, or protracted failures to negotiate peace. Because of 
these background conditions, such cases could be judged as least likely to 
exhibit patterns of peaceful transformation, rendering institutional design 
and innovation a plausible cause of “success” once a process of transforma-
tion has been initiated. Crucial case studies are appropriate in studying insti-
tutional innovation in conflict- ridden societies not only because they allow 
researchers to control for alternative explanations but also because they high-
light the mechanisms through which institutions interact with the “most pro-
hibitive” conditions for peace.
Besides the crucial- case method, the book employs comparative histori-
cal analysis focusing on why societies succeed or fail in endorsing power- 
sharing settlements. For this purpose, it relies on interpretive work to 
demonstrate the role of ethnocentric frames in constraining leaders from ne-
gotiating mutually beneficial institutional compromises, focusing primarily 
on historical precedents from the Balkans and the Middle East. To further 
assess actors’ motives and actions, it draws on archival material, parliamen-
tary records, newspaper reports, surveys and interviews with political figures 
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and opinion- makers, and three publicly available databases, Greek- Turkish 
Negotiations and Crises 1983– 2003 (Loizides 2009a), Referendums in Peace 
Processes (Loizides 2009b) and Negotiating the Right of Return (Loizides 
2009c). Finally, it relies on policy memos previously submitted to various 
sides in peace mediations and feedback accumulated over years in debates of 
alternative institutional arrangements across a wide range of issues in divided 
societies. 
The book’s two main methodological innovations are simple but distinct. 
First, the book is among the first attempts to integrate the crucial- case 
method with comparative historical analysis and interpretive work. By rely-
ing on framing analysis including use of false analogies from the past, it ad-
dresses a major gap in the literature, namely, the relative absence of successful 
federal arrangements among societies evolving from the “post- Ottoman 
space.” Second, while others have advocated innovative approaches to the 
study of comparative political institutions, Designing Peace goes farther, 
using negotiation and mediation analysis to integrate institutional innova-
tions across a diverse set of challenges facing societies in transition, from 
power- sharing to reconciliation and displacement. It specifically relies on ne-
gotiation analysis (e.g., cross- issue linkages and scenario planning) to 
demonstrate how novel institutional designs inspired from elsewhere could 
be modified and applied in future UN negotiations in Cyprus as well as in 
other divided societies. Thus, each of the following chapters puts forward a 
new set of policy proposals, drawing on the history and politics of Cyprus 
and its region or on established theoretical traditions and precedents else-
where in the world. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter 1 starts with a brief history of Cyprus and highlights the main nar-
ratives of the two communities. Although neither side maintains a uniform 
narrative of the past, the chapter focuses on general perceptions of critical 
junctures in the history of Cyprus. The second part of the chapter demon-
strates how such narratives continue to have an impact on peace media-
tions. It also looks at the collapse of consociational arrangements in the 
early 1960s to demonstrate how false analogies are often drawn from earlier 
failures to validate current opposition towards a federal Cyprus. As for fu-
ture prospects for a settlement, Chapter 1 clarifies the meaning and content 
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of power- sharing and federalism and argues that a decentralized federal set-
tlement is qualitatively distinctive from the earlier failed consociational 
arrangements. 
Is Cyprus an exceptional case? Chapter 2 situates Cyprus in its geopoliti-
cal surroundings, emphasizing regional commonalities between the island 
and its immediate post- Ottoman neighborhood. The region features almost 
no exemplary or inspiring power- sharing arrangement, while containing no-
table and well- documented failures, such as Lebanon, Libya (1951– 1963), 
United Arab Republic (1958– 1961), post– 1960 Cyprus, the former Yugosla-
via (including Serbia- Montenegro), Sudan (2005– 2011) and most recently 
Iraq. Through comparative historical analysis, the chapter offers explanations 
of why conflict- ridden societies in the region, including Cyprus, have not 
opted for federalism and consociationalism. Building on Chapter 1, it argues 
that a selective reading of the past and false analogies drawn from the Otto-
man and western colonial legacies make the endorsement of power- sharing 
settlements difficult even in conditions that seem permissive. 
Chapter 3 expands the discussion on institutional innovation by demon-
strating how other societies have managed to break their own stalemates. 
Specifically, it focuses on the d’Hondt process, a Northern Irish innovation 
on power- sharing that has safeguarded political stability since 2007. It argues 
that this innovation could be exported to other divided societies simply by 
creating a mechanism that guarantees automatic participation of all political 
groups in the country’s cabinet, with a share proportional to their electoral 
results. By avoiding risky and time- consuming negotiations following elec-
tions, the d’Hondt mechanism eliminates potential dysfunctionalities and 
delays in formation of government coalitions. Its key advantage is automatic-
ity in formation of the cabinet by all main political actors including political 
parties that are less likely to be otherwise included in coalitions. 
More important for the case of Cyprus, the d’Hondt is a flexible formula 
that could potentially allow the introduction of semipresidential arrange-
ments as an additional arbitration mechanism to resolve future deadlocks; 
this modification could inspire similar transitions in other presidential sys-
tems such as Lebanon, Egypt, and Colombia. The book’s unique promotion 
of semipresidentialism as a solution to the problems of divided societies mar-
ries Lijphart’s consociational theory (1968) with Horowitz’s centripetalism 
(1985, 2002a), two theories seen as hostile in most accounts, but maintains 
consociationalism as the dominant partner. 
The Cypriot experience poses major challenges for policymakers and 
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academics working on displacement and settler issues. Chapter 4 focuses on 
displacement and argues that a negotiated settlement could address commu-
nity and individual rights more effectively than its alternatives because 
power- sharing is based on a culture of compromise, reciprocity and mutual 
recognition of the need to protect vulnerable groups. The chapter re- evaluates 
win- win linkages in light of current negotiations, utilizing earlier proposals 
on the issue and the 2009 survey data of the Cyprus2015 group (focusing on 
Greek Cypriot displaced persons). For one thing, it draws examples from 
elsewhere in particular reversals of displacement in Bosnia to inform negoti-
ations in Cyprus. For another, it examines how such proposals on critical is-
sues such as compensations and restitution for the properties of the displaced 
could adjust to the island and the sovereign debt crisis. 
Chapter 5 identifies a critical yet understudied question in institutional 
design: peace referendums. It examines the extent to which referendums are 
useful in the ratification of peace agreements, especially their relevance in 
power- sharing transitions. In some cases, communities in conflict reach a 
negotiated settlement by avoiding or postponing public ratification pro-
cesses, as in the Zürich- London Agreements; in other cases, referendums are 
central to the transition phase, as in the Annan Plan. The February 2014 joint 
statement by Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders stipulates that the settlement 
will be based on a bicommunal, bi- zonal federation with political equality 
and that such an agreement “may be put into separate and simultaneous 
referenda.”4
This chapter asks whether a referendum would be useful in ratifying fu-
ture agreements in peace processes and, if so, how it should be designed, 
monitored, and implemented. Few scholars have considered referendums in 
federal and consociational transitions, despite their growing importance in 
international politics (Qvortrup 2002; Butler and Ranney 1994; Leduc 2003). 
Yet positive intentions in peace negotiations might be compromised by the 
absence of carefully designed mediation and ratification processes. Govern-
ments in Cyprus, and more recently in Israel and Colombia, have debated 
referendums without adequately considering comparative cases and exper-
tise across conflict- prone societies. Referendums might also inflame already 
unstable ethnic relations as suggested in East Timor (Paris 2004: 219) and 
demonstrated more recently in the cases of Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, and Crimea. 
The chapter concludes by discussing the case of South Africa where an early 
mandate referendum contributed to the ending of Apartheid (Strauss 1993; 
Sussman 2004; Kersting 2010). 
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Chapter 6 extends the arguments of the previous chapters on intractabil-
ity and builds on five successful stories of peacemakers in Cyprus to empha-
size how societies in conflict can choose to reverse the most difficult aspects 
of their territorial division. Countering conventional wisdom, it shows that 
reversal of partition is not dependent on friendly or hostile neighbors; rather, 
it is a society’s own choice. It considers six levels of society: a municipality, 
showing how the mayors of divided capital Nicosia have dealt effectively with 
the city’s most difficult problems; a village, investigating how the Maronite 
residents of Kormakitis have regained their village under conditions of occu-
pation; a movement, looking at how the Bu Memleket Bizim (this homeland 
is ours) movement mobilized Turkish Cypriots for peace in 2002– 2004; a 
party, investigating how DISY risked its party unity by supporting the 2004 
Annan Plan; and finally an institution, focusing on how the CMP became a 
successful bicommunal project on an issue that other divided societies, in-
cluding Northern Ireland, have failed to resolve even after a peace settlement. 
Through the analysis of “relative success” stories, the chapter demonstrates 
the options of a comprehensive versus a gradualist approach to peacemaking 
and offers a broader conceptual model to negotiate peace. It challenges and 
amends Zartman’s (1985, 2000) concept of ripeness by highlighting strategies 
for dormant (less promising) times in protracted mediations, negotiations. 
Finally, it introduces a novel framework, the “stalemate theory,” and presents 
the broader conceptual justification for utilizing dormant moments in peace 
negotiations, as those could apply, for instance, to the return to the deserted 
Greek Cypriot sector of Famagusta. 
Chapter 7 revisits the questions of Europeanization and conflict resolu-
tion in the Levant following the discoveries of hydrocarbons. It focuses in 
particular on cross- issue linkage, paying special attention to alternative sce-
nario planning for the future of the regions. It identifies mutually advanta-
geous linkages, illustrating how these could match alternative scenarios given 
a number of critical uncertainties involving Turkey’s EU accession and the 
discovery of natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. Unlike 
the previous chapter’s discussion of gradualist approaches, Chapter 7 debates 
the merits of a comprehensive settlement involving broader cross- issue link-
ages with Greece and Turkey. Should the Cyprus problem be solved simulta-
neously with the Aegean conflicts? What role can Greece and Turkey play in 
the Cyprus settlement in the context of an enlarged EU in the Eastern Medi-
terranean? How could Israel and the rest of the Levant be integrated in this 
equation following the discovery of natural gas reserves in the region? 
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Finally, it puts forward a number of propositions for regional peace and secu-
rity, including alternative scenarios for the future. 
The Conclusion summarizes the findings and presents a comprehensive 
argument for the merits of federal and consociational arrangements. It exam-
ines the limits of and defines the criteria for institutional innovations in di-
vided societies. Innovation in institutional design, including critical 
knowledge of available options and dilemmas, costs domestic actors and in-
ternational diplomacy much less than transforming structural or historical 
preconditions. Often going unnoticed, novel ideas and institutional innova-
tion have incentivized cooperation and helped resolve intractable disputes. 
Simply stated, innovative institutional design could foster durable and nego-
tiable peace settlements, ones that are compatible with local expectations and 
universal human rights standards.

C h a p t e r  1
A Federal Cyprus? Consociational 
Failures and Prospects
Cyprus has experienced conflict at various times in its recent history, and this 
has inevitably shaped adversarial narratives across the communal divide. Un-
derstanding the background of the Cypriot conflict, especially how each 
community generally perceives certain critical historical junctures, is im-
portant before debating potential institutional choices for the future. In par-
ticular, identifying the reasons behind failures in previous consociational 
compromises and mediations is critical as analogies are often made across 
time and space to inform subsequent decisions. For instance, at critical mo-
ments in the past critics have drawn parallels between proposals for the re-
unification of Cyprus (e.g., the 2002– 2004 Annan Plan) and the 1959 
Zürich- London Agreements that led to the establishment and subsequent 
collapse of consociationalism in Cyprus. 
Neither community has maintained a homogeneous narrative in its fram-
ing of the Cyprus problem, however certain perceptions about the past seem 
to persist across the ethnic divide. The chapter first presents a short history of 
the Cyprus problem and then focuses on the most significant up to mid- 2015 
United Nations mediation attempt in Cyprus, the Annan Plan, which divided 
each side into those favoring the proposed settlement and those opposing it. 
While challenging the narratives and arguments of the critics, this chapter 
also recognizes critical institutional gaps in past UN mediation processes in 
the island of broader relevance to postconflict peacebuilding. Moreover, the 
chapter recognizes that history shapes the boundaries of what is possible for 
the future of conflict- ridden societies and argues that, in Cyprus, a federal 
arrangement will have better prospects, if it assumes a decentralized form. 
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Drawing on the history, particularly past failures in mediating federalism 
and consociationalism in Cyprus, the chapter discusses how decentralized 
federalism could offer a negotiable and durable alternative. 
Cypriot History and Narratives
The Ottomans conquered the island in 1571, but Cyprus escaped the devas-
tating wars of the late Ottoman era, as it was transferred to the British follow-
ing the Berlin Congress in 1878. Officially, it became a crown colony in 1925; 
Turkey recognized the 1914 annexation of the island by the British in the 
1923 Treaty of Lausanne (article 20). The first decades of colonial rule were 
punctuated with minimal conflict, but gradually both communities devel-
oped stronger attachments to their respective “motherlands” and became 
more assertive in their ethnopolitical demands (Demetriou 2012). Thus, the 
narratives of the two communities diverge in their explanations of the origins 
of the bicommunal violence (for a summary of major historical events and 
the respective narratives of each community see Table 1 below). 
Even though they fought in World War II on the side of the British, in the 
1950s, Greek Cypriots under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios started 
an active campaign against colonial rule and demanded enosis (union) with 
Greece. Like other colonial peoples, they felt eligible for freedom and self- 
determination, also citing their demographic majority status at about 80 per-
cent of the population. In January 1950, 95.73 percent of Greek- Cypriots 
voted in favor of union with Greece in a “plebiscite” (in the form of signature 
collections) led by the Church (Crawshaw 1978: 34– 56; Averoff- Tossizza 
1986: 8– 9). 
Turkish Cypriot counter- mobilization developed almost simultaneously 
and emphasized geographic proximity to Turkey, as well as previous owner-
ship of the island. In response to enosis, Turkish Cypriots, with the backing of 
Turkey, demanded taksim (partition) of Cyprus into two separate territories 
(Bahcheli 1972: 60; Attalides 1977: 78– 86). In a massive demonstration in 
December 1949, attended by 15,000 people, Turkish Cypriots demanded that 
the island be returned to Turkey if Britain decided to leave (Gazioğlu 1996: 
455). 
Between 1955 and 1959, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters 
(EOKA) attempted to end colonial rule and unite the island with Greece. The 
EOKA leadership initially promised not to target the Turkish Cypriot 
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community and avoided bicommunal incidents until 1958. However, for the 
Turkish Cypriots, maintaining colonial rule was preferable to a potentially 
hostile Greek administration. Following the start of the EOKA campaign, 
they actively sided with colonial authorities to make up for Greek Cypriot 
police officers who resigned from their positions (Ker- Lindsay 2004: 16). Ac-
cording to Turkish Cypriot accounts, it was expected that “sooner or later the 
campaign of terror would be directed against the Turkish Cypriot commu-
nity” (Necatigil 1998: 7). As the latter supported the British against EOKA, 
retaliations did take place, triggering further attacks and counterattacks 
(Bahcheli 1972: 55). 
Turkey added its strategic interests to the equation and insisted that any 
change in the status quo would necessitate a revision of the Lausanne treaty 
of 1923 (Bahcheli 1972: 71). The Turkish side drew attention to the treatment 
of the approximately 100,000 Turks living in Western Thrace (57) and cited 
historical analogies to claim Turkish Cypriots might face the same fate as 
their co- ethnics in Crete and the Balkans (Kızılyürek 1999: 64; Denktaș 1982: 
19; Gazioğlu 1996: 85– 97). For the most part, Turkish Cypriot positions 
aimed at preventing the island from being dominated by Greeks and implied 
an understanding that no change to status quo was possible without the com-
munity’s consent (Ertekün 1984: 1– 5; Necatigil 1998: 7– 8).
For the Greek Cypriot majority, such consent was unimaginable, given 
the prevailing climate of rival ethnonationalist mobilizations. The Greek Cy-
priot side employed demographic, historical, and cultural arguments to de-
mand “enosis and only enosis.” Turkish Cypriots were not included in the 
anti- British campaign, even at a symbolic level, in what Greek Cypriots con-
sidered their national struggle for self- determination. Greek nationalism in 
Cyprus drew its symbolism and inspiration from the mainland, and the sym-
bols of Greek Cypriot armed struggle (1955– 1959) were carefully selected to 
correspond to Greek ones. EOKA initially planned to begin action on the 
anniversary of Greek revolution on March 25, 1955, also a major Greek Or-
thodox religious holiday (Papadakis 1999: 25). 
EOKA’s military leader Georgios Grivas was a controversial figure of the 
Greek Civil War who saw communists as outside the national community 
and as obstacles to attainment of nationalist goals (Holland 1998: 29– 30; 
Crawshaw 1978: 42– 91). He found strong allies in the ultra- conservative 
Church of Cyprus, which was threatened by the rise of the communist left 
among the working classes (Markides 1977; Servas 1997). Even though it oc-
casionally emphasized a shared Cypriot identity, the left chose not to 
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challenge the major tenets of Greek nationalism; in fact, even after indepen-
dence, AKEL followed the mainstream Greek Cypriot position and, at times, 
even supported union with Greece (Markides 1977: 63; Averoff- Tossizza 
1986:7; Drousiotis 1998: 40– 46; Diglis 2010). 
The 1959 Zürich- London Agreements were seen as a “forced partnership” 
imposed on the two communities by their respective “motherlands” in the 
prevailing climate of the Cold War (Xydis 1973). The Agreements, the first 
and only power- sharing attempt, lasted for just three years. Critics point to 
consociationalism itself as a cause, particularly the separate election of com-
munity leaders (a Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot vice- 
president voted only in their respective communities), the mutual vetoes of 
the two leaders and the over- representation of the minority Turkish Cypriots 
in the cabinet and civil service (Adams 1966; Polyviou 1980; Anderson 2008). 
Yet attributing the failure of the Zürich- London Agreements to consocia-
tionalism per se has significant flaws. To begin with, the “presidential conso-
ciationalism” of the Agreements would not have been the preferred 
institutional choice of consociational theorists (Linz 1990; Lijphart 2004; 
McGarry 2011). Since the 1980s, Juan Linz has emphasized that presidential-
ism is less likely than parliamentarism to sustain stable democratic regimes 
(see also Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 449). Presidentialism tends to intro-
duce a majoritarian (“winner- take- all”) logic into the politics of divided soci-
eties, which is often incompatible with the very essence of power- sharing. 
The view that ethnically diverse societies are better served by parliamentar-
ianism than by presidentialism is now widely accepted in comparative politi-
cal science and illustrated in recent failures of presidential regimes to secure 
democratic transitions in Egypt, Zimbabwe, and Kyrgyzstan (McGarry 
2013).1 
Moreover, as Lijphart (1977: 160) argues, the main reason for the failure 
of consociationalism in Cyprus is that it could not be imposed against the 
wishes of one or more segments in a plural society, in particular, against the 
majority community. In this respect, the Cypriot case parallels Northern Ire-
land and Sri Lanka, with the dual imbalance of power constituting the cru-
cially unfavorable factor as each community managed to see itself as a 
minority facing an existential threat (160; see also Trimikliniotis 2006). But 
as the example of Northern Ireland suggests, structural disadvantages do not 
predetermine consociational failures, if institutions are designed to address 
such weaknesses and win ratification by majorities in peace referendums. In 
Cyprus, the unfavorable “dual imbalance of power” factor could have been 
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mitigated by improving incentives for cooperation, making better security 
arrangements in the island and the region and eliminating unconstructive 
ambiguities about decentralization (e.g., with regard to the issue of separate 
municipalities, which had been an issue of immediate importance to both 
sides). 
Both Greece and Turkey had already joined NATO in 1952, but member-
ship did not mitigate the security dilemmas in the Greece- Turkey- Cyprus 
triangle (Krebs 1999: 357; Güney 2004). In fact, the Zürich- London Agree-
ments institutionalized the military presence of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus 
as guarantor powers without their having to cooperate within the institution-
alized structures of NATO or with the limited UN forces after 1964 (Joseph 
1997: 21; Necatigil 1998: 9– 20). Despite an earlier informal agreement for 
Cyprus to join NATO, the Republic became a member of the Non- Aligned 
Movement (Xydis 1973: 413). And while the decision was made against the 
wishes of Turkish Cypriot leaders, they did not use their constitutional veto 
(Ker- Lindsay 2004: 20). In fact, the Turkish government opted against Cy-
prus joining NATO, as membership would have severely curtailed and de-
layed Turkey’s ability to act in the island (20). 
Given the staggering security gap, it was only a matter of time before eth-
nic nationalism trumped power- sharing and shared visions of citizenship. 
Greek Cypriots saw the Agreements as the first step toward enosis while 
Turkish Cypriots continued to hold taksim as their priority. Both EOKA and 
the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) had already established strong 
organizational networks throughout the island. More important, (uncon-
structive) ambiguities in the constitution concerning municipal decentraliza-
tion fueled grievances about the “forced nature” of the partnership. The 
Agreements provided for separate municipalities in major cities. At the same 
time, Article 173 made those provisions subject to the future approvals of the 
president and vice- president, with no clarity on the extent of their authority 
or territorial boundaries. As Dianne Markides argues, the strong Greek Cy-
priot reactions to the realities of municipal partition, the ambiguity of the 
wording of Article 173 and the failure of the guarantor powers to make the 
necessary clarifications fueled the constitutional breakdown in the early 
1960s (2001). In the absence of effective and credible external guarantees, 
both communities remained captive to their fears of being pre- empted by the 
other (or by the “motherlands”). As a result, both engaged in preemptive mil-
itarization and violence, leading to the breakdown of the consociational ar-
rangements in 1963– 1964. 
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The official narratives of the two communities differ in their interpreta-
tion of the collapse of power- sharing arrangements. Several thousand mem-
bers of the Turkish Cypriot community were displaced into enclaves and the 
community was economically isolated for more than a decade (Patrick 1976), 
forcing it to rely on Turkey for protection and international representation 
(Vural and Rustemli 2006: 338). The Greek Cypriot side, which gained the 
right to represent the Republic of Cyprus in international organizations in-
cluding the United Nations, interpreted the 1963– 64 events as a revolt against 
the legitimate state (Joseph 1997: 100; Necatigil 1998: 48– 51). Nonetheless, in 
the 1968– 1974 period, the two communities came close to a compromise 
with limited regional autonomy for Turkish Cypriots in exchange for accom-
modating most amendments proposed by Greek Cypriot leaders in 1963. 
According to Glafkos Clerides, who led these negotiations for the Greek 
Cypriot side, President Makarios rejected the proposed settlement because of 
Denktaş’s demand to renounce Greek Cypriot aspirations for enosis (Clerides 
1989– 1992, 2007). As argued elsewhere in this book, ethnocentric framing, 
particularly with regard to national entitlements, could constrain leaders 
from negotiating necessary and mutually beneficial institutional compro-
mises. While Clerides recognized the necessity of these compromises, he ad-
mits that he could not confront Makarios or the dominant narratives in his 
own community (Clerides 2007). 
These negotiations were interrupted by the Turkish invasion of the island 
on July 20, 1974. Turkey intervened militarily to prevent what it saw as an 
attempt by the Greek Junta to unite Cyprus with Greece in a coup against 
Makarios five days earlier. During the invasion, approximately 140,000 Greek 
Cypriots were forced by the Turkish military to flee from the North, while 
around 40,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the South chose or were coerced to 
abandon their houses and move to the North (Fisher 2001: 311). Fearing the 
demographic separation of the two communities, the Greek Cypriot leader-
ship initially refused to allow Turkish Cypriots to settle in the North but con-
sented to do so in the 1975 Vienna Agreement. The same Agreement 
promised protection for the remaining 20,000 Greek Cypriots in the North; 
however, the UN mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP), with its limited capabilities, 
failed to implement this agreement. In the end, the new authorities in the 
North forced the overwhelming majority of remaining Greek Cypriots into 
the South (Sambanis 1999; Richmond and Ker- Lindsay 2001). 
The events of 1974 understandably angered Greek Cypriots and caused 
them much anxiety about their future. The Junta coup against Makarios 
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forced people to join opposing camps and fight against their co- ethnics; pun-
ishing coup participants was extremely difficult given the bitter history of 
internal Greek Cypriot antagonism between supporters and opponents of 
Makarios. The sense of betrayal reached a high when Turkey invaded Cyprus 
(Attalides 1979: 57– 79; Peristianis 1995: 131). At this point, the hitherto na-
tionalistic junta returned authority to politicians and abandoned a divided 
Cyprus to Turkey. The July 20, 1974, invasion is the equivalent for the Greek 
Cypriots of the al- Nakba Day for Palestinians commemorating their dis-
placement following the 1948 Palestine War (or the War of Independence for 
Israelis). For decades, the Greek Cypriots pointed to their displacement, 
missing persons and suffering following the invasion, emphasizing the ille-
gality of the army- controlled areas in the North (Joseph 1997; Sambanis 
1999; Ker- Lindsay 2011). Greek Cypriot soldiers returned from the battle-
field, bitter from having to fight against a superior enemy without mainland 
Greek support. Mock (2011) demonstrated how such symbols of defeat shape 
the construction of national identity in conflict- ridden zones around the 
globe. Significantly, the 1974 defeat also caused Greek Cypriots to challenge 
their unquestioned attachment to mainland Greek nationalism. 
Interestingly, while Greek Cypriots remained highly oppositional to Tur-
key, they attempted to accommodate Turkish Cypriot positions in the 1977– 
1979 High Level Agreements for a federal Cyprus (Peristianis 1998). In fact, 
one of the major postwar successes of the Greek Cypriot leadership was to 
overcome the enosis discourse and establish a new vision emphasizing a fed-
eral compromise which, since the 1990s, has been combined with the pros-
pect of Europeanization for the whole island. To meet these goals, the George 
Vasiliou and Glafkos Clerides presidencies (supported by ideological rivals 
AKEL and DISY respectively) fostered consensus on the need for close coop-
eration with moderate Greek governments, while Greek prime ministers 
Constantine Mitsotakis and Kostas Simitis offered support and political le-
gitimacy to compromises made during intercommunal negotiations (Clerides 
1989/1992, 2007; Bahcheli and Rizopoulos 1996). 
Overall, the decades following the 1974 invasion present a relatively com-
plex picture. The Cypriot conflict has generally been seen as frozen and in-
tractable (and rightly so), but as demonstrated in the Greek- Turkish 
Negotiations and Crises 1983– 2003 database there are limits to this view. 2 On 
the one hand, in the 1984– 1986, 1992, and 2002– 2004 periods, decisive UN 
mediations on the Cyprus problem almost led to a settlement (Groom 1986; 
Bolukbasi 1995; Richmond and Ker- Lindsay 2001; Faustmann 2004). 
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Unfortunately, they failed despite early promising signs. On the other hand, 
and more worrisomely, the two “motherlands” came close to an armed con-
frontation in 1977, 1987, and 1996, suggesting that the Cypriot conflict has 
contributed to a broader regional insecurity. With the exception of the past 
decade, Greece and Turkey have been in a near- war situation at least once 
every decade since their entry into NATO. 
Probably the most serious incident occurred in January 1996, when 
Greece and Turkey came close to a war over ownership of two uninhabited 
islands in the Aegean (the Imia/Kardak crisis). Following this incident, 
Clerides added a military angle to the already close relationship with Greece, 
emphasizing further the Joint Defense Doctrine that included stronger mili-
tary ties with Greece and purchase of S- 300 missiles from Russia (Prodro-
mou 1998; Kızılyürek 2006). Agreed on three years earlier by Andreas 
Papandreou and Clerides, the joint defense doctrine stipulated inclusion of 
Cyprus in the Greek defense plan, joint political decisions on the Cyprus 
issue, and Greek commitment to declare war on Turkey in the event of a fu-
ture military advance into Cyprus (Migdalovitz 2003). Through the deliber-
ate militarization of the conflict, Clerides aimed to turn international 
attention to the Cyprus problem while appeasing the nationalist- minded 
fraction of the Democratic Rally and courting votes from DIKO (Democratic 
Party) and Greek Cypriot Socialists associated with ruling PASOK (Panhel-
lenic Socialist Movement) in Greece (Hadjidemetriou 1999; Clerides 2007). 
The missiles gave Clerides a surprise victory in the 1998 presidential elec-
tions against George Iacovou; his subsequent decision to deploy the missiles 
not in Cyprus but in Crete marked the end of the Joint Defense Doctrine. 
Clerides later attributed both the purchase and cancellation to Greece and its 
changing “national priorities” (2007). As time went on, however, citing Greek 
national interests became an increasingly weak “political card” in legitimiz-
ing domestic politics in Cyprus, even within the national- minded Greek Cy-
priot center- right (Achniotis 1999: 11). 
Meanwhile, in the post- 1974 era, Turkish Cypriots initially saw the 
“motherland” troops as liberators. But these feelings waned the following de-
cade, because of the resulting international isolation, Turkey’s interference in 
Turkish Cypriot community affairs, economic stagnation, and uncontrolled 
naturalization of Turkish settlers/migrants (Lacher and Kaymak 2005). Ulti-
mately, the new conditions led many Turkish Cypriots to reconsider their 
unconditional loyalty to the policies of their national center (Sarıoğlu 1997; 
Bizden 1997). 
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During the 1980s, Turkish Cypriot opposition parties started making 
short- term electoral breakthroughs, thereby challenging ethnonationalism 
and the Denktaş/Eroğlu hold on power (Hatay 2005). Despite the weakening 
commitment of even Turkish Cypriot right- wingers to his leadership, Denk-
taş remained officially in control for decades, primarily through his strong 
connections with the Turkish political system. In 1983, he expedited the uni-
lateral declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 
against the wishes of many even in Ankara. The decision to declare a new 
state came at an unfortunate time for its instigators, as there was little indica-
tion of international support (no country except Turkey has recognized the 
TRNC since then). For the most part, the declaration aimed to keep Denktaş 
in power, and in this aim it succeeded (Turkmen 2003). Until 2003, Denktaş 
managed to hold onto Turkish support by appealing to the interests and emo-
tions of special interest groups in the “motherland,” including the Turkish 
military, ultranationalists, and influential elites across the political 
spectrum. 
On July 4, 1990, the Republic of Cyprus applied for membership in the 
European Union; the application was accepted by the Council and forwarded 
to the European Commission for consideration (Ker- Lindsay 2012a). De-
spite Turkish and Turkish Cypriot opposition, three years later, the Commis-
sion confirmed the eligibility of Cyprus for membership, and in June 1994, 
the Corfu European Council expressed its determination to include Cyprus 
in its next phase of enlargement without making settlement of the Cyprus 
problem a precondition (2012a; Joseph 1997; Eralp and Beriket 2005). On 
December 13, 1997, at the Luxembourg European Council, the member 
states decided Cyprus could begin the formal process of negotiating the con-
ditions of membership in the EU, while at the same time rejecting Turkey’s 
application for membership.
Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş continued to oppose the pro-
cess. However, the latter’s lack of cooperation in the Cyprus issue made ac-
cession to the EU more likely, an eventuality criticized at the time by leading 
Turkish commentators (Birand 2001; Kohen 2001). Meanwhile, the post- 
earthquake diplomacy of August 1999 allowed media and civil society net-
works to play a crucial role in improving the image of Greece in Turkey (and 
vice versa), creating a warmer climate between the two nations (Rumelili 
2007; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008). As Greek- Turkish relations improved, 
Greece lifted its veto of Turkey’s EU candidacy at the European Council 
Meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 (Ker- Lindsay 2007). 
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Then after the 2002 parliamentary elections in Turkey, the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan launched “fresh and 
constructive diplomatic initiatives” in the country’s foreign policy (Abramow-
itz and Barkey 2009). Closely related to these developments, Turkish- Cypriot 
civil society mobilized in 2002– 2004 to support a federal settlement com-
bined with EU membership; as a result of these mobilizations, the Turkish 
Republican Party (CTP) and its leader Mehmet Ali Talat gradually came to 
control almost all important posts in the Turkish Cypriot community by 
2005 (Sözen 2005). In the meantime and in response to the public demand 
for cooperation, in April 2003, Denktaş lifted his restrictions on travel across 
the so- called Green Line separating the two communities for decades and 
allowed members of the two communities to cross to each other’s sector for 
the first time since the island’s division in 1974. 
In early 2004, reunification talks resumed between Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot leaders. Although the leaders again failed to reach agree-
ment, they allowed UN secretary general Kofi Annan to prepare a plan for 
reunification. The drafters of the Annan Plan used their own experience from 
conflict resolution elsewhere, particularly from Switzerland, El Salvador, 
Bosnia, and Rwanda (De Soto and del Castillo 1994; Jones 2003; Cox and 
Garlick 2003). And as shown in the following chapters, the Plan produced a 
set of noteworthy innovations; Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders were the 
first to allow the UN secretary general the final arbitration role in completing 
the peace settlement, introducing it directly to the public in parallel referen-
dums without prior endorsement at the leadership level. Under the proposed 
Plan, Greek and Turkish Cypriots would have retained autonomy over most 
of their affairs under a decentralized federal system. Turkish Cypriots prom-
ised to return land to Greek Cypriot displaced persons in exchange for 
power- sharing, EU membership, and federal status within a reunited Cyprus 
(Michael 2009; Pericleous 2009; Sözen and Özersay 2007). 
The Annan Plan was partly crafted around the principle of constructive 
ambiguity, a set of terminological acrobatics that avoided direct conflict with 
perceived interests and declarations of each side. Constructive ambiguity al-
lows actors to perceive and frame the agreement as the first step toward achiev-
ing their own ultimate goals, rather than making a final or irreversible 
compromise. Mediators are often tempted to leave gaps in peace agreements to 
expedite the process, but these remaining ambiguities are likely to bring down 
an agreement at a later stage, as suggested by the example of Cypriot munici-
palities in the 1960s. On the one hand, if gaps had persisted on issues of daily 
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importance for both sides, for instance on provisions with regard to the set-
tlers, displaced persons, and power- sharing, a settlement in Cyprus would 
have suffered, as demonstrated in the following chapters. On the other, An-
nan’s principle of constructive ambiguity would have served the settlement 
well on more abstract matters such as the “continuity of the state” or “the prin-
ciples of sovereignty.” For one thing, these issues cannot be addressed easily 
unless there is an element of compromise in the language in the negotiated 
settlement. For another, if these issues become problematic in the future, their 
consequences will not have immediate implications on the ground, while their 
resolution will take place at international forums and courts where each side 
will inevitably have to moderate its positions to win international support. 
Although the Annan Plan initially had the qualified support of the two 
main Greek Cypriot political parties (AKEL and DISY) representing two thirds 
of the electorate, it was rejected by a landslide 76 percent of Greek Cypriots, 
while 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots approved it during the twin April 2004 
referendums. Surprisingly, DISY, whose ideological origins go back to the eno-
sis movement, supported the Plan under the leadership of Nicos Anastasiades, 
while traditionally pro- settlement AKEL rejected it in a last minute volte- face 
(Trimikliniotis 2006). Reunification did not take place, but in the following 
month Cyprus formally joined the EU as agreed a year earlier, following a 
number of unsuccessful attempts to convince Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots 
to settle the issue before the signing of the formal Treaty of Enlargement on 
April 16, 2013 (Ker- Lindsay 2011). As a result, the benefits of EU membership 
applied mostly to the Greek Cypriot community. The northern part remained 
officially part of the EU, but the acquis communautaire (European body of law) 
did not apply to the areas outside the control of the Republic of Cyprus. The 
majority of Turkish Cypriots maintained citizenship in the Republic of Cyprus 
and were entitled to travel and work in Europe, but the northern part of the is-
land could not initiate direct trade with or flights to third countries. 
Following the 2004 referendum, Turkish Cypriots argued for further eco-
nomic and political integration of the northern part of the island with the 
EU, but Greek Cypriots accommodated this demand only partly and even 
threatened to veto Turkey’s accession. They ultimately refrained from doing 
so despite Turkey’s refusal to extend full diplomatic recognition to the Re-
public. EU members decided to slow down accession talks in December 2006 
after Turkey’s reluctance to open its ports and extend trade privileges to the 
Republic of Cyprus. 
Efforts to reunify Cyprus resumed after the election of Demetris 
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Christofias from AKEL as president of the Republic of Cyprus in February 
2008. Despite some initial progress in the peace talks, Christofias failed to 
make the necessary ground- breaking decisions while Talat was in power. De-
lays caused a reversal in Turkish Cypriot electoral preferences, leading to the 
reelection of conservative Derviş Eroğlu in 2010. Progress in mediations has 
been slow during the Eroğlu period, and new problems have emerged as a 
result of disputes over natural gas explorations and the Eurozone debt crisis. 
With respect to the question of hydrocarbons, in 2011 a consortium of 
American and Israeli companies began explorations for oil and natural gas in 
the southern part of the island within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 
the republic. Interestingly, the traditionally pro- Palestinian Greek Cypriots 
have gradually developed stronger ties with Israel while Turkey, formerly Is-
rael’s closest ally in the neighborhood, has assumed a leadership role in advo-
cating the Palestinian cause. The issue of natural gas became critical with the 
spread of the Eurozone crisis and the near bankruptcy of the thriving Greek 
Cypriot economy in 2013, just weeks after Anastasiades’ election to the pres-
idency. Despite a promising start, negotiations between the two communities 
were also interrupted in October 2014 following the incursion of the Turkish 
seismic vessel Barbaros into the Cypriot exclusive economic zone. The emerg-
ing financial and geopolitical challenges have added another source of appre-
hension in the volatile Eastern Mediterranean region. The Greek Cypriots 
faced a double transition, very evocative of the post- communist era when the 
transition to a new economic model became a necessity at a time of escalat-
ing ethnopolitical challenges. 
The April 2015 election of Mustafa Akıncı with an outstanding 60.3 per-
cent of the vote brought renewed hopes for the settlement of the Cyprus 
problem. The new Turkish Cypriot leader is widely known for serving as the 
mayor of the Turkish Cypriot sector of divided Nicosia. As mentioned else-
where in the book, he and Lellos Demetriades resorted to an ad hoc set of 
arrangements in the 1980s to address the city’s impending environmental di-
saster in the absence of a sewer system. A couple of years back few would 
have expected that a retired politician associated with a small leftist party 
would make a resounding comeback to politics. But as noted in the introduc-
tion, the Cypriot public has frequently questioned partition by electing 
prominent pro- unification figures. Leaders however have yet to turn this 
public mandate into a publically endorsed peace settlement. This is not un-
common in divided societies especially those in problematic geopolitical 
neighborhoods.
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Cyprus has a contentious history, to say the least, and only its broad out-
lines can be included here. Marc Ross has demonstrated the importance of 
using the divergence of historical narratives in contemporary ethnopolitical 
conflicts (2007) as a starting point in discussions of conflict management. 
Inspired by his presentation of ethnonationalist narratives, Table 1 summa-
rizes the main events in recent Cypriot history and shows how each commu-
nity generally represents these in its narrative.
The Annan Plan and Its Critics
With the broader historical framework now constructed, each side’s argu-
ments for or against the most significant UN mediation attempt in Cyprus 
(the Annan Plan) can now be evaluated. The Annan Plan is undeniably a 
turning point in the history of negotiations in Cyprus and a broadly exam-
ined case study in the wider academic literature. While scholarly studies 
have concentrated on structural or institutional dimensions in explaining 
successes and failures of accommodation systems (Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 
1993; Schneckener 2002), they have not considered oppositional framing 
between advocates and critics in the context of peacemaking. The second 
part of this chapter addresses the critiques against the Annan Plan as well 
as subsequent efforts for a peace settlement in the island, including the Feb-
ruary 2014 joint statement focusing in particular on the public discourse 
surrounding the introduction of federalism and consociationalism in 
Cyprus. 
In summary, there are three main anti- federalist arguments focusing on 
past legacies of coercive power- sharing, its capacity to deliver a fair settle-
ment toward each community and, more important, its viability in Cyprus as 
a whole. Conventional wisdom assumes that countries with first- hand expe-
rience of the collapse of power- sharing agreements will be more reluctant to 
adopt renewed federal or consociational arrangements.3 The problem is not 
specific to Cyprus. As shown in the next chapter, societies who have experi-
enced federal and consociational collapses or have witnessed failures in their 
immediate neighborhood tend to hesitate when debating their own power- 
sharing transitions. In any event, failures in its immediate region have (mis)
informed political debates at home in Cyprus, and no “regional or interna-
tional model” has been identified in the public discourse to inspire the is-
land’s reunification process.
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Table 1: Selected Greek and Turkish Cypriot Narratives 




Ottoman conquest 1570–71 Ottomans cut ties to 
Europe and rule Greek 
Cypriots
Ottomans bring tolerance and 
stability to island 
British rule (Berlin 
Congress)
1878 First step toward union 
with Greece
Cyprus remains nominally an 
Ottoman territory until 1925 
Enosis (union) with 
Greece vs. Taksim 
(partition)
1955–59 Struggle for self-
determination and 
union with Greece 
(“Enosis and only 
Enosis”)





1959–60 Independence begins in 
1960 but enosis remains 
a goal
Power-sharing agreement but  





1963–64 Turks revolt against the 
legitimate state and 
form armed enclaves
Greeks break agreement and force  
Turkish Cypriots into enclaves 
Kofinou Crisis 1967 Turkey threatens to 
invade Cyprus as in 
1964
Greek National Guard attacks  
enclave of Kofinou
Greek junta coup 1974 
(July 15)
NATO-backed junta 
coup targets Makarios 
and Greek Cypriot 
democrats 
Greek coup aims to eliminate  
Turkish Cypriots




Turkey invades and 
occupies about 40 
percent of island
Turkish motherland saves Turkish  
Cypriots 
Vienna Agreement 1975 Turks violate agreement 
to displace another 
20,000, total of 165,000 
since 1974






1977 Cyprus will be reunited, 
independent, and 
nonaligned 
Freedom of settlement will be 
restricted  
for practical reasons 
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Ten-point  
Agreement 
1979 Human rights, 
demilitarization, and 
return of Varosha






provocation by Turkey 
and Denktaş
Self-determination for Turkish 
Cypriot people
Pérez de Cuéllar  
UN mediation
1984–86 Main GC parties 
support the Plan which 
is rejected by President 
Kyprianou and Greece 
Denktaş accepts versions of the 
proposal although with reservations
Aegean oil crisis 1987 Turkey objects to 
sovereign Greek rights 
on oil exploration 
Aegean Sea cannot be a Greek lake. 
Ghali Set of Ideas 1992 Mostly positive but 
requires further 
mediation
Few positives but mostly favors 
other side
Imia/Kardak crisis 1996 Turkey extends 
territorial ambitions to 
Aegean
Greece threatens sovereign Turkish  
rights 
S-300 missile crisis 1997 Self-defense a sovereign 
right of the Republic of 
Cyprus
Militarization poses existential 
threats 
EU accession talks 
start
1998 Cyprus cannot be 
excluded from EU due 
to Denktaş’ 
intransigence
EU accession violates community 
veto rights 
Annan Plan 
referendum and  
EU accession
2004 Plan has been 
unworkable and unfair, 
thus voted down by the 
people
Turkish Cypriots remain in isolation 
despite their endorsement of Plan
UN (Downer) 
mediation
2008 Future settlement 
should be different from 
Annan Plan






2012 Sovereign right of the 
Republic of Cyprus
A bicommunal issue to be decided 




2014 Significant first step in 
the process of Cypriot 
reunification 




As stated earlier, during the Annan Plan referendum, critics drew paral-
lels between its proposals for the reunification of Cyprus and the Zürich- 
London Agreements that led to the establishment and subsequent collapse of 
the Republic of Cyprus (Coufoudakis 2004; American Hellenic Institute 
2004). For instance, in an influential London Review of Books essay criticizing 
the Annan Plan, renowned historian Perry Anderson mentions the 1959 
Agreements which give birth to the first Cypriot constitution: “The constitu-
tion of Zurich had proved unworkable enough, leading only to communal 
strife and breakdown. The constitution of Bürgenstock [the Annan Plan], far 
more complicated and still more inequitable, was a recipe for yet greater ran-
cor and paralysis” (2008). Even when such parallels are not explicitly made, it 
is inevitable that past memories and legacies directly and indirectly influence 
decisions for the future. 
While common, this analogy is of dubious value. Actors who look at their 
immediate neighborhood or earlier historical experience often misapply “the 
correct lessons of that case to a new situation which differs from it in import-
ant respects” (George 1992: 464). It is questionable whether the Zürich- 
London Agreements per se offer a substantial comparison with current or 
recent proposals for a bizonal bicommunal federation in Cyprus. The type of 
the proposed institutional arrangements, the nature of Cypriot society and 
politics then and today, not to mention the international environment influ-
encing Cyprus, are simply not comparable. To compare them is to set up a 
false analogy (George 1980; Jervis 1968, 1976).
As scholars of federalism argue, the study of failed federations does not 
offer concrete lessons to guarantee future successes in federation building 
(Burgess 2012: 227). In fact, other prominent scholars in the field, such as 
T. M. Franck (1968: 171– 96), stress the limitations of their own extensive 
studies investigating why federations succeed or fail; they emphasize what 
academics and policy- makers “could not learn” (emphasis in original) and 
point to the dangers of “false analogies” (see also Burgess 2012: 227). As 
shown below, reasoning by analogy can be beneficial if old and new situa-
tions are truly comparable, but analogies can be misleading, if the situations 
are only superficially similar. 
A major difference between contemporary Cypriot politics and the poli-
tics of earlier decades is how communities have evolved socially and politi-
cally. Today’s Cyprus is far removed from the 1960s era of political 
assassinations and disappearances, not to mention the indiscriminate and 
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unpunished killings of ordinary civilians simply because they were “Greeks” 
or “Turks” (Loizos 1988). In the eyes of most Greek Cypriots, the birth of the 
Cypriot Republic was preceded by a period of intercommunal violence, the 
imprisonment of suspected EOKA sympathizers in camps manned by Turk-
ish Cypriot auxiliary forces to the British colonizers, and forced dislocations 
of populations among both communities living in mixed areas (Mallinson 
2005; Patrick 1976). By way of contrast, they now have had decades of almost 
zero violence and even amicable encounters between Greek and Turkish Cy-
priots, accelerated by the opening of the checkpoints in 2003. Admittedly, 
grievances persist and will continue even after the settlement; however, these 
will be more easily addressed today than half a century ago, as both commu-
nities enjoy stable political systems, have become more accountable to Euro-
pean and international legal norms, and have developed more effective and 
professional policing mechanisms. 
In addition, comparisons of UN proposals such as the Annan Plan with 
the Zürich- London Agreements are often made without distinguishing be-
tween the two forms of power- sharing: consociationalism and federalism 
(Lijphart 1979). As stated in the Introduction, consociationalism refers to 
decision- making within the central government; among other characteris-
tics, it requires that power be divided between majorities and minorities, 
thereby implying mutual veto rights (Lijphart 1977; McGarry and O’Leary 
1993). Federalism implies a territorial dimension and refers to situations 
where authority is divided between central and provincial governments, with 
both enjoying constitutionally separate competencies (O’Leary 2001b: 49– 
52). As stated in the introduction, the first Cypriot constitution stipulated a 
consociational settlement, as in Lebanon, while any settlement proposed in 
Cyprus since 1974 has contained both consociational and federal features, as 
in Belgium and Switzerland. 
Economic development is another important factor, as federations are 
unlikely to fail in developed countries (O’Leary 2001a: 284). Snyder argues 
that ethnic federalism has a “terrible track record” (2001: 37), a statement 
criticized by McGarry and O’Leary as greatly exaggerated given relevant ex-
amples from both the developed and developing world (2009b: 5). In fact, no 
federation has fallen apart in an economically developed democratic society 
since World War II. Inevitably, the economy can play a moderating role, as it 
brings together several overlapping interests and creates a strong incentive 
for all parties to maintain peace. In Cyprus, intercommunal fighting in the 
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1960s would have been much more costly for the two communities if it had 
meant the destruction of the tourism and real estate industries. In a similar 
case, with the 1995 Quebec referendum (a result of the failure of the Char-
lottetown Accord in a popular referendum three years earlier), the economy 
and economic interests played a key role in maintaining Quebec’s future in 
Canada (Johnston et al. 1996; Young 1995). Finally, in Cyprus, critics of a 
federal settlement emphasizing financial constraints, such as former Central 
Bank director Christodoulos Christodoulou (2009), have failed to anticipate 
followed for the economy, banking in particular, once Cyprus was deprived 
of critical allies in the European Union.4
By extension, an intelligently designed future peace process will link eco-
nomic considerations with the peace settlement. The Greek Cypriot side has 
enjoyed impressive economic progress since 1974, while Turkey’s GDP tri-
pled in AKP’s decade in power, with the country counted among the 20 larg-
est economies of the planet.5 Even with acute financial cuts as a result of the 
Eurozone crisis, Cypriots (particularly in the areas controlled by the Repub-
lic) enjoy one of the highest standards of living among societies in conflict 
zones. Since the 1970s, both sides have shown good levels of economic devel-
opment; arguably, Greek Cypriot wealth could have provided the resources 
and confidence to win Turkish Cypriot support for the settlement even 
among conservative voters. Both sides have developed the human and mate-
rial infrastructure to capitalize on the benefits of a federal reunification, and 
for decades supporters of reunification have advocated shared prosperity in a 
joint federation. Yet the island’s economic performance has yet to become a 
catalyst for a peace settlement, partly due to arguments by opponents con-
cerning the viability of the settlement and partly because the type of institu-
tional arrangements proposed did not eliminated worst- case scenarios feared 
by undecided voters on both sides of the divide. 
Decentralized Federation
For the most part, a decentralized federation will address many of these fears, 
not only in the economic sphere but also in daily politics. Contrary to the 
critics’ logic, a consociational agreement combined with two federal units in 
Cyprus could be more stable and functional than post- independence Cy-
prus. Under past and current mediation proposals, each community could 
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run its own domestic affairs, ranging from road infrastructure to health and 
social welfare. With less demand for common decision- making in most areas 
of daily public life, there would be less opportunity for acrimony. Constituent 
states would maintain a degree of flexibility in their engagement with the 
central government; they could decide to share the costs and benefits of new 
infrastructure (e.g. a specialized hospital unit or sewerage system in a major 
urban center) or they could resort to separate albeit more costly infrastruc-
ture programs. 
Following this line of thought, future proposals for a settlement should 
build even further on the merits and prospects of a decentralized political 
system. This would address many of the fears of those who remain hesitant to 
endorse a peace settlement in Cyprus. Decentralization could be an effective 
point of convergence in mediations; it has been historically advocated by 
Turkish Cypriot leaders and more recently endorsed by DISY, the largest po-
litical force in the Greek Cypriot community (Necatigil 1989; Yesilada and 
Sozen 2002; Clerides 2011). A decentralized federation follows the subsidi-
ary principle whereby authority devolves to the most appropriate level to fa-
cilitate improved financial, social and other administrative services. 
Widely accepted in EU structures, this principle allows local communi-
ties an effective say in their daily issues (Golub 1996; Elazar 2001). The more 
decentralized a federation is, the more space it allows for each community to 
run its own domestic affairs. As shown below, decentralization at the provin-
cial and municipal levels leads to less demand for common decision- making 
in most areas of daily public life; hence there is less chance of a bicommunal 
deadlock. 
The principle of subsidiarity implies that decisions on decentralization 
are shaped according to financial, sociopolitical, and technocratic criteria 
specific to the context, economic features, and comparative advantages of 
each constituent unit rather than ideology (Jordan 2000). Even though the 
Cypriot leaders interpret decentralization in rather different ways, by engag-
ing with technical lessons and experiences from other societies they might be 
able to identify the common ground. Past failures of federal systems (in de-
veloping or former communist countries) could be attributed to the fact that 
essential market criteria in decentralizing were undermined by nationalist 
ideology or, in the case of the former communist countries, the Leninist doc-
trine on federalism that favored ethnopolitical decentralization over eco-
nomic integration among federations (Connor 1984). In the former 
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communist federations such as the USSR and Yugoslavia, each constituent 
state was forced, for the most part, into self- sufficiency in terms of outputs 
and infrastructure, with minimal economic interdependence among the re-
publics; for instance, investment by the richer Slovenia in the poorer Kosovo 
was discouraged since exploiting cheaper labor markets was seen as violating 
the communist doctrine (Stefanovic 2008b). 
By way of contrast, the subsidiarity principle in decentralized federations 
relies less on ideology and more on evidence- based performance. It provides 
constituent states with alternative options and incentives; they can decide to 
share the costs and benefits of a new infrastructure project or work inde-
pendently with the risk of duplicating efforts and costs. The subsidiarity prin-
ciple allows flexibility across sectors, issues and periods of relative turbulence 
in financial markets. 
As stated above, critics often confuse decentralization with confederation 
(see Altinay and Bowen 2006). According to O’Leary, in a federation “the 
federal and regional governments are co- sovereign whereas in a confedera-
tion the member states retain sovereignty” (2005: 51). A confederal arrange-
ment has no direct implications on sharing power; instead, its primary 
emphasis is the rights of constituent units to form a treaty of union and, if 
that fails, to legally secede and be recognized as an independent UN member 
state. 
According to Watts, it is even possible to have a centralized confedera-
tion with more powers assigned to it than a decentralized federation. In 
some respects, the EU (a confederation) is more centralized in its central 
bureaucratic regulations than the Canadian federation (Watts 1998a). Un-
like confederations, a decentralized federation implies no sovereign rights. 
By prohibiting partition or secession or any other unilateral change to the 
state of affairs as well as by reasserting the single sovereignty of united Cy-
prus, the February 2014 joint statement between Anastasiades and Eroğlu 
confirms without any doubt that a reunited Cyprus will be a federation and 
not a confederation. A highly decentralized (and asymmetrical) federation 
such as Spain does not permit secession, while past communist federations 
have been highly centralized in some respects (e.g., through control by the 
central party) but ambiguously confederal in constitutional terms, thereby 
rendering themselves vulnerable to secessionist demands. A confederal or 
fairly ambiguous constitution might ceteris paribus enable third countries 
to recognize seceding republics, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia fol-
lowing the decision of the Badinter committee (Pellet 1992; McGarry 2011). 
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Yet the recognitions of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia should 
be treated as exceptions in guiding policy- makers in Cyprus, as those have 
deviated extensively from default policies and international norms on de-
laying or (non)recognizing new state entities (Moore 1998; Ker- Lindsay 
2011b). 
At the same time, the new federal Cyprus and other aspiring federations 
aiming to transcend de facto partitions should be particularly sensitive to 
lessons from elsewhere. Following decades of separation, central govern-
ments should not aim for extensive powers, as critics argue, to force public 
support for a federal project. A centralized and “dominant ethnicity” govern-
ment will encourage, not prevent secession, as suggested by the examples of 
interwar Spain, Nigeria in the decade following its independence, post- 1971 
Pakistan, Milošević’s Yugoslavia, or Ukraine in 2014, to name only a few 
examples. 
Rather than creating a dysfunctional centralized administration, aspir-
ing federations could rely on constitutional provisions and external secu-
rity guarantees to prevent secession or the breakdown of intercommunal 
relations. But as the experience of the Zürich- London Agreements suggests, 
such guarantees could be ineffective, even detrimental, if the two sides fail 
to incentivize each other’s cooperation in a settlement. Thus, it is more im-
portant in a future Cypriot settlement to have limited but secure and effec-
tive areas of authority, endowed with the necessary financial resources and 
competent public sector officials to meet long- term challenges. In other 
words, public expectations and competences should not exceed the re-
sources available to the federal government. Likewise, central governments 
should not entertain unrealistic expectations in eliminating, for instance, 
per capita income inequalities, as such inequalities have not vanished in 
mature federations with centuries of experience in managing ethnofederal 
tensions. 
The principle of subsidiarity and decentralization does not merely apply 
to federal units; it applies equally well to other levels of regional government. 
Unlike “loose federations,” a decentralized federation does not eliminate ef-
fective governance in areas of security, citizenship and foreign policy. Indeed, 
as the Swiss experience illustrates, to implement municipal decentralization, 
central governments often must have the designated authority to do so 
(Steiner 2003; Mueller 2012). 
Some scholars argue that the “medicine” of decentralization could end up 
being “poison,” if decentralization becomes so excessive that any interaction 
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among constituent states is restricted (Hechter 2000: 151– 52; see also cri-
tique in Stefanovic 2008b). Yet this argument has its limits, as it assumes cen-
tral governments are the only agents responsible for maintaining a unified 
federation; in fact, in Cyprus, citizen initiatives, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, multiethnic political parties, local governments, cross- community 
universities, and joint economic ventures might be equally important and 
possibly more effective venues in maintaining the federal identity of the re-
unified island. And as the chapter demonstrates in postcolonial Cyprus, it 
was the failure to accept decentralization even for municipalities that trig-
gered the collapse of power- sharing in 1963– 1964 and partly lay behind the 
failure to restart it between 1968 and 1974. 
With regard to future lessons for a reunited Cyprus, the literature and 
international experience are limited in their recommendations on decentral-
ization. As Lijphart admits, “Experts have no clear advice to offer on how 
much decentralization is desirable within the federation, and there is no con-
sensus among them as to whether the American, Canadian, Indian, Austra-
lian, German, Swiss, or Austrian model is most worthy of being emulated” 
(2008: 84). Thresholds cannot be determined from international experience, 
since federations decentralize in different forms (e.g., budgetary, territorial, 
administrative) that are difficult to quantify. Likewise, Bermeo argues, “Ex-
pecting uniform results from federalist institutions is particularly unwise be-
cause federalism involves a constellation of institutions that can take 
majoritarian or consensual forms” (Bermeo 2004: 479– 80).
Decentralization in a reunited Cyprus (unlike loose federation) does not 
eliminate the unifying elements essential to maintain the legitimacy and sta-
bility of a federal state. Rather, a decentralized federation emphasizes, en-
hances, and localizes unifying elements across various levels of government, 
from the central administration to the municipal level. This is often described 
in the literature as “cascading federalism,” whereby power- sharing principles 
that apply to the central government translate to similar consociational struc-
tures at the level of the constituent states, as well as municipalities (Bieber 
2006). As federal systems provide more layers of government, there are also 
more settings for peaceful bargaining (Bermeo 2004: 475).
In Cyprus, cascading federalism would be able to balance the concerns of 
each side. The Greek Cypriot community might object to power- sharing with 
Turkish Cypriots if Greek Cypriot returnees were denied basic minority rights 
under the Turkish Cypriot administration, but cascading federalism could 
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resolve the issue. Cascading forms of power- sharing appear in many federa-
tions and consociations. Experience with the Forum of Cities in Transition 
has highlighted to the author the importance of such local power- sharing en-
gagements. During the Forum’s international meetings, municipal councilors 
from Northern Ireland’s SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party) have 
demonstrated how municipal power- sharing in their city preceded the 1998 
Good Friday agreement. The rationale for this early power- sharing experi-
ment stemmed, according to SDLP municipality representatives, from John 
Hume’s invaluable contribution to the province’s peace process. For Hume 
power- sharing had to be equally exercised at different levels. If Irish National-
ists demanded power- sharing across Northern Ireland, they could only justify 
their position by offering similar arrangements to Ulster Unionists in cities 
such as Derry/Londonderry where Unionists were a minority.6 Likewise, in 
the future, Turkish Cypriots might offer Greek Cypriot returnees to Girne/
Kyrenia municipality guaranteed representation in the city’s municipality 
and, as in Derry/Londonderry, the position of vice- mayor. 
Such arrangements can apply in other divided societies to address popu-
lar misperceptions of power- sharing (identified in the next chapter for post- 
Ottoman successor states). In fact, during my fieldwork in Diyarbakir in 
April 2012, I made a similar proposal to Kurdish BDP (Peace and Democracy 
Party) suggesting shared municipal governments in places where the BDP 
won the majority vote as a means of gradually raising awareness of the merits 
of power- sharing for the whole of Turkey. 
A cascading decentralized federation could address these challenges at 
the level of constituent states and municipalities. The experience of post-
conflict societies, particularly in the Balkans, has shown municipalities to 
be effective local institutions in managing ethnic conflict (Koneska 2012). 
People are more likely to resolve disputes at the local level, not necessarily 
because they trust each other more but because the benefits of collaboration 
are immediate, tangible, and obvious. Decentralization at the municipal 
level in a reunited Cyprus would have multiple applications in, for instance, 
a reunited Nicosia, a properly reconstructed Famagusta, and the new twin 
towns of Morphou and (Yeni) Güzelyurt (to be relocated farther north). The 
fact that more than half the population of Cyprus will reside in these cities is 
a unique feature and distinct advantage of Cypriot federalism; however, 
none of the previous UN proposals have built on this feature to incentivize 
the settlement or, at a minimum, to provide the institutional formulas to 
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avoid problems of municipal government similar to those encountered in 
the 1960s. 
Municipal interdependency could be a major stimulus to building federal 
unity in Cyprus. Moreover, following the general principles of decentralized 
federalism, as in previous plans, there could be villages with special rights 
and administrative status in Karpasia, Kokkina, and the Maronite villages; 
some municipalities in the Turkish Cypriot sector might have substantial 
Greek Cypriot communities that would also be major beneficiaries of 
decentralization. 
A decentralized federation is more likely to enable return among dis-
placed Greek Cypriots (see also Chapter 4). For one thing, the Greek Cypriot 
side will be in a better position to negotiate improved human rights for the 
displaced if it satisfies the longstanding Turkish Cypriot position for decen-
tralization. Contrary to the logic of the critics, there could be a win- win link-
age between decentralization, human rights and economic transfers. For 
another, an international body of norms (for example, the Lund recommen-
dations that Turkey was instrumental in shaping) emphasizes the need for 
minority rights protection through municipal arrangements (OSCE 1999; 
Packer 2000). Such legal instruments suggest the need for bilingual policies 
within a municipality, if a certain percentage of its inhabitants belong to a 
different linguistic group or have an indigenous claim. This arguably be-
comes an undeniable right if these inhabitants are natives to the land or for-
merly displaced persons. 
Finally, diverting authorities and resources toward municipalities would 
enable these locales to draw on EU funds for joint infrastructure projects. 
Indeed, some Cypriot municipalities have already benefited from joint op-
portunities, and a level of local competence is already established. There is 
little need for the federal government to micro- manage either the Nicosia or 
Famagusta municipalities, if each can do well on its own, securing external 
funds for projects that favor peace, reconstruction and reconciliation. In-
stead, the central federal government could have a limited but important role 
in further incentivizing such projects elsewhere by providing the necessary 
matching funds. 
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Conclusion
Overall, the chapter demonstrates how the failure of Cypriot consociational-
ism in the 1960s was overdetermined by a number of factors, such as the 
forced nature of the “consociational partnership” and highly problematic se-
curity provisions. There were many ambiguities in the Zürich- London Agree-
ments affecting daily issues and no credible arbitration mechanism to 
transcend the mutual vetos of the Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cy-
priot vice- president. The Agreements suffered from significant gaps, not only 
in constitutional but also in critical security provisions by failing to secure 
the presence of international peacekeepers to deter any perceived, attempted 
or recognized violation. 
Sadly, their perhaps inevitable breakdown adversely affected the future 
prospects of a bicommunal Cyprus. Countries with prior experience of 
forced power- sharing or its violent collapse are more hesitant in adopting 
renewed federal or consociational arrangements. Inevitably, Cypriots drew 
on past failures and possessed no regional successful example to inspire fed-
eral reunification, a critical gap that is highly relevant to other divided societ-
ies in the region, as I demonstrate in the next chapter. 
Any future settlement in Cyprus could benefit from institutional innova-
tions, looking at the design of federal and consociational arrangements 
around the world and adapting them to Cyprus. Simply stated, federal insti-
tutions should identify and emphasize the unique features, needs, and advan-
tages of each case. Contrary to Horowitz’s (1999) claim that power- sharing 
democracy is a crude “one size fits all” model (see also criticisms in Lijphart 
2004), there is enormous variation in the design and application of federal 
and consociational models on which Cyprus could draw. This applies at both 
the macro and micro levels of governance and, as the chapter demonstrates, a 
decentralized federation has better prospects, judging from recent Cypriot 
history. More importantly, as the following chapters show, the reunification 
of Cyprus should not be the exclusive responsibility of the federal state; 
rather, constituent states, municipalities, businesses and civil society should 
play a part. 
Inevitably, the transformation of the Cyprus problem through a decen-
tralized federation would provide an invaluable model not only for other di-
vided societies but also for the much- needed transformation of conflicts in 
the region surrounding the island. As the next chapter argues, commonalities 
46 Chapter 1
in the experience of Cyprus and the successor states of the post- Ottoman 
Empire occur at different levels and offer the potential for comparisons and 
extensive lesson drawing. With civil wars escalating in the region, a reunited 
Cyprus could provide a viable and valuable federal model for others in the 
Balkans and the Middle East. 
C h a p t e r  2 
The Region’s Federal Movements: Why Did 
(post-)Ottoman States Fail in Sharing Power?
Each one in its faith to live as free
To the glory of the war jointly to rush 
Bulgarians and Arvanites, Armenians and Greeks
Blacks and Whites in a joint stream. 
— Rigas Velestinlis (1757– 1798)
The Country of the Arabs is my fatherland,
From Damascus to Baghdad,
From Nejd to Yemen,
To Egypt and Tetuan. 
— Fakhri al- Barudi (1886– 1966)
Federalist ideas are not unknown to the modern descendants of the Ottoman 
Empire and its successor states: almost every movement or national commu-
nity in the region has its own version of an imagined federalism. Velentsilis’s 
early federalist and revolutionary writings cited above are found throughout 
Greek and Greek Cypriot national historiography, as are federalist equiva-
lents in Southern Slav, Arab, and Turkish post- Ottoman narratives. Histori-
cally, the communities in the post- Ottoman space have entertained “federal 
ideas” as a means of addressing ethnic diversity or mitigating conflicting na-
tional aspirations (Stavrianos 1959; Banac 1984; Dawisha 2003). Advocates 
have promoted federalism or related institutional arrangements as an alter-
native to war, arbitrary partition, violent assimilation, ethnic cleansing, or 
48 Chapter 2 
genocide. Despite their apparent popularity, for the most part federalist en-
gagements have not been successful; post- Ottoman societies could not es-
cape wars and violent conflict that left bitter memories across divided 
communities and new national borders. 
Surprisingly, neither the intensity of these conflicts nor the resulting anti- 
nationalist narratives have reshaped national ideologies to embrace federal-
ism. In this chapter, I aim to situate Cyprus in its broader (post- Ottoman) 
neighborhood comprising parts of the Balkan and the broader Middle East-
ern regions. The chapter aims to identify regional patterns in power- sharing 
thereby making a contribution to the growing debate on the origins and im-
plementation of federal and consociational settlements (Watts 2002; Mc-
Garry and O’Leary 2005; Rector 2009; Burgess 2012). Much of the analysis of 
the Cypriot conflict has either focused on the island itself or the late 
twentieth- century politics of the “motherlands” with little attention to the 
broader neighborhood surrounding Cyprus. 
Looking at federal and consociational engagements in the post- Ottoman 
lands and successor states, the chapter questions their “relative failure” de-
spite conditions that would predict otherwise. In fact, the region has pro-
duced few “successful” cases, while it contains a number of notable failures 
despite the political and normative merits of power- sharing arrangements 
(Haklai 2011). Drawing on comparative historical analysis, the chapter ad-
dresses these conundrums and offers explanations as to why post- Ottoman 
societies, including Cyprus, have yet to benefit from power- sharing arrange-
ments. While recognizing a set of alternative explanations relating to post- 
Ottoman social or institutional structures, pressure from western 
superpowers, perverse colonial effects and the dominance of nondemocratic 
regimes, I argue that ideational barriers have an equally important weight in 
explaining federal deadlocks and consociational failures. Specifically, analo-
gies with a nation’s past or its immediate region have (mis)informed political 
debates particularly in the absence of a successful regional model that could 
be otherwise identified to inspire power- sharing solutions.
The Ottoman Empire: The Legacy
Scholars argue that the Ottoman Empire’s institutions preserved ethnic and 
religious cultural diversity for centuries (Inalcik 1973; Shaw 1977; Karpat 
1985) and thus should have provided the antecedents for federal and 
The Region’s Federal Movements 49
consociational administrations either in the late Ottoman state or its succes-
sor states (Kedourie 1956, 1960, 1968, 1970; Peristianis and Vural 2010). Lij-
phart emphasizes the importance of past institutional legacies in the success 
of subsequent power- sharing arrangements. Specifically, his “tradition of 
elite accommodation” argument identifies such legacies as a favorable condi-
tion for consociationalism (1977: 99– 104). However, Lijphart does not elabo-
rate on alternative (mis)uses of historical traditions and how memories or 
competing nationalist interpretations of the past might matter.1 A “tradition 
of elite accommodation” might have been present but misinterpreted by 
dominant nationalist ideologies. I therefore proffer an amended interpreta-
tion: a selective negation of past power- sharing legacies might obstruct fu-
ture power- sharing settlements. 
The Ottoman legacy of accommodation offers a critical case study to ad-
dress debates on power- sharing and its ideational origins. Kedourie describes 
the Empire as “impervious to ideology and doctrinaire adventure” and 
praises its imperial tolerance under which Muslims, Christians and Jews 
lived in harmony for ages: although far from perfect, he argues the Ottoman 
Empire could have transformed to address its ethnic and religious diversity 
(Kedourie 1960, 1968, 1970).2 Yet Kedourie and other scholars have framed 
the puzzle too narrowly: the Ottomans were not the only ones to fail; their 
successor states and sub- units had also little success with federal and conso-
ciational arrangements. By contrasting and comparing federal and consocia-
tional engagements in the region across different historical periods and levels 
of analysis among successor states or sub- units of the Ottoman Empire, we 
can discern some broadly generalizable patterns, leading us closer to the root 
causes of the failures of power- sharing, as well as its prospects in the region. 
As Walt argues, theoretical clarity is essential before prescribing responses 
and evaluating the impact of different policies (2005: 23). With such clarity, 
we can begin to examine how specific institutional designs might better fit 
the region’s legacies and institutional heritage. 
Imagining Federalism 
In the last decades of the Ottoman empire and its immediate aftermath, a mul-
tiplicity of popular federal movements emerged in the region, along with na-
tionalist ideologies, as for example, among the Balkan nations (Stavrianos 
1959), Southern Slavs (Banac 1983, 1984), Macedonians (Rossos 2008), Greeks 
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and Turks (Anagnostopoulou 1997; Veremis 1989), Israelis and Palestinians 
(Yiftachel 2006) and pan- Arab nationalists (Ajami 1978; Dawisha 2003). Un-
surprisingly, the cases of the Southern Slavs and pan- Arabism have received 
broader scholarly and public attention. In the latter case, corresponding fed-
eral engagements have failed to endure even among the imagined pan- Arab 
community arguably sharing a common ethnicity, language and national 
 ideology— and despite the enormous political, military, and economic ad-
vantages of such (federal) unity. Quoting experts discussing the prospects of 
Pan- Arabism in the region, Lustick says emphatically: 
A Pan- Arab state . . .  would include a total area of 13.7 million square 
kilometers, second only to the Soviet Union and considerably larger 
than Europe, Canada, China, or the United States. . . .  By 2000 it 
would have more people than either of the two superpowers. This 
state would contain almost two- thirds of the world’s proven oil re-
serves. It would also have enough capital to finance its own economic 
and social development. Access to a huge market could stimulate 
rapid industrial growth. The aggregate military strength and political 
influence of this strategically located state would be formidable. . . .  It 
is easy to comprehend why this dream has long intoxicated Arab na-
tionalists. (Lustick 1997: 653)
The United Arab Republic was a popular but short- lived attempt to move in 
this direction. Other potentially federalizable units of the empire have also 
failed, as for instance, the long- aspired federation among the Balkan people, 
or more specifically, among the South Slavs, including as the Habsburg and 
Ottoman Štokavian speakers; the latter dialect effectively “united” the Serbo- 
Croat- Bonsiak linguistic world and set the stage for the political union of the 
Southern Slavs. Nonetheless, the former Yugoslavia did not succeed in main-
taining its “federal unity” despite the shared language and rich intellectual 
traditions of Yugoslavism. While western media initially pointed to its ethnic 
diversity as a cause of its violent breakdown, federalism was equally short- 
lived among the “ethnically related” Serbs and Montenegrins (Ramet 2006). 
Likewise, the attempt to federalize Libya in three main provinces lasted only 
about a decade (1951– 1963). Following Muammar Gaddafi’s takeover in 
1969, federal options between Libya and its neighbors were negotiated, first 
with Egypt and Syria, and then with Tunisia, but both ended up in acrimony 
(Dawisha 2003). Iraq and Sudan are the latest manifestations of failed 
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power- sharing arrangements in the post- Ottoman space. In the latter’s case, 
O’Leary (2012: 515) attributes this failure to the North Sudanese choice of 
“downsizing” (opting for a smaller and more homogeneous Sudan than the 
compromises by a pluralist federation). The argument is not irrelevant for 
elsewhere including Cyprus as “downsizing” (recognizing partition) has be-
come an option for a segment of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot public opin-
ion as shown in relevant polls (Cyprus2015 2012). 
Meanwhile, early consociational attempts in the region’s smaller multi-
ethnic states, such as Cyprus (Kyriakides 1968; Markides 1977) and Lebanon 
(Zahar 2005; Dekmejian 1978), also led to violent breakdowns. Both cases 
commonly feature as major examples of unsuccessful consociationalism in 
the relevant literature (Schneckener 2000; Lijphart 1996). As discussed ear-
lier, Cyprus is particularly puzzling, as reunification talks have failed to reach 
a comprehensive settlement despite a signed agreement on bicommunal fed-
eralism since 1977– 1979, strong pro- federalist positions embraced by at least 
three main political parties in the island, and proactive involvement of inter-
national and regional organizations including the UN and EU (Richmond 
2005; Anastasiou 2008; Ker- Lindsay 2011). 
Nor has federalism emerged in larger or fairly homogeneous states with 
historic or geographical provinces, such as Greece, Bulgaria, Egypt, or Tur-
key. In the case of Greece, one could imagine a federal state centered on the 
country’s unique geography and historical provinces comprising, for exam-
ple, the Peloponnese, Thessaly, Macedonia, Iperus, Crete, the smaller islands, 
and Thrace. Federalism could have addressed chronic mismanagement prob-
lems at the central government level and regional grievances without “endan-
gering security,” as all provinces are almost exclusively Greek with the 
exception of Western Thrace, which includes a Turkish minority plus an eco-
nomically dominant Greek majority (Hüseyinoğlu 2012). More important, 
power- sharing at the center could have safeguarded social cohesion between 
rival left- and right- wing political traditions, as happened in post- civil war 
Austria (Rose 2000) and to a lesser degree Spain (Encarnación 2008). Nota-
bly, a consensual compromise among Greek political traditions (deeply di-
vided since the 1946– 1949 civil war) could have helped the country face its 
current socioeconomic hardships. Yet in contrast to its Southern European 
neighbors, even limited or informal consensual features have been largely 
absent in Greece. 
Interestingly, according to Lijphart et al.’s measures, while other south-
ern European countries such as Spain and Portugal combined majoritari-
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an-consensual institutional mechanisms, Greece has been “literally the most 
eccentric,” a close “approximation of the majoritarian model” (1988: 19– 20). 
Power- sharing in Greece became very popular among voters following the 
post- 2009 financial crisis as demonstrated in polls.3 Yet the Greek political 
parties have failed to form a broad coalition government until the country 
faced virtual collapse; and only when they did so the country’s economy 
begun to recover (Kovras and Loizides 2015). Thus, the “Greek tragedy” is 
characteristic of the region’s power- sharing failures across different levels of 
analysis. 
For its part, Greece’s neighbor in the East, Turkey, could have evolved 
into a federation of eight administrative provinces as originally planned in 
the late phases of its military dictatorship in 1983 (Yucel 2007).4 In the case of 
Turkey (and Egypt), one could point to their population size or suggest the 
possibility of introducing “informal” federal or consociational arrangements, 
as in South Africa, Singapore, and Spain, to regulate conflict with the Kurds 
(or Copts in Egypt). Instead, the AK Party has governed Turkey with little 
formal or informal power- sharing with either the Kurds or rival Kemalist 
political parties. Likewise, in post- Mubarak Egypt, the choice of a (majoritar-
ian) presidential system has deepened the conflict between the supporters of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the military, reversing the achievements of the 
Arab Spring. 
Similar arguments could apply to the Palestinians in Israel/Palestine pre-
ceding the first Intifada (Yiftachel 1992) or to Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 
the 1963– 1974 period after the breakdown of formal consociational arrange-
ments (Kyriakides 1968). As stated in the previous chapter, Greek Cypriots 
rejected an improved settlement during an extended six- year period of nego-
tiations between 1968 and 1974, which combined limited regional autonomy 
to the Turkish Cypriots in exchange for a weakened veto in the central gov-
ernment; this decentralized power- sharing arrangement provided a win- win 
arrangement for both communities. According to Glafkos Clerides, who led 
these negotiations for the Greek Cypriots, President Makarios rejected the 
settlement not only because he opposed local autonomy but also because 
Denktaş eventually hardened his position and demanded that aspirations for 
enosis be renounced (Clerides 1989– 1992, 2007; Pericleous 2009: 102– 9). It is 
a paradox how during this period both Makarios and Denktaş did their best 
to derail a mutually beneficial peace agreement. By rejecting minimum con-
cessions to the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot leadership exposed the 
island to the subsequent invasion by Turkey in 1974, while Denktaş kept the 
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Turkish Cypriot community in isolation and destitute by insisting on the 
symbolic renouncement of enosis. As implied by this incident, nationalist 
narratives and their intrusion into peace mediations could easily trap leaders 
into making decisions with long- term devastating consequences.  
Framing Federalism in the Post- Ottoman World
Existing scholarly inquiries focusing either on federalism or consensus de-
mocracies have provided a wealth of insightful interpretations as to the 
emergence and durability of power- sharing arrangements (see Burgess 2012). 
Early scholarship on federalism has emphasized, among other factors, the 
desire for federal unity and the compatibility of political institutions among 
constituent states (Wheare 1963), the structure of party systems (Riker 1964), 
expectations for economic advantage (Watts 1998a), and shared ideological 
commitments toward federalism among political elites (Franck 1968). Mean-
while, the literature on consociationalism has focused on overarching loyal-
ties to the state, traditions of elite accommodation and the presence of 
external threats common to all communities (Daalder 1974; Lijphart 1977; 
Kerr 2006). 
While drawing on this scholarship, I have also employed a broader theo-
retical framework arguably more relevant to peace settlements and power- 
sharing breakthroughs or collapses. As stated in the introduction, Diamond’s 
popular work on societal collapse, especially his five- point framework on 
how societies choose to fail or succeed is particularly useful here (2005). This 
framework is not only encompassing of existing scholarly debates in the field 
but also highly relevant to intractable conflicts where decisions on peace, 
power- sharing and state failure are closely interlinked. For the most part, five 
interrelated factors determine why societies choose federalism and consocia-
tionalism as part of a successful peace settlement or a related constitutional 
amendment. These include the state of relations among potentially rival eth-
nic or religious communities, key changes in the local and regional environ-
ment, hostile neighbors, support from friendly outside actors, and finally the 
society’s own decisions and openness to institutional innovation. The final 
factor is especially important and as the post- Ottoman region demonstrates, 
a society’s choice frequently determines the direction and intensity of causal-
ity in the first four. 
Societies respond differently to similar problems; thus, framing peace is 
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important, not only in endorsing federal or consociational arrangements but 
also in the survival of conflict- ridden communities. Although initially a cen-
tral concept in the study of social movements (Benford and Snow 2000), 
framing has recently emerged as an important analytical tool in conflict res-
olution and ethnic conflict analysis (Desrosiers 2011; Kaufman 2011; Mc-
Doom 2012). Building on the social movement literature and our broader 
definition in the Introduction, framing in ethnic relations could be defined 
here as the conscious strategic effort to shape shared understandings about 
an ethnic group, its recent memories, grievances and boundaries (identity or 
physical), particularly with regard to its perceived territorial entitlements. 
Whether cooperative or adversarial toward ethnic “others,” ethnopolitical 
frames are strategically important in a group’s narrative because they legiti-
mize subsequent courses of action by combining past, present, and future. 
Framing is often used interchangeably with other terms, such as dis-
course, ideology, hegemonic beliefs, or narratives; what distinguishes 
frames from such related terms is the degree of strategy involved, specifi-
cally in appropriating, challenging, or negotiating a shared meaning of a 
particular public choice (Loizides 2015). Frames involve normative assess-
ments and strategic calculations aiming to link past experiences with con-
temporary policy dilemmas. They transform abstract grievances into 
specific courses of action by focusing attention and articulating meanings 
of contested events. In federal and consociational dilemmas, adversarial 
frames obstruct majorities from sharing power while guiding potentially 
secessionist minorities toward conflictual strategies. Ethnocentric framing 
frequently dominates discourse in divided societies and shapes common 
(mis)understandings on the fairness and viability of federal arrangements, 
leading to a society’s entrapment even when such compromises are desir-
able and necessary. 
In their personal memoirs, pro- federalist political leaders in Cyprus and 
elsewhere point to this problem. For instance, former president Vasiliou ar-
gues: “Every time that an idea or a plan was suggested by the UN, [my oppo-
nents] portrayed this as a national disaster, even when, through in the various 
studies that we submitted to the National Council it was made clear that the 
UN plans did satisfy positions that we were promoting” (2010: 259).
Charles Ingrao, a leading historian of the Balkans who attempted to apply 
his expertise from the Scholars’ Initiative for the former Yugoslavia in Cy-
prus, encountered a similar problem. After examining the Yugoslav contro-
versies and myths, Ingrao and his colleagues point that once divergent 
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narratives become embedded in public memory, it becomes virtually impos-
sible for democratically elected politicians to question them without risking 
their political future (Ingrao 2012). Ingrao calls this the “Frankestein Effect,” 
saying it ensures the complicity of succeeding generations of politicians who 
face electoral suicide by challenging the veracity of such artificial 
constructions. 
Frames and institutional innovation go hand in hand. Proposals for novel 
institutional designs require supportive action narratives, while on their part 
peace frames are more likely to emerge in favorable institutional settings. Ad-
versarial framing limits the scope of creative solutions even in less complex 
settings. Frames set conceptual boundaries which limit innovative thinking. 
Creative solutions often lie outside these boundaries, while failure to identify 
or to even consider alternative strategies retains rigid conceptual boundaries, 
especially in debating complex arrangements such as power- sharing. 
Winning the hearts and minds of diverse populations for compromise 
often requires an alternative “peace frame,” defining the common ground for 
a compromise and defending the fairness and viability of federal and conso-
ciational arrangements. But in the case of the post- Ottoman lands and suc-
cessor states, a selective reading of the past in the form of “false or questionable 
analogies” drawn from the region’s historical legacies has made the endorse-
ment of power- sharing arrangements difficult and in some cases impossible. 
As a result, mainstream nationalisms, both right- wing and left- wing, have 
developed strong anti- federalist/consociational biases preventing adaptation 
even when power- sharing had emerged as the only alternative to secession, 
disintegration and violence.  
The various frames cut across most subtypes of post- Ottoman national-
isms and can be summarized in three main concepts that pervade the region’s 
ethnonationalist discourses:
(1) Power- sharing in federal or consociational arrangements is unneces-
sary because “our” people are united as a whole. Despite local but 
minor differences we have lived in harmony for ages.
(2) Ethnic homogeneity is a necessary and sufficient condition for suc-
cessful state- building. Multiethnic states are prone to conflict and will 
fail regardless of their institutional choices. 
(3) Power- sharing cannot resolve issues of multiethnicity. Federalism and 
consociationalism are by their own nature destructive and only fur-
ther aggravate ethnic or religious conflict. 
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Critics could argue that these frames are dominant in the Ottoman Balkans 
and the Middle East because they rely on “objective realities” on the ground. 
On this point, a common approach to the growing scholarship on frames is 
to treat the latter as corresponding either fully or roughly to existing struc-
tural conditions and “realities.” Frames must stick close to the “facts” to avoid 
being debunked (Swindler 1986), and, as Hroch (1988: 99) argues, the basic 
condition for the success of any national or state- building movement is that 
its argument (or frame) at least roughly corresponds to the realities perceived 
by those at whom it is directed. 
Hroch’s logic applies equally to power- sharing arrangements, yet framing 
of related movements and projects does not seem to be only the product of 
“objective conditions,” unless one assumes that the radical transformation of 
the ethnic landscape in the Ottoman Empire and its successor states was un-
avoidable or structurally overdetermined. On this point, several academic 
studies have also criticized ethnic federalism and consociationalism as mech-
anisms that perpetuate divisions, foster ethnic antagonisms, and encourage 
secessions (Horowitz 1991; Snyder 2000; Wimmer 2003; Aitken 2007). Ad-
mittedly, even scholars advocating power- sharing acknowledge the limits of 
consociational engagements and recognize that governance in multiethnic 
societies tends to pose more challenges than in fairly homogeneous societies 
(O’Leary 1989; McGarry and O’Leary 2004). Likewise, the classic reading of 
nationalism literature questions the degree to which tensions between na-
tionalism and power- sharing are reconcilable (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; 
Hobsbawm 1990, 1992; O’Leary 1999a). Yet as I demonstrate in the following 
chapter, federal and consociational achievements across the world (including 
North America, Western Europe, and the developing world) suggest that so-
cieties frequently overcome structural impediments or self- fulfilling prophe-
cies including past antifederalist frames. 
As with politics in general, such framings are arguably driven by political 
interests— or even manipulations frequently contrary to institutional or 
structural conditions. Emphasizing the role of ideas, leading Middle East 
scholar Fouad Ajami has argued in his influential study on the end of pan- 
Arabism that political ideas make their own realities in defiance of logic not 
foreseen by those spinning the myth and play themselves out in the end 
(1978: 355). Thus, whether agents are conscious or unclear about their conse-
quences, frames encapsulate otherwise contested realities, meanings and ac-
tions. They imply agency, deliberation or manipulation in the construction of 
new “realities” (Benford and Snow 2000). Even if there is something one 
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could call “the facts of history” around which framing takes place, these same 
“facts of history” can be interpreted in various ways. In other words, the 
“dots” of history in the post- Ottoman lands can be connected and recon-
nected to create diametrically opposed meanings; they can enable or restrict 
power- sharing arrangements (see also Loizides 2015). 
The three frames noted above have been widely used across time and 
space in the region. On the one hand, they explain the relative absence of 
federal and consociational arrangements in the post- Ottoman lands and suc-
cessor states. On the other, all three display internal contradictions and 
weaknesses in addressing counter evidence. While dominant in public dis-
course, these frames are flawed on both empirical and normative grounds. 
The evidence provided below for Cyprus and its immediate region suggests 
alternative ways through which the dominant adversarial frames could be 
identified and challenged in public discourse. 
“We are all brothers [and sisters]” 
The most prevalent frame of the three listed above emphasizes that power- 
sharing is unnecessary because people in the region have been living in peace 
and harmony for ages. This frame implicitly relies on the Ottoman legacy al-
though it rarely makes explicit references to the Ottomans, with the partial 
exception of national ideologies associated with dominant groups in the em-
pire (e.g., modern Turkish nationalism). 
Integrationist and assimilationist programs downplaying ethnic differ-
ences have been common particularly among left- wing political movements. 
Leftist integrationists (and not only) subordinated minority questions to 
their own anti- class struggle. By emphasizing unity over minority rights, left-
ist movements have restricted even undermined federal and consociational 
prospects. For instance, one could point to the early writings of pan- Arab 
nationalism with regard to the Kurdish minority question. In a familiar even 
for now language, Michel Aflak, one of the intellectual fathers of the Arab 
struggle and incidentally a Christian, says of the Kurds: 
We were one people in the past. If the Kurdish people have any griev-
ances, they are in countries other than the Arab lands, as there was no 
segregation or discrimination between them and the Arabs. They 
were treated in the Arab homeland the way Arabs treat Arabs. There 
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is another fact, which is ignored only by those who lack a historical 
view, and this fact is that the Arab revolution is the revolution of this 
age. It is the measure of every revolution and every progressive move-
ment in every country in the world. He who stands against it cannot 
be progressive or revolutionary. . . .  How could a national movement 
of a small people be in opposition to the march of the Arab revolu-
tion? (Aflak 1974)
Certainly, such frames give precedence to Arab nationalism, first by stating 
that Kurds reside in the “Arab homeland,” and second by challenging the ex-
istence of the minority rights in an attempt to belittle the Kurds as a “small 
people.” Treating only individuals and not constituent groups as equals in a 
state- building project sets integrationism apart from federalism and consoci-
ationalism. In fact, the failure of the Arab unity project could be attributed to 
its emphasis on “unity” rather than “diversity,” which in principle could have 
been accommodated through federal and consociational devises. This is true 
with regard to Kurdish minorities and in the Shiite versus Sunni conceptions 
of Arab unity (and their respective fears). 
Mediating power- sharing requires explicit (constitutional) commitments 
to potentially marginalized groups that “unity” will not preclude diversity. 
Credible constitutional arrangements should aim to safeguard minorities 
from the loss of autonomy or representation while majorities should be pro-
tected from dysfunctional constitutional provisions and secession. As Chap-
ter 3 demonstrates, such critical uncertainties are not irresolvable. In fact, the 
major advantage of federal and consociational arrangements is that they fre-
quently offer the most credible way to address security, financial or identity 
risks while combining shared goals with separate spheres of government for 
majorities and significant minorities. Likewise, power- sharing, either 
through guaranteed group representation at the central government or 
through territorial decentralization and federalism, could be also understood 
as a form of “compensation” for groups likely to resist a “hegemonic” or as-
similationist state yet they have an interest in a unified power- sharing struc-
ture. In short, understanding past failures in balancing tensions between 
nationalism and power- sharing could be critical for future federal projects in 
the region.  
Historical examples from interwar Yugoslavia and the United Arab Re-
public are illustrative. In both cases, attempted state- building has failed to 
balance the tensions between unity and diversity, leading to disintegration 
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and conflict. As Dawisha (2003: 219) notes, while factors like leadership were 
important to pan- Arab nationalists, the main tensions in the 1950s and 1960s 
were between al- qawmiya (Arab nationalism) and al- wataniya (nationalism 
based on state sovereignty). In the case of Iraq, Dawisha says this struggle 
became evident during the peak of Arab nationalism in 1958 following the 
July 14 coup and the emergence of rival parties. For the “Iraq First Group,” 
issues of preserving diversity across ethnic and religious lines were critical: 
“Arab Unity was seen as a Sunni project designated to ensure the ultimate 
subjugation of the non- Sunni communal groups” (219). He adds that the 
Iraqi- first group “was not necessarily averse to some form of union, but theirs 
was a much looser conception than that held by the nationalists, at most a 
federal arrangement in which Iraq would retain considerable autonomy” 
(216). A similar problem in Syria eventually resulted in the failure of the 
Arab unity project. 
So too, South Slav federal/state- building projects fell short of balancing 
regional/federal autonomy with national solidarity. Using the term “flawed 
unification,” Banac (1984: 13) says Yugoslavia failed to meet the promise of 
its intellectual founding fathers. This was particularly true in interwar Yugo-
slavia, originally called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Accord-
ing to Ramet, its component peoples “came to the kingdom with rather 
different expectations and for different reasons” (2006: 37). Like the Kurds 
in Iraq today, Croats and Slovenes sought security, aligning with the new 
Kingdom to protect themselves from further territorial losses to Italy but 
also hoping for a federal constitution (37). Even so, Serbian elites assumed 
political, economic, and cultural hegemony within the new state, adopting 
strict centralism. And as in the case of pan- Arab unifiers, Ramet concludes 
that “the policy of monopolizing the top posts in the country for Serbs was 
at the minimum, politically insensitive likely to give provocation, and 
short- sighted.” 
Integrationist frames not only inform and account for historical cases. 
Aflak’s response to the Kurdish question is commonly voiced by Arab cen-
tralists in today’s Iraq; they question the efficacy and necessity of federal ar-
rangements among people who have “lived as brothers and sisters for 
centuries.” As discussed above, a theoretically puzzling aspect of framing is 
how it often departs from realities on the ground. The Scholars Initiative for 
the former Yugoslavia suggests that existing evidence can frequently be used 
to discredit myths and invalidate “inconvenient facts.” Yet interpretations can 
also vary in the acknowledgment of responsibility for the past even in the 
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presence of undisputed evidence. For instance, Iraqi centralists downplay 
crimes against the Kurds by attributing these exclusively to the Saddam Hus-
sein regime. For their part, Iranian and Turkish nationalists, mostly on the 
left, voice similar arguments when discussing their own Kurdish national mi-
norities, attributing crimes to previous regimes. Yet since the mid- 1990s the 
Turkish left has retained only limited support among the Kurdish minority. 
Even after the election of a moderate leader from the region, Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu, as its president, the main opposition party, CHP (Republican 
People’s Party), won only a tiny fraction of its votes in the Kurdish regions of 
the country. 
With regard to majority- minority relations, leftist movements often pres-
ent their own repression by right- wing dictatorships as a proof of everyone 
else’s suffering in their respective countries. Such frames proffered by major-
ity “moderates” ignore that minorities generally suffer more at the hands of 
non- ethnics in the security forces because they are discriminated against on 
multiple levels. For the most part, in dictatorial regimes, leftists are targeted 
for their political beliefs, while ethnic minorities are repressed for their eth-
nicity, cultural practices, and use of their motherland tongue; in other words, 
minority members suffer for “who they are.” For instance, in Turkey the 
Kurdish minority has been deprived of basic cultural rights, while up to 1.2 
million have been forcibly displaced within the country (see Celik 2005; 
Somer 2005). In Iraq, Kurds have been subject to colonization by Arab set-
tlers, particularly in the Kirkuk area; more important, in 1988 they were vic-
tims of a chemical attack and genocide in Haladja (O’Leary 2005). 
It is interesting that the “peaceful past” frame appears even in societies 
that have experienced major incidents of intercommunal strife. For instance, 
in Lebanon a former chief negotiator of the Taif agreement, Hussein Hus-
seini, rejected the idea of federalism: “In the social structure of Lebanon 
there is diversity within the unity but there is no pluralism. There are a large 
number of confessions and sects, but they are one people who share the same 
history, heritage, legacies and language. The common denominator essential 
for federalism [pluralism] does not exist” (Abi- Habib 2007). Likewise, a left-
ist thinker and leading political figure in Cyprus, Ploutis Servas, has pre-
sented the history of the island as peaceful coexistence between the two 
communities, with a “short parenthesis” of intercommunal strife, driven by 
interests of the colonial powers (Servas 1997). Although he was later margin-
alized within AKEL, his line of reasoning dominated his party’s discourse for 
decades. 
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“They will fail” 
The second dominant frame posits multiethnic states as prone to failure. This 
is particularly the case with (but not limited to) right- wing nationalisms, 
which frequently see not just federalism but any recognition of ethnic or reli-
gious diversity as a stepping- stone to partition. On this issue, one could draw 
a relevant comparison between Greek and Turkish nationalisms following 
the wars in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq respectively. At the time of Yugo-
slavia’s collapse, Greek nationalists described “Skopje” (FYROM/Republic of 
Macedonia) “as a disorganized multiethnic mess, without state entity, econ-
omy, or bread”5 calling on the Greek government to impose its will and 
demonstrate its strength. 
Despite the neighboring republic’s progress, ten years after the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement, Greek politicians still appear confident that its mul-
tiethnic character is not sustainable. For instance, former Greek prime min-
ister Antonis Samaras emphasized in 2008: “It is for certain that Skopje will 
not exist as a unitary entity in a while” (ΕRΤ 2008; emphasis added). For Sa-
maras, the future unification of the Albanians across neighboring countries 
is unavoidable. On this point, it is interesting to note that by 2011 Greece’s 
northern neighbor has enjoyed substantial economic growth following a de-
cade of decentralization and power- sharing between ethnic Albanians and 
Macedonians. Ironically, centrally governed Greek Macedonia suffered the 
most from the post- 2009 financial meltdown, with almost a quarter of its 
population unemployed during the peak of the debt crisis (Guardian 2011).
Greek politicians have often endorsed arguments in the Balkans in direct 
contradiction to their official positions on federalism in Cyprus. If a multi-
ethnic country in the Balkans is unsustainable, so too is a reunified Cyprus— 
 yet the latter has been advocated by successive Greek governments since the 
mid- l970s. But looking at the origins of the Cypriot federal idea in Greece 
one could also point out that it was first conceived and framed within the 
dominant logic of the Greek nation- state. In a 1976 meeting, Prime Minster 
Konstantinos Karamanlis emphasized to the Cypriot negotiating team that a 
federal settlement in the form of a bizonal federation was the favored option 
of all European governments. He went on to argue that by showing modera-
tion, Greek Cypriots would expose Turkey as the intransigent side to interna-
tional public opinion. But his conclusions departed from the moderate logic 
of power- sharing when he argued for bizonal federation as a temporary step 
toward nationalist objectives: 
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bizonality is not only unavoidable but beneficial as beneficial is the 
central government with loose central authorities if the territory that 
the Turks keep is under 25 per cent. In this way we will isolate the 
Turks in the north and we will organize the Greek Cypriot sector in a 
way that has the overwhelming superiority and safety with regard to 
the Turkish one. This will leave the road for possible union of the 
Greek sector with Greece if the Turks agree on a double union. This 
option would have to be excluded with the settlement in cantons 
which might lead to more clashes between the communities and the 
danger of Turkey intervening again.6 
Fears of multiethnicity are not uncommon in mainstream post- Ottoman 
narratives. Right- wing nationalisms have a particularly strong attachment to 
power, authority, and territory, frequently treating sovereignty in a non- 
negotiable manner while attributing conflicts with their minorities to exter-
nal interference. In the narratives of most Middle East and Balkan 
nationalisms, territories “won or kept with blood” are not in any sense rene-
gotiable through federal or consociational arrangements. Unsurprisingly, 
then, remembrance of fallen soldiers has been a central theme in the region’s 
official discourses as demonstrated for instance in Turkey with regard to the 
PKK casualties in the 1990s (Navaro- Yashin 2002: 118). Debates in parlia-
ment at the time demonstrate this; for instance, conservative president Süley-
man Demirel in his 1995 speech to the assembly remembered with 
compassion all Turkey’s “martyrs and our teachers who have become victims 
of terrorism while trying to educate our children through great self- sacrifice.”7 
He went on to assure his audience that Turkey’s unitary state status and unity 
and solidarity would be preserved. Asked to qualify the unitary state, he reit-
erated: “it consists of Turkey’s unity and solidarity. In order to protect it, here 
is the image we must give: there is one nation, one country, one state, one 
language, and one flag.”8
Elsewhere in the region, various contemporary political parties have 
drawn their inspiration from national liberation movements, as in Croatia 
(HDZ), the Republic of Macedonia/FYROM (VMRO- DPMNE), Cyprus 
(DISY among Greek Cypriots and UBP for Turkish Cypriots) and Lebanon 
(Kataeb Party), to mention only a few. Yet these political parties have shown 
elements of adaptation since the late 1990s suggesting that power- sharing is 
not necessarily incompatible with right- wing (or left- wing) ideologies. 
Center- right political actors could develop effective and credible ties with 
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external peace actors such as the EU (Sandal and Loizides 2013). Similar pro-
cesses of positive adaptation can take place among alternative political tradi-
tions. For instance, in Spain, the left has traditionally supported power- sharing 
arrangements with the Catalans and Basques, often against the wishes of 
right- wing opposition. And as highlighted in the Introduction, the Turkish 
Cypriot left has contributed a number of impressive mobilizations in favor of 
reunification in Cyprus. 
Despite these breakthroughs across the political spectrum, political par-
ties seldom reach consensus in issues of power- sharing, as moderate parties 
frequently face ethnic outbidding by intra- ethnic rivals. As shown in previ-
ous chapters, even between Greek Cypriot political parties historically sup-
porting federalism, lack of intragroup consensus has made intercommunal 
compromise more difficult. In the presence of dominant nationalist frames, it 
is easier for the masses to adopt political views uncritically and act in ways 
that strengthen existing elite consensus, thus creating a vicious cycle between 
public expectations and the viability of federal or consociational projects. 
Even moderate elites might shy away from promising peace settlements, if 
they perceive those as politically risky or unfeasible. 
In a nutshell, perceptions of the viability of power- sharing are critical for 
the negotiability and durability of such projects. As shown in the social 
movement literature, frames should aim not only at addressing grievances 
but also at identifying appropriate opportunities for conflict transformation 
(Snow and Benford 1988; Entman 1993). By extension, supportive allies and 
hostile neighbors are critical factors in the viability of federal and consocia-
tional projects. A reassuring international environment for power- sharing 
enables domestic actors to act accordingly. 
In his seminal essay probing the absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers, 
Lustick (1997) suggests that a “permissive international environment” (fo-
cusing primarily on war as an instrument of political will) can explain forc-
ible unification of separate entities in Europe. In other words, power relations 
and the use of military force by either regional or international actors are 
critical in understanding the success of federal projects. By contrast, even a 
large, territorially concentrated ethnic/national solidarity has been by itself 
insufficient in producing a corresponding great power, particularly among 
the Arabs. Unlike Europe, in the Middle East a system of colonial subordina-
tion and externally enforced norms to which the region was subjected in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries did not allow substantial changes in the 
number, size, or internal regimes of states (1997: 657). While Lustick 
64 Chapter 2 
supports his arguments with both historical and contemporary data, his 
overall rationale could be challenged for deemphasizing local agency and 
statesmanship. Does power- sharing fail because external actors actively work 
against it, or does it fail because domestic forces have not acted preemptively 
to neutralize destructive outside influences? 
This question could be asked of Bosnia and Lebanon in the past decades, 
and more recently of Iraq. In Cyprus itself, recent scholarly work has ques-
tioned the applicability of the O’Malley and Craig (2011) “conspiracy thesis,”9 
and the degree to which western governments and specifically the United 
States have conspired to partition the island (Ker- Lindsay 2011: 45– 46). Yet it 
is admittedly hard to argue against Lustick’s overall analysis of the role of 
major powers— direct or indirect— in sustaining or preventing federal proj-
ects, or the importance of the neighborhood, particularly in the Middle East 
and Balkans. 
Moreover, as shown in the most recent crises, the government in Turkey 
has played an active role in the Iraqi conflict, insisting, for instance, that a 
federal system could lead to autonomous Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish regions, 
breaking up the country and threatening the stability of the region. As ar-
gued above, by framing multiethnic breakups as expected and inevitable, 
neighboring governments have channeled their energy toward this “eventu-
ality,” obstructing potentially viable multiethnic entities, and even contribut-
ing to their demise. The warning becomes a self- fulfilling prophecy, as a 
frame’s prediction initiates actions that alter preexisting structures. On the 
issue of multiethnicity and federalism, it is interesting to note the confidence 
of regional leaders in their own predictions. Echoing Samaras’ confidence 
about a Macedonian breakdown, minister of foreign affairs and later on pres-
ident of Turkey Abdullah Gül said of Iraq: “The core of the problem is that if 
Iraq is divided [federalized], there will be definitely civil war and definitely 
neighboring countries will be involved in this” (Gamel 2006, emphasis 
added). 
Yet the Iraqi case particularly in the Kurdistan region demonstrates how 
nations could escape these eventualities and self- fulfilling prophecies under 
conditions that seem prohibitive. Not only regional leaders but also key U.S. 
policy advisors have predicted since 2003 the “end of Iraq” due to the pres-
ence of Kurdish ethnonationalism (Galbraith 2007). O’Leary (2012) demon-
strates that federalism versus disintegration in the country (as well as in the 
contrasting case of Sudan), depended less on neighborhood and more on 
Iraq’s own leaders’ choices and decisions. Despite the obvious problems of 
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Sunni alienation leading to the rise of the Islamic State, Kurdish leaders in 
Iraq demonstrated wisdom in two critical areas. First, their willingness to 
work consociational arrangements within the country and second, their 
adaptability in identifying functioning relations with the AKP government in 
Turkey point to crucial lessons for other divided societies including Cyprus 
in dealing with complex geopolitics. Overall, Iraqi Kurdistan demonstrates 
that hostile neighbors might also come to realize that federal and consocia-
tional arrangements contain positive aspects, not only for countries adopting 
them but also for their broader region. 
 “Power- Sharing Is Destructive”
Nonetheless, a third dominant frame is that power- sharing cannot resolve 
issues of multiethnicity. For critics, federalism and consociationalism have 
devastating effects and could worsen ethnic and religious conflicts. For the 
most part, critics argue that power- sharing in various forms has failed in the 
region, both historically in the late phases of the Ottoman Empire and subse-
quently in postcolonial or post- communist societies. In the past decades the 
examples of Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, and post- 1960 Cyprus have 
further consolidated the view of federalism and consociationalism as dys-
functional, if not catastrophic. Sadly, the region lacks an indisputably suc-
cessful consociational or federal model that could inspire others to follow 
suit. Looking at the interwar period, Ramet points that, whereas Norway and 
Finland in Europe provided models of what newly independent states could 
be, there was no similar model for the Balkans (2006: 3). More recently, in 
Iraq, external and domestic critics have emphasized the absence of a relevant 
federal example. For instance, Muslim religious leaders as well as “liberal and 
democratic” politicians have stressed the need to preserve the country’s unity 
and have frequently “urged the Kurds not to rush into formulae like federal-
ism and confederalism with which the region is not familiar” (Mideast Mirror 
2004; emphasis added).
As argued earlier, Ottoman institutions and religious legacies of tolerance 
preserved cultural diversity for centuries; despite their embedded hierarchi-
cal nature, these could have provided the political and cultural antecedents 
for federal and consociational arrangements. But the reading of the Ottoman 
past is frequently limited to brief references in national history books and is 
highly selective. More important, how elites publically frame the millet legacy 
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in the post- Ottoman successor states makes public endorsement of federal 
and consociational arrangements extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
Making a series of false analogies, contemporary critics engage in com-
parisons of recent minority accommodation proposals in the form of power- 
sharing or community recognition and the millet system and its role in the 
violent collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Berkes 1963). One example is 
Sonyel’s Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire (1993), pub-
lished by the Ataturk Culture, Language, and History Foundation, an institu-
tion devoted to preservation of Kemalist thought in Turkey. Such frames 
preclude any discussion of federalism in either the official Turkish Republi-
can ideology or the broader majority discourses in the country, including 
AKP’s counterhegemonic positioning. Thus, despite the general liberaliza-
tion of discourse in Turkey with regard to its domestic and regional identity 
representation since the 1990s (Somer 2005; Fokas 2008), institutional trans-
formation through power- sharing has not been central in the country’s polit-
ical discourse. Instead Turkey has moved toward an increasingly majoritarian 
(semipresidential) system, paradoxically with the support of Kurdish voters 
following the 2008 referendum (Levitt and Ciplak 2012). 
State institutions play a central role in maintaining hegemonic frames on 
political accommodation, particularly when confronted with contrary exam-
ples from other parts of the world, including Northern Ireland and Spain, as 
mentioned earlier. After visiting Spain in 1993, for instance, Turkish prime 
minister Tansu Çiller allegedly proposed use of the Basque model to solve the 
conflict in Kurdish regions, something she later denied (TRT TV 1993; Pope 
1993: 14). Her rival and ANAP successor Mesut Yilmaz rejected the idea of 
federation with the Kurds and stated that regional cultures in Turkey must be 
allowed to exist through their own means (TRT TV 1992). On another occa-
sion, Yilmaz said Kurdish should become the second official language in Tur-
key, but this proposal was eliminated before any debate could take place 
(McDowall 1997: 428). 
More interestingly, in early 2007 a Turkish prosecutor initiated a criminal 
inquiry against late former president and coup leader Kenan Evren for sug-
gesting that Turkey should become a federation. Drawing on his early pro-
posal for administrative regions, Evren spoke openly in the media, suggesting 
that Turkey would one day decide on federalism; otherwise, “there will be no 
peace,” he said, adding that the 10 percent election threshold obstructed 
Kurds from getting into Parliament (Turkish Daily News 2007). Not surpris-
ingly, reactions against Evren were overwhelmingly negative. Zeki Sezer of 
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the small Democratic Left Party (DSP) argued that “those who are fooled by 
[the] insensibility of Evren and his like and hope for disintegration of the 
country are mistaken” (New Anatolian 2007). The more influential National-
ist Movement Party’s (MHP) Müsavvat Dervișoğlu said: “Evren speaks as a 
former president or as a 90- year- old whose head has gone soft,” while leader 
of the miniscule Independence and Change Party (HURPARTI) Yasar 
Okuyan argued: “[The] one who proposes dividing Turkey into eight prov-
inces is not a man; emphasis added). 
And as Lustick argues in his seminal work on unsettled states and dis-
puted lands, the treatment of dissent as evidence of treason, criminality, and 
insanity rather than contrary opinion is part of hegemonic politics that help 
sustain violent conflict around the world (2002). But for Evren, who once 
referred to the Kurds as “mountain Turks,” federal ideas are less dictated by 
reconciliation dynamics and more by the logic of state security. This is not 
necessarily problematic or unprecedented. For one thing, successful federa-
tions such as India have maintained their unity by providing the constitu-
tional space to establish new subnational units in response to secessionist 
demands. With the exception of the rather ham- fisted establishment of Tel-
angana state in 2014, all other processes of state reorganization have been 
carried out with the general concurrence of the state legislature.10 For an-
other, federalism is often driven by insecurity prevalent in unstable regional 
or sub- state systems (Riker 1975; Rector 2009). As implied above, Iraqi Kurds 
have opted to remain in a federal Iraq rather than simultaneously confront 
their neighbors. Comparable considerations appeared among South Slavs in 
the interwar period (e.g., the threat of fascist Italy) and are common to both 
communities in Cyprus today with regard to the gradual demographic 
change in the North following the unconstrained migration of Turkish 
settlers. 
Lack of trust in international institutions stemming from anticolonial 
discourses is important in accounting for the failure of consociational and 
federal arrangements in the post- Ottoman lands. In divided societies foreign 
mediation, arbitration, and external peacekeeping are often essential in sus-
taining power- sharing settlements. Yet, as cases such as Cyprus reveal, even 
small and insecure states are frequently hesitant to welcome the involvement 
of major international organizations, opting to sustain a political culture that 
frowns on internationally endorsed arrangements. Admittedly, while secu-
rity considerations (including Lustick’s permissive international environ-
ment variable) are critical in explaining post- Ottoman exceptionalism, it 
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appears that related frames also contribute to narrowing available options for 
peacemaking even further. 
Overall, the analysis points to several misperceptions with regard to post- 
Ottoman national and federal movements. Majority nationalisms in the 
post- Ottoman successor states confronted ethnic and religious diversity not 
only by eliminating differences through ethnic cleansing and genocide (phe-
nomena commonly associated with the region), but also by incorporating, 
even glorifying, diverse “folklore” traditions provided that those were ad-
justed to fit within the parameters of the dominant state nationalism 
(Hobsbawm 1992; Triandafyllidou 1998: 606). In a nutshell, it is not surpris-
ing that the roots of many post- Ottoman conflicts lie not in exclusion and 
oppositional state- building programs but in ambitious efforts to forcibly in-
tegrate and assimilate unwilling “half- brothers and sisters” (Stefanovic 2005). 
In principle, these real or imagined half- siblings could have been politically 
accommodated through federal and consociational arrangements balancing 
their own local interest with the broader military, economic, or political ad-
vantages of a unification project. Power- sharing and federalism could be an 
appropriate antidote to contested conflicts in volatile regions. Federalism and 
consociationalism have been fairly successful elsewhere by avoiding compe-
tition among state or sub- state loyalties, as people gradually learned to adapt 
to alternative identities. The Arab and South Slav unification projects dis-
cussed above are not the only cases in point. The essence of the Macedonian 
or Kurdish conflict in the twentieth century lies not in the exclusiveness of 
neighboring nationalisms, but in the involuntary incorporation of “brotherly 
communities” into narrowly defined centralized nationalist programs. 
Partial “Successes” and Alternative Explanations
It is also important to acknowledge recent and “partial” success stories from 
the region, which also demonstrate that there is no inherent incompatibility 
between the region’s identities and power- sharing. The degree to which a fed-
eration or consociation is seen as successful is central to any discussion of 
arrangements in the post- Ottoman lands or elsewhere, especially if one aims 
to define partial successes or failures. In most conflictual environments the 
relative success of power- sharing should be understood in relation to previ-
ous records of civil strife. Following this reasoning, post- Taif Lebanon, post- 
Dayton Bosnia, post- OFA Republic of Macedonia, and, more recently, the 
The Region’s Federal Movements 69
Kurdish regions in Iraq, as well as post- Arab Spring Tunisia and Morocco, 
are “relative success” stories (Zahar 2005; Bieber 2006; O’Leary 2005; Belloni 
2008). Yet only certain aspects of these peace processes could offer inspira-
tion across the Balkans and Middle East and justify positive analogies in pub-
lic debates. The lack of an undisputed successful model from the region 
unavoidably restricts the catalyzing effects of power- sharing and institutional 
innovation. Admittedly, part of the relative success in these cases could be 
attributed to external support, but nonetheless, indigenous leadership has 
also been instrumental. 
Although external protectors can be important, accounting for domestic 
factors in these “least likely to succeed cases” matters as well. As stated above, 
underdevelopment and previous violent breakdowns in ethnic relations did 
not prevent Lebanon, Iraqi Kurdistan, or Bosnia from mitigating ethnic or 
religious differences through power- sharing institutions. Admittedly, a polit-
ical settlement on these occasions occurred primarily through external inter-
vention (including use of military force). However, domestic opposition also 
contributed to (or at least failed to prevent) power- sharing settlements from 
functioning relatively effectively. External peace allies and credible incentives 
are critical in socializing undecided actors to embrace a power- sharing set-
tlement. As suggested in Chapter 3, external mediation and power- sharing 
institutions could be designed in ways that better accommodate domestic 
political parties and their needs. And as demonstrated in the broader litera-
ture, external intervention works best in areas where indigenous leadership 
has been extensively engaged in decision- making and implementation 
(Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005; Bieber 2006; Belloni 2008; Stefanovic and 
Loizides 2011). 
There are major limitations to the extent to which structure can explain 
unsuccessful federal or consociational engagements. As implied above, there 
is a significant variation in external intervention strategies and other struc-
tural conditions across historical and contemporary cases in the post- 
Ottoman region, including size, regime type, and level of economic 
development. Structural factors certainly contribute to the emergence and 
implementation of federal and consociational settlements, but no easily iden-
tifiable set of structural conditions is shared by most cases presented here. 
Other explanations also fall short; as noted, alternative accommodation 
formulas have failed despite historical institutional precedents, ethnic or lin-
guistic affinities, and major external incentives, as recently demonstrated by 
the EU intervention in Cyprus. This is hardly a new argument in the 
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literature. Much of the existing literature on the emergence of federations 
refers to “circumstantial causation,” often the product of negotiation between 
unity and diversity (Burgess 2006). The cases presented above demonstrate 
these observations, yet what remains relatively underdeveloped in the litera-
ture is how this “circumstantial vacuum” is filled with narratives and action 
frames that ultimately guide or restrict the formation of federations. When 
there are no discernable causal patterns shaped by macro- structures, it could 
be assumed that frames could have more space to catalyze political 
outcomes. 
Moreover, Kedourie’s argument that nationalism has broken the patterns 
of the hierarchical but plural coexistence of the Ottomans and replaced it 
with a strongly homogenizing impulse is relevant to the present discussion.11 
Yet there is also an important limitation to Kedourie’s reasoning, as national-
ism is not necessarily incompatible with federalism or other forms of politi-
cal accommodation. In fact, previous scholarship has pointed to the 
kaleidoscopic nature of the nationalist doctrine and the ease with which it 
adapts or relates to philosophically opposed ideologies (Hutchinson and 
Smith 1994: 3). For instance, nationalism historically has assumed ties to lib-
eralism, even though the former presupposes a strong commitment to the 
national community that transcends individualism. Nationalism often ac-
commodates conservative values, including religion, despite the moderniz-
ing mission of modern nations (Appleby 2000: 12– 13; Tambiah 1992: 1– 4). 
Furthermore, it has even been paired with communism despite the interna-
tionalist orientation of Marxist ideological traditions (Connor 1984). 
Thus, with regard to the interplay between nationalism and power- 
sharing, one can isolate two critiques. First, nationalism’s kaleidoscopic na-
ture could have easily adapted to “philosophically opposed” aspects of 
federalism and consociationalism, particularly with regard to maximizing 
security, as shown in this chapter.12 More interesting, it is important to note 
that in its earlier formulations nationalism attempted to combine national 
self- determination with power- sharing in the form of federalism, as pre-
sented by the founding fathers of the United States in the Federalist Papers 
(O’Leary 2001a: 280). These earlier formulations preceded the Romantic and 
homogenizing nationalisms of central and Eastern Europe; nonetheless, plu-
ralist federations such as Switzerland and Canada also emerged and flour-
ished during the “age of nationalism” in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.
Another alternative explanation of post- Ottoman exceptionalism is the 
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impact of colonial rule. However, it is important to consider the experience 
of other countries before passing judgment. For one thing, the success of fed-
eral arrangements is not confined to industrial nation- states, out of which no 
federation has failed since World War II (Bermeo 2002). For another, in 
much of the developing world, successful federations and consociations have 
survived and even thrived in volatile regional environments. These include a 
number of former colonies, such as India, Nigeria, Brazil, Ethiopia, South 
Africa, and Indonesia, whose socioeconomic and political conditions, argu-
ably, are similar to those in the Middle East or the post- Ottoman Balkans.13 
Thus, explanations emphasizing colonial effects or the unique social struc-
ture of the Balkans might not adequately account for the nature of post- 
Ottoman state- building.
As argued elsewhere the “dots of the Ottoman history” might have been 
drawn differently in constructing hegemonic post- Ottoman narratives. One 
could argue that local conditions, including the diverse but “modernizing 
impact” of the west, could have given the region an early advantage in power- 
sharing. Faced with comparable challenges, as for instance in India, other 
postcolonial leaders successfully countered colonial legacies by “crafting a 
pragmatic, political secularism that offered symmetrical treatment to various 
religious communities” (Kohli 2001: 5). In contrast, in the post- Ottoman 
lands, coercive power- sharing turned the region’s “early advantage” of toler-
ance into an unfortunate demonstration of how federalism and consociation-
alism lack prospects or viability. 
It is useful to draw comparisons with post- communist societies as well. 
Critics of power- sharing in the region claim that ethno- federalism facilitates 
nationalist mobilization and state disintegration, an issue raised in the rele-
vant literature (Bunce 1999). For Bunce, the design of these systems puts into 
place virtually all the building blocks necessary for the rise of nationalist 
movements (49). This process seems to be confined to communist federa-
tions, although a similar argument could be made about authoritarian re-
gimes in the Middle East. In Yugoslavia, Stefanovic identifies the problem as 
the country’s centralism, not federalism. He argues that “despite its formal 
federal character, the centralized organization of the Communist Party, 
which wielded political and economic power, insured that Yugoslavia was a 
unitary state” (forthcoming). He concludes: “Communist Yugoslavia was not 
a genuine federation as the communist federations were federal in form but 
unitary in content” (emphasis added; see also Connor 1984; McGarry 1998a). 
Despite their “federal and consociational failures,” some of the successor 
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states of the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia 
(like Lebanon), returned to such arrangements in the absence of alternatives 
and in the search for more genuine and viable forms of power- sharing. These 
areas are already demonstrating signs of success: decreased violence, reduced 
international involvement in peacekeeping commitments, and, as shown 
later in the book, return in some areas of internally displaced persons. Insti-
tutional innovation was key in transcending some of the obstacles facing 
those renewed power- sharing projects. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, Bosnia 
has partly escaped the fate of other postconflict societies such as Cyprus, 
where lines of division were perpetuated with almost zero returns. Mean-
while, power- sharing provisions in the Republic of Macedonia prevented re-
newed violence after the short 2001 war despite predictions to the contrary. 
As argued in Chapter 3, the provisions of the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
combined many of the characteristics of the Northern Irish d’Hondt innova-
tion especially with regard to the latter’s automaticity and inclusivity across 
ethnic lines. 
Conclusions
More broadly, with regard to the post- Ottoman space my conclusions are 
threefold. First, traditions of elite accommodation and past legacies matter. 
On the one hand, they sustain power- sharing arrangements (Daalder 1974; 
Lijphart 1977); on the other hand, they act as barriers to such arrangements 
if negative memories, nationalist narratives and false analogies prevail in the 
public discourse. Although contemporary federal and power- sharing models 
differ greatly from the Ottoman Empire’s millet system, communist Yugosla-
via, or the postcolonial arrangements created for Cyprus and Lebanon, these 
cases sustain discourses negating federalism and consociational arrange-
ments; they also constrain recent institutional innovations that could poten-
tially overcome the obstacles that led to past failures. 
Second, the careful reading of post- Ottoman (and world) history sug-
gests that even the most promising federal and consociational projects could 
fail. As Haklai (2011) frames this same puzzle: “if power- sharing is a good 
method for governing diverse societies and is normatively desirable . . .  why 
is it relatively scarce among states that emerged in the twentieth century” (2). 
The chapter has demonstrated through the experience of post- Ottoman 
neighborhood the resistance of narratives to conflict- mitigating mechanisms 
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including institutional innovation. Aspiring federations such as Moldova, 
Georgia, or Cyprus might well conclude from this comparative and transhis-
torical exercise that there is nothing inevitable in their federal projects; as in 
the case of aborted federal movements of the past centuries, some federal 
ambitions might materialize while others will fall into oblivion.
Finally, recent examples from postwar Yugoslavia and elsewhere suggest 
that the appropriate institutional design could overcome ideational and 
structural barriers. Of course, reintroducing power- sharing in difficult cases 
where previous experience has been negative might require major invest-
ment and support from outside actors, at least for a transitional period. In 
addition, related peace mediations require a deep understanding of the argu-
ments of critics highlighted earlier in the book. It is essential to confront the 
arguments of those who oppose power- sharing and to design institutional 
arrangements that ease potential defects. Besides analyzing post- Ottoman 
failures, we need to identify conflict- mitigating institutions that have been 
most effective under “least likely” conditions. The “transferability potential” 
of such institutional arrangements lies in their capacity to mitigate “most dif-
ficult” conflict situations, setting the stage for comparable arrangements in 
similar or less complicated environments. 
C h a p t e r  3
Innovations in Power- Sharing: 
The Northern Irish d’Hondt
This chapter discusses innovations in power- sharing across divided societies 
by focusing primarily on comparative lessons from Northern Ireland. As 
stated in the introductory chapter, the d’Hondt system has contributed to 
broad inclusive coalitions and political stability in the province particularly 
since the restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly in 2007 (O’Leary et 
al. 2005; McGarry and O’Leary 2009a; Schwartz 2011). By incentivizing the 
participation of all major parties in government, the d’Hondt skips a prob-
lematic and time- consuming aspect of consociationalism, namely that of 
forming interethnic majority coalitions. I use the case of Cyprus as a counter- 
example to the d’Hondt procedure where seemingly promising formulas 
have failed to be negotiated in the past emphasizing the reasons behind such 
failures in power- sharing mediations. I argue that a modified d’Hondt system 
could be highly relevant for peace mediations in the island and that it could 
fit nicely with the specific features and needs of federalism in Cyprus. 
Power- sharing in Cyprus could take a number of different forms, each of 
which could be reflected in an alternative electoral design or system of govern-
ment, for instance, in a parliamentary or presidential democracy, or, as sug-
gested below, a semipresidential system aiming to integrate the two. Before 
selecting one arrangement, however, it is important to understand the broader 
criteria for power- sharing in divided societies. Power- sharing arrangements 
should first carry the promise of functioning smoothly, even if elected hard-
liners veto important legislation in an attempt to challenge federal unity. 
Equally, if political parties from the divided communities fail to form a gov-
erning coalition (as for instance in Belgium during its record- breaking 541 
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days without an elected coalition government in 2009– 2010), mechanisms to 
resolve deadlocks should be present to secure the proper functioning of the 
central government. Second, it is necessary to consider how a power- sharing 
proposal accommodates the interests of each political party, a crucial question 
in the current Cyprus peace talks. This is an essential aspect of any mediation, 
as individual parties are unlikely to endorse an electoral or governance system 
in the peace talks or subsequent referendums, if any of its provisions threatens 
the perceived interests of their communities and their own future capacity as 
political parties to serve the public. 
To set the context, the chapter introduces past and current mediation pro-
posals and notes how these have been debated internally in Cyprus. It discusses 
the history and logic of the Annan Plan provisions and the subsequent cross- 
voting arrangements agreed on by Talat and Christofias in 2009, pioneered by 
Costa Carras and the Friends of Cyprus in the 1970s. It also revisits an earlier 
argument (Loizides and Keskiner 2004) that relates cross- voting proposals in 
Cyprus to Horowitz’s intellectual tradition (see also McGarry 2011). It goes on 
to debate the merits of cross- voting as well as to address its multiple limita-
tions. The second part of the chapter argues that a Northern Irish style d’Hondt 
executive offers a more negotiable and durable arrangement in Cyprus. It 
draws from the Cypriot experience to juxtapose Horowitz’s approach to power- 
sharing with the alternative consociational view proposed by Arend Lijphart 
(see also McGarry and O’Leary 2009a; McGarry 2011). More important, it in-
tegrates the two intellectual approaches through a proposal for a mixed semi-
presidential system for Cyprus (and potentially for other divided societies 
currently relying on presidential systems such as Colombia or Ukraine). 
The 2002– 2004 Annan Plan Arrangements
Was power- sharing in the Annan Plan unfair and dysfunctional? Critics have 
focused on the aborted plan’s vetos, forms of rotating presidency, and conten-
tious use of foreign arbitration in case of deadlocks. Coufoudakis points out 
that the proposed system was dysfunctional, given the apparent veto powers 
granted to the Turkish Cypriots and “the fact that disputes will be resolved by 
non- Cypriots, as in the case of the Supreme Court and the Central Bank” 
(2004: 10). As stated in the previous chapter, criticisms have also noted the 
disparity between decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and provisions of the Annan Plan on property and the right of return (Palley 
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2005). In many aspects, the Annan Plan prioritized the rights of Turkish Cy-
priots (and settlers) with regard to property and more important power- 
sharing, but failed to “compensate” Greek Cypriots on issues of security and 
the right of return (Palley 2005; see also Loizides and Antoniades 2004, 2009). 
If the Annan Plan had been approved by the Greek Cypriots, the reunited 
island would have had a Senate with a 50- 50 composition reflecting the polit-
ical equality of the two communities (i.e., with voting rights based on ethnic 
background) and a Chamber of Deputies elected separately in each of the 
constituent states reflecting their respective populations (with no less than a 
quarter of the seats allocated to the Turkish Cypriot constituent state). Ac-
cording to all versions of the Plan, ordinary decisions in the Senate would 
have required a majority to agree, including at least a quarter of the represen-
tatives from each community. On issues of vital interest, such as the election 
of the Presidential Council (an executive body similar to that in Switzerland), 
there was a provision for a special majority of at least two- fifths of the sena-
tors from each side plus approval by the Chamber of Deputies.1 
To reduce Turkish Cypriot apprehensions about the resettlement of Greek 
Cypriots under Turkish Cypriot administration, the plan delinked residency 
and voting rights for the Senate. Thus, it proposed that members of each 
community would vote separately for their representatives in the Senate (i.e., 
as Greek and Turkish Cypriots) while representatives in the Chamber of 
Deputies would be voted in each constituent state. Cross- voting was initially 
debated during the negotiations but eventually abandoned with regard to 
electing the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, as the Turkish Cypriot side 
argued that such electoral mechanisms were incompatible with “genuine” 
Turkish Cypriot representation.2 Meanwhile, Greek Cypriots showed little in-
terest, even though the National Council had since 1989 entertained such 
cross- voting arrangements (Press Information Office 1989). 
Ironically, the Plan maintained centripetalist provisions in electing the 
Presidential Council on a cross- community basis. As discussed above, the 
council was not supposed to be appointed by each community independently 
but on a “single list by special majority in the Senate and approved by majority 
in the Chamber of Deputies for a five year term”.3 This provision maintained an 
element of dysfunctionality that was nonetheless addressed through a Belgium- 
style requirement for the previous government to stay in power, if party nego-
tiations had failed to agree on a new coalition (McGarry forthcoming). 
Both communities expressed reservations about the operation of the two 
Chambers in the Annan Plan. Greek Cypriots feared that the strict bizonal 
Innovations in Power-Sharing 77
character of the Senate would prevent decision- making and voting in the 
Presidential Council because of the Turkish Cypriot veto. The latter could 
have normally vetoed a decision either at the Senate if less than one quarter 
approved a decision4 or at the Presidential Council if both Turkish Cypriot 
representatives voted against.5 For their part, the Turkish Cypriots feared po-
tential deadlocks at the Greek Cypriot- dominated Chamber of Deputies. A 
mutually agreed compromise in the Senate and Presidential Council could 
have still failed to gain majority endorsement in the Chamber of Deputies 
where Greek Cypriots controlled as many as three quarters of seats.6 As stated 
previously (see Chapter 2) majorities are often reluctant to “grant” numerical 
minorities veto rights. Greek Cypriots have not been an exception; Turkish 
Cypriot veto rights have been one of the most contentious aspects of negoti-
ations and public debates for decades. 
Is a Turkish Cypriot veto an essential characteristic of a consociational 
agreement? In theory, it is possible to have a federal arrangement that allows 
the two Cypriot communities to run most domestic affairs in their respective 
constituent states while decisions at the federal level could be made by a sim-
ple majority irrespective of ethnic origin (closer to the Canadian federal 
model). In Cyprus, an effort could be made to include Turkish Cypriots in-
formally in this majority, but this would fall short of endorsing a formal veto 
right for the Turkish Cypriot community. By extension, given the percentage 
of the Turkish Cypriots (historically around 18 percent), removing their offi-
cial veto seems a fair adjustment in future mediations. 
Yet the logic of this argument is flawed. The veto concept is not a product 
of the current negotiations, but a central feature of the 1960 constitution, re-
iterated in the references to political equality signed by Papadopoulos- Talat 
on July 8, 2006. It will be difficult to convince any side at the negotiating table 
to give up what its community considers an inalienable and established right, 
especially after decades of de facto partition. On this same issue, critics are 
incorrect when they argue that veto rights or rotating presidencies cannot be 
found in other countries; in fact, a list of federal countries discussed below 
rely on similar arrangements, not to mention the EU itself (arguably in the 
eyes of many a confederation). 
There are other considerations when creating a fair arrangement for both 
sides in the island. According to Will Kymlicka, an argument “in defense of 
group- differentiated rights for national minorities is that those are the result 
of historical agreements, such as the treaty rights of indigenous peoples, or 
the agreements by which two or more peoples agreed to federate” (1995: 
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116). Kymlicka emphasizes the importance of historic arrangements but rec-
ognizes that previous agreements can be made under duress, an argument 
that both communities in Cyprus could, in theory, have employed until the 
signing of the July 8, 2006, Agreement of Papadopoulos and Talat, which 
took place with little external pressure or international interference. Kym-
licka also addresses the equality critique that assumes a state must treat its 
citizens with equal respect. He stresses that deviations from the principle of 
equality can be made when the demos is contested and when there is a “prior 
question of determining which citizens should be governed by which states” 
(116). Finally, he argues that it is a serious breach of trust to renege on histor-
ical agreements signed in good faith because these agreements give rise to 
legitimate expectations by citizens who come to rely on them (119). 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, minority vetos could add to the func-
tionality of a peace settlement. On the one hand, in a majoritarian federation 
there is a temptation not to take minority views seriously or to rely on non-
representative views of the minority; the question of who to listen to, to what 
extent, and under what circumstances remains undefined and subject to 
(electoral) cycles of moderation and escalation. On the other hand, properly 
crafted consociational arrangements could add a measure of certainty and 
reduce transactions costs, including negotiating new rules each time deci-
sions have to be made. More important, inclusive consensus democracies, 
according to several studies, are better not only at managing ethnic diversity 
but also at running more effective economic policies, particularly in times of 
crisis. Lijphart (1999/2012), in his influential Patterns of Democracy, identi-
fies a set of fiscal indicators (e.g., inflation) in which consociational democra-
cies outperform majoritarian ones. International markets and the EU 
Commission have pointed in the same direction in recent calls for consensus- 
building and power- sharing in debt crisis- ridden countries. Broad inclusivity 
builds consensus and adds to a government’s capacity to deal with fiscal cri-
ses and other major challenges (Kovras and Loizides 2015). 
Interestingly, while maintaining the positive aspects of consociational-
ism, the 2004 UN plan significantly watered down the 1960s Turkish Cypriot 
veto. Depending on the issue, a coalition constituted of just 20– 40 percent 
Turkish Cypriots was proposed as a compromise in governing the federal 
structures of reunited Cyprus (Loizides 2009d).  
Yet the “moderate” critics of the Annan Plan at the time also criticized its 
lack of integrative elements. Several independent proposals suggested possi-
ble improvements to the UN Plan using the concept of cross- voting between 
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the two communities (Emerson and Tocci 2002; Rotberg 2003; Anastasakis 
et al. 2004). Cross- voting or weighted voting has a long history in the island, 
and it is undeniably one of the most innovative ideas produced in bicommu-
nal workshops in the past decades. Costa Carras and the London- based 
Friends of Cyprus have both lobbied for such arrangements since the late 
1970s. References to cross- voting were also included in the Greek Cypriot 
proposals of 1989. 
Notably, although held independently, three university conferences in the 
final months of 2003 at Harvard, Oxford, and Cornell led to similar sugges-
tions. The Harvard conference resulted in a report titled “Cyprus After the 
Annan Plan: Next Steps Toward a Solution” (Rotberg 2003), authored by 
Robert Rotberg with the input of leading political figures from both sides of 
the island. Rotberg suggested that cross- voting or other similar electoral 
methods could encourage, even mandate, coalition- building across ethnic 
and state lines. He described this type of voting as beneficial for the Turkish 
Cypriots, arguing that cooperation across ethnic lines could work to elimi-
nate discrimination against numerical minorities. Likewise, the Oxford re-
port, “Getting to Yes: Suggestions for Embellishment of the Annan Plan for 
Cyprus” (Anastasakis et al. 2003), suggested that “cross- voting would poten-
tially greatly contribute to enhancing the role of moderate factions in island 
politics and increasing the fluidity of the new political system on the island.” 
In fact, the idea of cross- voting has been developed for many years by peace 
activists in the island. In a 2002 speech in the House of Commons, Andrew 
Dismore (vice- chair of the Friends of Cyprus) pointed out that without cross- 
voting there was a risk that rejectionists on both sides could create problems, 
as in Northern Ireland at the time (Dismore 2002). Finally, at the Cornell 
conference on Cyprus titled “Crossing the Green Line,” a leading expert on 
ethnic relations in the former Yugoslavia, Chip Gagnon, stated that the ab-
sence of an electorate mechanism ensuring ethnic cooperation has been a 
major factor in the current malfunctioning of the Bosnian political system.7 
The 2009 Cross- Voting Arrangements
Given its earlier support by academics and NGOs, the 2009 compromise on 
cross- voting by Talat and Christofias could have in principle catalyzed bi-
communal negotiations in the island. Briefly stated, the 2009 compromise 
stipulated the following had a related settlement been approved: it allowed all 
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Cypriots a double vote, in their ethnic community and (with a suggested 
standardized weight of about 20 percent) in the other community. In the 
election of the president, every person would have one vote, making Turkish 
Cypriots an electoral minority of around 20 percent. In a second election, 
Turkish Cypriots would vote for a vice- president (to become president for 
one- third of the term). Greek Cypriots would participate but with a weighted 
vote of about 20 percent. Thus, the Greek Cypriot vote would be significantly 
weighted, and the community would become an electoral minority of the 
Turkish Cypriots. As stated above, the Greek Cypriot president would be 
head of government two- thirds of the time, the Turkish Cypriot for one third. 
In cases of constitutional deadlock, the acting president would have the win-
ning vote and play the role of arbitrator. 
Critics in both communities have argued that weighted votes and rotat-
ing presidencies are a Cypriot innovation with no international precedents. 
Yet weighted voting systems in particular are neither new nor particularly 
exceptional. As discussed in the Introduction, a significant percentage of the 
world’s population live in democratic or democratizing federations. By their 
very nature, federal systems try to balance individual rights with those of 
constituent federal units, drawing on weighted voting systems to do so. In 
mature democracies such “electoral anomalies” might be initially resisted but 
are often accepted and gradually become almost completely normalized in 
the public eye (Economist 2011).
In fact, to refute anti- federalist claims, relevant examples could be drawn 
from more than a dozen federations. In Switzerland, for example, apart from 
the system of the rotating presidency, “one citizen from Uri outweighs 34 citi-
zens from Zurich” (Linder 1994: 73). Linder notes that in the country, 9 per-
cent of the Swiss population (residing in the smallest cantons) could block a 
democratic majority of 91 percent. Such ratios are not unique to Switzerland. 
In the United States, the difference in a Senate vote between the smallest and 
largest states can reach a ratio of 1 to 50 or more, while in 2000, Al Gore won 
the popular vote but lost the election because of the way the Electoral College 
system operates in the election of the president. In Australia, Tasmania, with 
about 502,000 people, has the same number of senators as New South Wales 
with over seven million. Prince Edward Island in Canada, with 138,632 resi-
dents, has four (appointed) senators, while Vancouver Island (not a province 
but part of British Columbia), with over 740,000, might have none. Manitoba, 
a single province, derailed the Meech Lake Accord with Quebec in 1990, while 
Ireland delayed the Lisbon treaty for the whole EU. 
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There are other examples in the EU. In northern Italy, in the little known 
province of Bolzano- Bozen, also called South Tyrol, a German- speaking 
population of about 290,000 shares space with an Italian- speaking popula-
tion of 120,000, along with 18,000 Ladins. A major feature of power- sharing 
in South Tyrol is the compulsory rotation of offices in the presidency of the 
provincial Assembly. The presidency consists of one president and one vice- 
president elected by the Assembly. In the first half of every five- year legisla-
tive period, an elected representative of the German- speaking group must be 
chosen president and an Italian vice- president; in the second half, their roles 
reverse (Wolff 2009: 14– 15). In another level of power- sharing between the 
provinces of South Tyrol and Trentino (forming the region of Trentino- Alto 
Adige/Südtirol), in the provinces’ joint regional Assembly, majority Italians 
and minority German- speakers rotate the presidency and vice- presidency. 
Bosnia provides a relevant example among post- Ottoman successor 
states. Since the Dayton Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina have been divided 
(or reunited) through a complex constitutional architecture featuring on the 
one hand the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the other the 
Republika Srpska (often called the Bosnian Serb Republic). So far the post- 
Dayton Bosnia has survived a permanent division, and for a time the country 
escaped the majoritarian and disintegrating nation- state trajectory of the 
post- Ottoman region partly due to the heavy- handed approach of the inter-
national community following the 1992– 1995 civil war. As in Switzerland 
and South Tyrol, Bosnia has a rotating presidency. The office of the president 
rotates between a Croat, a Muslim, and a Serb (Bieber 2003; Belloni 2008); 
however, the principle of restricting the office to representatives of the three 
main ethnic groups received condemnation of the ECtHR in the Seldić and 
Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina case (McCrudden and O’Leary 2013). In Re-
publika Srpska, the candidate with the highest number of votes wins the race, 
whereas in the Federation, the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) candidate and the 
Croat candidate with the most votes win the election for state president. The 
2000 demographic situation was Bosniak 48, Serb 37.1, and Croat 14.3 per-
cent.8 Thus, although Bosniaks outnumber Croats by four to one, the Bos-
niak and Croat presidents have almost equal influence.9 Many scholars and 
practitioners dismiss the Bosnian model, yet the latter has reduced violence 
and brought stability to a wartorn and hitherto partitioned country (see also 
Chapter 5 on return of the displaced). Despite the pitfalls of Dayton’s institu-
tional structure, the majority of Bosnians today would not oppose the agree-
ment, if they had the chance to vote for it in a peace referendum.10 
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In short, weighted voting and rotating presidencies, particularly follow-
ing conflict, is not the exception but is commonly found in both established 
and democratizing federations. States have used federal structures for de-
cades (in some cases for centuries), and new federations have emerged re-
cently, especially in Europe, successfully addressing ethnic balances while 
distancing themselves from the “one person one vote formula.” The latter way 
of thinking is increasingly recognized as being not only unfair by perma-
nently excluding minorities from power but also destabilizing, as those ex-
cluded may resort to secession or violence (e.g., Kurds in Turkey, Albanians 
in the former Yugoslavia, Irish Republicans in Northern Ireland before 1998, 
and Tamils in Sri Lanka). The critical question is whether weighted- voting 
systems as the one suggested in Cyprus can be inclusive of all citizens and 
potentially conducive of moderation. 
Consociationalism Versus Centripetalism
For the most part, consociationalism involves guaranteed group representa-
tion. Elites come together to rule in the interests of society because they rec-
ognize the dangers of noncooperation (Lijphart 2004). Because it focuses on 
elite bargaining and mutual vetoes, critics argue that consociationalism pre-
vents the development of a stable culture of compromise at the grassroots 
level. Horowitz (1985: 342) points out that the conflict- promoting character 
of consociational systems stems from the absence of incentives for cross- 
community cooperation (see also Moore et al. 2014). This lack of incentives, 
above all, leads to ethnic outbidding. For instance, an ethnic party represent-
ing Serbs in Bosnia would compete intra- ethnically with another Serbian 
party, rather than with broader cross- community coalitions also inclusive of 
Muslims and Croats (and vice versa). Parties become more antagonistic, crit-
ics say, leading to public alienation from the peace process. 
As in Cyprus, critics elsewhere have suggested incentives for cross- ethnic 
moderation, including electoral mechanisms allowing members of an ethnic 
community to vote for the other community’s representatives, in addition to 
voting for their own (Horowitz 1991, 1993). Parties are encouraged to form 
coalitions before elections, creating broadly inclusive but majoritarian gov-
ernments (Sisk 1996: 35). Successful electoral engineering lacks precedent, 
however. According to Sisk one major weakness of integrative approaches is 
“the lack of whole- country empirical examples of working systems” (35). 
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Centripetalist devices also carry various risks. For one thing, despite positive 
intentions, political parties might lose control of voters in moments critical 
for the peace agreement; for another, incentives for electoral moderation 
might backfire among the public, if each ethnic community turns its back on 
electoral incentives and limits its vote to community representation, effec-
tively restricting its own representation in government (Loizides and Keski-
ner 2004; McGarry and O’Leary 2009a). According to Lijphart, healthy 
partisan competition requires that the basic rules of the democratic election 
game are broadly supported (Lijphart 1994: 151). Such considerations are 
pertinent in divided societies particularly in the absence of prior power- 
sharing experience and reconciliation initiatives, as suggested in the follow-
ing chapters. 
Hardliners and Power- Sharing 
Moreover, critics might point to the vulnerabilities of a federal system if 
hardliners come to power. Every society has moderates and hawks, and there 
are cycles when the former or the latter come to power. Yet, as this chapter 
demonstrates, there are often unrealistic expectations as to the capacities of 
moderates or inherently detrimental role of hardliners. International rela-
tions literature has even questioned whether moderates are more likely to 
reach peace than hardliners, especially in the long term (Schultz 2005), while 
consociational literature has pointed to the risks of excluding hardliners from 
negotiated peace agreements (McGarry and O’Leary 2009a). Because of fed-
erations’ inherent flexibility, the management of daily affairs is expected to 
take the form of close and cordial cooperation when moderates are in power 
and more distant cautious interaction when hardliners govern, with the un-
wanted side effect of minimizing the benefits of cooperation. 
There are admittedly risks if hardliners come to power, as they might ab-
stain from power- sharing for extensive periods of time, engage in acts of 
anti- federalist defiance, and even threaten secession. Yet this does not auto-
matically mean the end of a federation. For one thing, consociational pacts 
accommodate hardliners better than any alternatives through both local gov-
ernance and guaranteed representation at the central administration. For an-
other, a federal system with flexible structures allows adaptation to 
circumstances and is fairly sensitive to shifts in leadership attitudes. Finally, 
effective local arbitration mechanisms (with the assistance of international 
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organizations) could guarantee the long- term stability of a federation against 
deadlocks, thereby limiting the role of potential spoilers.
More important, convincing hardliners to cooperate in consociational 
systems seems less of a challenge than convincing them to endorse an inte-
grative/centripetalist system which might eliminate their political influence. 
A leading political scientist close to the Cyprus negotiations has emphati-
cally stated that for Eroğlu to endorse the current cross- voting arrangements 
agreed on by Talat and Christofias “is like turkeys voting for Christmas” (an 
observation that would apply to any future rightwing Turkish Cypriot 
leader). Likewise, in the future it will be difficult for hardline politicians (es-
pecially from the Turkish Cypriot right) to endorse an electoral system that, 
in their view, “was negotiated by the left for the left to stay in power.” Such a 
compromise will inevitably condemn certain parties to post- settlement 
isolation. 
This book’s argument on this point is simple: there is a multiplicity of 
electoral systems that can accommodate the interests of both Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots. Elected representatives and their coalition partners could 
be accommodated on this issue, especially if concessions are made in other 
areas the other side considers critical. And finally, if hardliners are offered the 
best electoral system possible and still reject it, it will be obvious that their 
side will have sole responsibility for the deadlock. The proposal below ad-
dresses these concerns but also builds on the progress already made in gover-
nance arrangements negotiated by Christofias and Talat. Potential obstacles 
are identified in advance with a view to mitigating them through the choice 
of an appropriate institutional design. 
D’Hondt plus Cross- Voting?
My suggested formula outlined below involves a semipresidential system 
with the introduction of d’Hondt at the legislative and executive levels while 
maintaining cross- voting mechanisms for the joint presidency (see also ear-
lier presentations in Politis 2012; CYBC 2012a). In a d’Hondt cabinet or sim-
ilar method, political parties will be automatically entitled to ministerial 
positions by virtue of their representation in parliament (or most likely in the 
case of Cyprus the Senate). Deputies and senators will be elected to their 
posts through proportional representation or another system safeguarding 
proportionality. The ministerial council will fill a ratio (for instance 
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4GC/2TC), and there will be rotating first and second prime ministerial po-
sitions representing the two communities. The joint presidency will involve a 
cross- voting formula as agreed on by Christofias and Talat in 2009– 2010. The 
two co- presidents will be elected directly by the two communities, each with 
a weighted contribution of 20 percent in the other’s electoral process.11 Exec-
utive power will lie primarily with the Cabinet, but the co- presidents will 
maintain key arbitration powers and deal with certain critical issues for in-
stance involving security and mediations with the UN force in the island. The 
most important responsibility of the co- presidents will be to mediate and ar-
bitrate deadlocks at all levels of government. If there are remaining unre-
solved issues, community vetos, or protracted stalemates elsewhere in the 
system, a consensus by the co- presidents will be sufficient to resolve such 
disputes before they arrive in the constitutional court or another arbitration 
mechanism. The presidential arbitration mechanism will add another demo-
cratic layer of governance to the reunification structure, creating a buffer 
zone between the constitutional court and the most inclusive form available 
of the d’Hondt executive cabinet. It will also ease critics’ objections to foreign 
arbitration as two alternative deadlock- breaking mechanisms will be in place 
before foreign or other arbitration takes place. 
As O’Leary et al. (2005) note, the d’Hondt executive is a Northern Irish 
innovation to power- sharing. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement aimed at 
accommodating all political parties in inclusive power- sharing institutions, 
while the “oversized” Northern Ireland Assembly of 108 MLAs (Members of 
the Legislative Assembly) in the province was designed to accommodate 
even the smallest loyalist parties representing former paramilitaries, elected 
through a system of proportional representation- single transferable vote 
(PR- STV).12 Moreover, political parties are not only proportionally repre-
sented in the Northern Ireland Assembly according to their total number of 
votes but also entitled to translate their assembly representation into ministe-
rial positions. Most scholars and practitioners associate the d’Hondt with the 
allocation of parliamentary seats. Its introduction in the distribution of exec-
utive positions is rare but not unprecedented, following the experience of 
Northern Ireland. The d’Hondt is also employed in allocation of committee 
chairs in the European Parliament, in allocation of cabinet positions, com-
mittee chairs, and deputy committee chairs in Northern Ireland (since 1998) 
and in municipalities in Denmark, for example, in Copenhagen since 1938. 
By inviting everyone to join the cabinet, d’Hondt or alternative mathematical 
formulas (e.g., Sainte- Laguë) could skip the most contentious aspect of 
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consociationalism in divided societies, namely, forming interethnic majority 
coalitions.
The d’Hondt allocation process and other similar methods provide a set 
of very simple formulas to estimate the number of ministries for each party 
and to draw the sequence with which parties choose ministerial positions. 
The d’Hondt formula is elegant and practical as it requires only simple divi-
sions by two, three, four, and so on. The party with the most MPs in each 
community chooses its preferred position in the government and its repre-
sentation in the Senate is divided by the d’Hondt divisor (1, 2, 3, . . .). Then 
the party with the largest ratio chooses again until positions are filled up. 
Participation is entirely voluntary, but if a party stays out of the coalition, the 
positions go automatically to other (rival) political parties. As discussed 
below, in Cyprus these “runner- up” parties could be drawn from the same 
community to maintain bicommunal balance of the settlement. If hardliners 
in one community opt out of this voluntary inclusive coalition, positions are 
assumed by default by others, most likely moderates. 
Table 2 demonstrates the strength of Parties A, B, C, and D, their quo-
tients when they are divided by the d’Hondt divisor (1, 2, 3, . . .) and finally, 
the order by which all four become entitled to six cabinet positions. Yet im-
porting the d’Hondt formula in Cyprus poses a number of practical chal-
lenges. For instance, it is important to note that in Cyprus the d’Hondt 
process would have to be run not once, as in Northern Ireland, but twice, 
once in each community. This is a result of the assumption that each commu-
nity will be awarded a certain number of cabinet positions in advance.
Table 2: Hypothetical Illustration of d’Hondt Allocation
Party Party A Party B Party C Party D
Divisor S M S M S M S M
1 34 1st choice 32 2nd choice 15 5th choice 9
2 17 3rd choice 16 4th choice 7.5 4.5
3 11.3 6th choice 10.6 5 3
Total 
ministries
3 2 1 0
S= seats in legislature; M=ministries. Parties vote divided by 1, 2, 3, . . .  (d’Hondt divisor). 
Parties choose in order of highest quotient for six ministries. Order based on percentages here 
is A,B,A,B,C,A.
Moreover, following the Northern Irish d’Hondt procedure per se might 
not be the only alternative. Sides could consider all alternative mechanisms 
Innovations in Power-Sharing 87
to better guarantee inclusivity. In Cyprus, the Sainte- Laguë divisor, for in-
stance, with six Greek Cypriot and four Turkish Cypriots could be a more 
suitable and negotiable arrangement for the Cypriot context. It will ensure 
the broad representation as understood by local political parties some of 
which are critical for the success of future peace talks. The tables below 
demonstrates the allocations based on the d’Hondt and Sainte- Laguë divisor 
formula (using 1, 3, 5, . . .  as denominators) with six Greek Cypriots and four 
Turkish Cypriots elected to the federal executive. Ten cabinet positions will 
probably be the maximum number of portfolios as the central government 
will have limited authorities in a decentralized federation (see Chapter 1). 
Increasing portfolios might unintentionally expand powers for the federal 
government unless some ministers are appointed without portfolios. As 
stated elsewhere in this book, DISY, AKEL, DIKO, and EDEK are parties in 
the Greek Cypriot community, while CTP, UBP, and DP are the three main 
political parties in the Turkish Cypriot side. 
Table 3: D’Hondt Allocation of Six Greek Cypriot Seats
Party DISY AKEL DIKO EDEK
Divisor S M S M S M S M
1 20 1st choice 19 2nd choice 9 5th choice 5
2 10 3rd choice 9.5 4th choice 4.5 2.5
3 6.7 6th choice 6.3 3 1.6
Total 
ministries
3 2 1 0
S=Seats in legislature; M= ministries. D’Hondt divisor: 1, 2, 3, . . .  D’Hondt sequence: DISY, 
AKEL, DISY, AKEL, DIKO, DISY. Alternative Sainte-Laguë divisor (see below): 1, 3, 5, . . .
Sainte-Laguë Sequence (see below): DISY, AKEL, DIKO, DISY, AKEL, EDEK (Sainte-Laguë 
offers DIKO a better pick and EDEK a seat in the cabinet at the expense of DISY).
Table 4: Sainte-Laguë Allocation of Six Greek Cypriot Seats
Party DISY AKEL DIKO EDEK
Divisor S M S M S M S M
1 20 1st choice 19 2nd choice 9  3rd choice 5 6th choice
3  6.7 4th choice 6.3 5th choice 3 1.7
5  4 3.8 1.8 1
Total 
ministries
2 2 1 1
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Table 5: D’Hondt Allocation of the Four Turkish Cypriot Seats
Party CTP UBP DP TDP
Divisor S M S M S M S M
1 21 1st choice 14 2nd choice   12 3rd choice 3
2 10.5  4th choice 7    6 1.5
3 7 4.7    4 1
Total 
ministries
2 1  1 0
S=seats in legislature; M=ministries. D’Hondt divisor: 1, 2, 3, . . . d’Hondt sequence: CTP, UBP, 
DP, CTP.Alternative Sainte-Laguë divisor (see below): 1, 3, 5, . . .  Sainte-Laguë sequence (see 
below):  CTP, UBP, DP, CTP. Th ere is no diff erence in the allocation of Turkish Cypriot seats, 
but following historical results Sainte-Laguë might be a better option for the moderate left .
Table 6: Sainte-Laguë Allocation of Four Turkish Cypriot Seats
Party CTP UBP DP TDP
Divisor S M S M S M S M
1 21 1st choice 14 2nd choice 12 3rd choice 3
3   7 4th choice 4.7 4 1
5  4.2 2.8 2.4 0.6
Total 
ministries
2 1 1 0
Figure 1. Pie-chart illustrations of d’Hondt (right) and Sainte-Leaguë (left).
A main advantage of sequential portfolio allocation is automaticity which 
implicitly reduces the veto powers of one community against the other in 
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deciding the cabinet positions. Th is is also the sequence through which cur-
rent political parties could choose ministerial positions based on their elec-
toral strength in late 2013. For instance, the sequence for Sainte- Laguë could 
be DISY, CTP, AKEL, UBP, DIKO, DP, DISY, CTP, AKEL, EDEK, assuming 
the two communities will also allocated ministries in rotation. 
An all- party cabinet formula will have multiple advantages for Cyprus. 
To begin, the various options presented above could be matched with a spe-
cifi c country’s political dynamics. As I read the situation, for instance, using 
the Sainte- Laguë divisor with six Greek and four Turkish Cypriots might be 
the most suitable arrangement for the Cypriot context and to ensure broad 
representation as understood by local political actors. Both the d’Hondt and 
Sainte- Laguë (as well as the Danish) divisors off er simple and inclusive ways 
to share power in a society that is deeply divided, not only in ethnic terms but 
also between left  and right.13 Th ese formulas are based on the pragmatic as-
sumption that a single party alone from each community cannot successfully 
address the challenges of reunifi cation. Broad coalitions allow everyone to 
participate in democratic governance without exclusions, as these might turn 
signifi cant constituencies against the peace settlement. 
As suggested by the Northern Irish experience, the automaticity of the 
formula eliminates the requirement to enter post- election negotiations to 
form a coalition (McEvoy 2006). Prolonged deadlocks in forming govern-
ments could be particularly problematic especially at the time of a global fi -
nancial meltdown. Th e absence of formal d’Hondt style arrangements has left  
federal countries without elected governments for prolonged periods as seen 
in Belgium in 2009– 2010.14 Under d’Hondt or a related process, if parties do 
not voluntarily assume their assigned cabinet posts, others will be entitled to 
step in. Th is is a major improvement from the parliamentary system of the 
Annan Plan, which sought the formation of coalitions similar to the Belgian 
model,15 and also closer to the Swiss “magic formula” (although the latter re-
quires individual approval of each cabinet member by the Swiss Parliament). 
Th e d’Hondt system in a federal Cyprus will enable moderate parties to 
cooperate without alienating hardliners or upsetting current coalition prefer-
ences among political parties for government or municipal posts. By relying 
on cross- voting, a moderate party might face two equally problematic situa-
tions: to be excluded from future coalitions or to run the government alone 
against the united opposition of its own community. By extension, parties 
risk losing critical allies or being outfl anked. 
Moreover, if AKEL forms a federal government together with moderate 
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Turkish Cypriot parties, DISY would align with DIKO and EDEK to exclude 
AKEL from state and municipal posts and vice versa. By contrast, d’Hondt 
eliminates the fear of exclusion and minimizes political risks for all actors, 
enabling constructive collaborations on issues. Moreover, because the 
d’Hondt executive does not make a distinction between hardliners and mod-
erates, all major parties are entitled of representation in government. Once in 
the cabinet, moderates and hardliners face the same incentives to compro-
mise by trading on issues that are less important in exchange for issues that 
are absolute priorities. 
Advocates of d’Hondt argue that engaging hardliners in compromises 
while in power is preferable to having them obstruct the peace process in 
opposition. The Northern Irish experience demonstrates that even when 
hardliners increase their support, they only do so by substantially moderat-
ing their agendas on critical issues (Mitchell et al. 2009). Northern Ireland 
also suggests that power- sharing can be introduced in societies with no pre-
vious tradition of power- sharing arrangements; suggesting its transferability 
across a wider set of cases. The province’s Sunningdale experiment with 
power- sharing was even shorter than Cyprus’s, lasting only a few months 
(1973– 1974). Yet institutional innovations could often overcome previous 
negative experiences and thus transcend obstacles to power- sharing. Inter-
estingly, in Northern Ireland itself there is little clarity as to the origins of the 
d’Hondt procedure, although UUP interviewees have claimed ownership of 
the idea. Citing an Ulster Unionist politician, McEvoy (2014: 71) points out 
that “out of the blue, there was a proposal that departments would be shared 
around.” And as d’Hondt promised proportionality, inclusivity, and automa-
ticity, it essentially provided a much more attractive arrangement negotiable 
across the broader Unionist- Nationalist political spectrum.
Furthermore, the case of Northern Ireland is “critical” in social science 
terms as the peace agreement faced major challenges in its early implementa-
tion phase. The 1998 referendum demonstrated Unionist fears, with a slim 
majority of Protestants (estimated at about 55 percent) backing the Agree-
ment; this dropped to a minority only three years later as confidence eroded 
(MacGinty 2004: 90; Moore et al. 2014). The Unionists protested that the 
Agreement put Sinn Féin in government with no guarantees of decommis-
sioning while several issues important to each side remained unresolved as 
the Agreement relied on constructive ambiguities.16 In the 2003 Northern 
Ireland Assembly election, the moderate UUP lost its position as lead party 
of the Unionist community to its main intra- ethnic competitor, the DUP. 
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When the Sinn Féin and DUP became the largest political parties in the 
province, the merits of d’Hondt became clear, as the system was tested under 
the “most difficult conditions” in the first decade of the peace agreement. 
Despite early deadlocks, d’Hondt incentivized collaboration by guaranteeing 
seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly, surprisingly even among former 
hardliners following the St. Andrews Agreement. Interestingly, in that Agree-
ment parties agreed to annul the centripetalist provisions in the Good Friday 
Agreement in electing the two premiers on a cross- community basis, instead 
the first and deputy first ministers currently come from the two largest par-
ties.17 Since St. Andrews, the logic of automacity and proportionality has pre-
vailed, almost exclusively for all cabinet positions in the province— a 
compelling evidence of d’Hondt’s general efficacy. The only ministerial posi-
tion not subject to the d’Hondt procedure is the Department of Justice, as it is 
still considered politically contentious for a Nationalist or Unionist politician 
to hold, though there are indications that even this might change in the 
future. 
The DUP’s electoral adaptation was most evident in its power- sharing 
with Sinn Féin; the party’s position changed from total resistance to agree-
ment (Moore et al. 2014). The St. Andrews Agreement restored power- 
sharing in Northern Ireland for the longest period in the province’s troubled 
history. Power- sharing even contributed to an “amicable relationship” be-
tween figures such as Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness— dubbed “the 
chuckle brothers” by Northern Irish media. According to McGuinness, in the 
past he and Paisley never had a conversation about anything— “not even 
about the weather.” Even so, after St. Andrews their parties worked very 
closely together with no angry words between them (Purdy 2007). Equally 
important, surveys from Northern Ireland demonstrate that the devolved in-
stitutions quickly became popular, with support for establishment of the As-
sembly rising from 57 to 70 percent among DUP supporters between 1998 
and 2003, and only 13 percent of Protestants rejecting power- sharing in 2007 
(McGarry and O’Leary 2009a: 56).
D’Hondt is not without its critics, however. On the issue of functionality, 
some feel that a government of all parties might lack coordination and con-
sensus. Unlike Northern Ireland, which can look to the UK and/or the Re-
public of Ireland for ad hoc arbitration (see O’Leary 1999b; McGarry and 
O’Leary 2009a), Cyprus cannot rely on direct rule by Athens and Ankara if 
power- sharing arrangements fail. Alternative mechanisms have to be identi-
fied if parties use their cabinet posts to block important legislation or, worse 
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yet, fail to enter a shared government. Or disagreements might arise at differ-
ent levels of governance within the cabinet, the two parliaments or any sub-
unit of the federation. 
The Annan Plan aimed at resolving such disputes through the arbitration 
of the constitutional court, a slow process at best. Likewise, the 1959 Zürich- 
London Agreements included a neutral judge who nonetheless depended on 
the two community leaders for appointment (Ker- Lindsay 2011: 26). 
On this issue, the present book adds another layer of arbitration to the 
reunification structure by entrusting co- presidents with the authority to me-
diate future conflicts by consensus. Combined with a d’Hondt executive, 
cross- voting for an arbitration co- president will have many positive effects. 
Hardliners will be less likely to veto a particular legislation, knowing that a 
co- president from their own community might reach a different compromise 
that would not necessarily reflect their preferences. Co- presidents will make 
decisions faster and in a more democratic fashion, leaving external arbitra-
tion as the last resort. They will have more flexibility in terms of time than the 
constitutional court and will be in a position to negotiate linkages across dif-
ferent issues, thereby maximizing gains for the two communities. 
Decision- making could be transferred to the constitutional court only if 
all democratic processes are exhausted following failure from both cabinet 
and co- presidents to resolve a deadlock. Moreover, the neutral judges could 
be appointed directly by the ECtHR as in Bosnia, unlike the Zürich- London 
constitution. Alternatively, the European Commission itself could serve as an 
ad hoc arbitrator, as stakeholders have expressed reservations as to politiciz-
ing the executive.18 
If advocates of cross- voting are right, presidential arbitration will add 
moderation to the system. Co- presidents will be entitled to form a de facto 
executive, if the d’Hondt Cabinet fails to produce results for prolonged peri-
ods. Even though the d’Hondt executive is the most inclusive form of govern-
ment, no single party could veto a decision by itself. Depending on the final 
agreement, a majority could be defined by two Greek Cypriot and one Turk-
ish Cypriot votes. This arrangement creates a dynamic of moderation by way 
of inclusion rather than exclusion. The Annan Plan had similar arrangements 
“splitting the Turkish Cypriot veto,” but these could have been neutralized by 
coalition dynamics. For example, if the Turkish Cypriot representatives in 
the coalition hailed from the same party, they would most likely vote to-
gether, therefore the arrangement would have no effect. 
The logic of checks and balances most common for non- consociational 
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democracies needs to be reversed for consociational arrangements in divided 
societies; instead, institutional designs should eliminate multiple veto points 
and add alternative arbitration mechanisms. As Bieber argues for Bosnia, 
adding overlapping veto points might unavoidably obstruct decision- making 
(2011). For example, unlike most political systems, in a d’Hondt configura-
tion, co- presidents could not veto or alter a compromise already made at the 
executive level. 
In a nutshell, the d’Hondt plus cross- voting proposal adds a “triple lock” 
to the governance system. A consensus at any level, the d’Hondt Cabinet, the 
cross- voted presidency, or a constitutional court, would be sufficient to re-
solve a dispute. 
Benefits for Each Party
An essential criterion for a novel proposal in peace talks includes its negotia-
bility that is extending significant and credible advantages to all main politi-
cal actors in the process. The negotiability of the above formula lies in the 
maximized gains for each political party and as explained below these gains 
are both short- term and long- term as well as extremely important for each 
community and the whole island. As discussed above, the proposed formula 
avoids two equally problematic outcomes: either significant parties being ex-
cluded from ruling coalitions, or parties winning office without a majority 
from their own community having to face fierce intra- ethnic opposition. 
National Unity Party: Traditionally, right- wing politics in the Turkish Cy-
priot community have been represented by the National Unity Party (UBP, 
Ulusal Birlik Partisi) of Derviş Eroğlu and the smaller Democratic Party (DP, 
Demokrat Parti) of Serdar Denktaş19 (Sözen 2005). These parties have few 
institutional or ideological links with Greek Cypriot political parties. Taking 
a nationalist line, they have traditionally confronted leftist opposition by em-
phasizing the prevalence of “motherland nationalism.” D’Hondt is arguably 
the best arrangement the Turkish Cypriot right could get from any negotia-
tion on governance. UBP could easily lose power under any previous pro-
posal, as Greek Cypriot political parties would be hesitant to enter a coalition 
with UBP or support its presidential candidate. Instead, with d’Hondt, UBP 
would automatically secure one of the prime- ministerial positions if it be-
comes again the largest party among Turkish Cypriots. UBP would also keep 
an important Cabinet position if it stays the second largest party. With regard 
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to the co- presidency, UBP might choose to vote for a moderate center- right 
politician for instance Kudret Özersay or to keep Mustafa Akıncı in power 
(whose former party formed an alliance with Eroğlu in the late 1990s), in 
exchange for the support in regional or municipal elections. 
Progressive Party of Working People: AKEL, the Progressive Party of 
Working People (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou), has seen itself 
as the leading force behind the peaceful reunification of Cyprus since 1974 
(Trimikliniotis 2006). AKEL is often referred to as a nominally communist 
party as it has adopted a pragmatic approach to issues of governance (Faust-
mann 2008). Yet Christofias’s 2008– 13 presidency was marked with failures 
not only in managing the Cyprus peace talks but also in anticipating the sov-
ereign debt crisis and forestalling the naval base explosion in 2011.20 These 
failures not only challenged AKEL’s “historic role” as the leading political 
force in the reunification of Cyprus, but also weakened its credibility as a 
coalition partner. 
A reunification settlement with the proposed or a similar formula would 
offer AKEL an exit strategy from its current problems. It will allow AKEL to 
disengage from the cross- voting arrangements agreed on in 2009– 2010 but 
do so in a dignified and mutually beneficial manner. AKEL could elect co- 
presidents with CTP— the most likely scenario. The co- presidents would em-
body the public face of Cypriot unity abroad and mediate deadlocks 
domestically. If AKEL were to accept the above proposal, it could still form 
majority opinion in cabinet, albeit in a politically less costly manner. In addi-
tion, AKEL could constitute a majority in the Cabinet with CTP’s support, 
along with two (possibly one) of DISY, DIKO, and/or EDEK, depending on 
the final arrangements. Unlike current agreements criticized as favoring 
AKEL, this formula is undoubtedly fair and even- handed toward all other 
political parties. A comprehensive settlement based on this formula and ear-
lier progress in the 2009– 2010 period could restore AKEL’s legacy and enable 
the party a smoother reintegration into the political system.
Turkish Republican Party: The Turkish Republican Party (CTP) has been 
in the forefront of reunification efforts in the northern part of Cyprus. As 
with AKEL under the 2009– 2010 arrangement, CTP might win office but 
lack the majority support of its own community. Decisions could be blocked 
in either of the parliaments, and each president would face overwhelming 
opposition from all other political parties at home. With d’Hondt, however, 
CTP can have a secure seat in the Cabinet as the second largest party. Even if 
UBP were to retain the largest share of votes and claim the Turkish Cypriot 
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prime- ministerial post, CTP would be the kingmaker. The two Turkish Cy-
priot Cabinet members would have to agree in order to veto a decision; thus, 
CTP would hold the winning vote in most cases. CTP is the most obvious 
choice among Greek Cypriots for the co- presidency. A CTP co- president 
could mediate deadlocks or refer them to the constitutional court. 
Democratic Rally: Since its establishment in 1976, DISY (Democratic 
Rally, Demokratikos Sinagermos) has hosted center- right liberals supporting 
reunification, right- wing nationalists, and former paramilitary groups who 
opposed Makarios in 1963– 1974. DISY has transformed in recent years, tak-
ing a pro- reconciliation, progressive line (Sandal and Loizides 2013). Its 
main rivals include AKEL on the left, whose own pragmatism toward a set-
tlement has yet to meet that of DISY for ideological reasons (Trimikliniotis 
2006: 21) and DIKO in the center- right, which nonetheless failed to outbid 
DISY in the post- Annan era (Moore et al. 2014). A d’Hondt executive would 
entitle DISY to the Greek Cypriot prime- ministerial position and possibly a 
second of the four seats. This is more likely through d’Hondt, but possibly 
not with the Sainte- Laguë alternative, which slightly favors socialist EDEK. 
So far, in the Greek Cypriot community the Democratic Party (DIKO) 
has been the kingmaker forcing the two major pro- solution parties in the left 
(AKEL) and the right (DISY) to adjust their positions. Despite its growth in 
electoral strength, the Rally has maintained a conservative image domesti-
cally and established an alliance with the Democratic Party which led to a 
comfortable victory in the February 2013 presidential elections. The Demo-
cratic Party has previously been allied with the Christofias administration 
but objected even to the limited proposals made to the Turkish Cypriots by 
his negotiation team. With d’Hondt, both AKEL and DISY would have en-
larged options for collaboration across the political spectrum and beyond 
DIKO; therefore, Greek Cypriot internal party competition would be less 
damaging for moderate policies. The d’Hondt executive would encourage 
DISY and AKEL to constructively work together with minimum political 
costs. Moreover, an inclusive government would be preferable to DISY be-
cause it would allow the party to form coalitions with different partners at the 
same time. For instance, it could vote with CTP (and AKEL) on federal re-
unification issues and with UBP and DIKO on the economy. In principle, 
DISY could “steal” CTP from AKEL under the 2009– 2010 formula but this 
attempt will require major concessions on all fronts particularly the econ-
omy. With this proposal, DISY voters could still be encouraged to vote for 
CTP for the co- presidency but the party could align with UBP and DIKO on 
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economic issues in the Cabinet. By extension, d’Hondt would encourage 
constructive engagement of both left- and right- wing parties in the adminis-
tration of a reunified Cyprus. 
Democratic Party (DIKO) and Movement of Social Democrats (EDEK): At 
the center, DIKO (not to be confused with the Turkish Cypriot Democratic 
Party) and EDEK have traditionally been the kingmakers in Greek Cypriot 
presidential elections. DIKO and EDEK combine lukewarm or no support for 
a federal solution with “rhetoric for the liberation of Turkish- occupied areas” 
(Trimikliniotis 2006). A system that enables broader inclusivity in the forma-
tion of the executive is by far the best arrangement EDEK and DIKO could 
get in a future power- sharing settlement. As in the case of UBP, both DIKO 
and EDEK would be the first to be left out of coalitions under previous cen-
tripetalist proposals. There is no reason for Turkish Cypriot political parties 
to enter a coalition with these parties if they can do so with AKEL and DISY. 
Instead, with d’Hondt, DIKO will automatically secure one of the cabinet po-
sitions if it maintains its current percentages. EDEK might also hold the 
fourth seat in cabinet depending on its percentages and calculation method 
(the Sainte- Laguë method will be preferable to EDEK instead of d’Hondt). 
Communal Democracy Party and Democratic Party: Among Turkish Cy-
priots, the Communal Democracy Party (TDP) and the Democratic Party 
(DP) will most likely be left out of the cabinet with their current percentages 
under this proposal. However, they will be represented proportionally in the 
two parliaments and could trade their influence across different levels of gov-
ernment. For instance, parliamentary chairs and other key committees could 
be shared in sequence after the d’Hondt allocation of ministerial positions 
and could privilege smaller political forces. As in Northern Ireland, the same 
party might not keep both a ministry and a chair of an assembly committee 
in the same area. This limitation is essential in safeguarding satisfactory 
monitoring and parliamentary scrutiny.21 
Bicommunal and Other Parties: Finally, an arrangement could be made to 
offer additional seats in the cabinet to any non- Turkish Cypriot non- Greek 
Cypriot party winning at least 5 percent simultaneously from both commu-
nities, counting Maronites as part of the Greek Cypriot community. TDP 
might benefit from this arrangement by seeking coalitions with smaller 
Greek Cypriot moderate parties, for example, the EDI Party (United Demo-
crats) or the Maronites, depending on final provisions on minorities. O’Leary 
et al. (2005) discuss the possibility of post- election coalitions among parties 
to increase their d’Hondt allocations in the cabinet, something not permitted 
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in Northern Ireland but offered as an option in Danish municipalities. A 
middle approach might be agreed on in Cyprus to enable only bicommunal 
parties across ethnic communities to form such coalitions; this would allow a 
fair representation of voters who feel primarily Cypriot. An alternative pro-
posal is to create one special cabinet seat for reunited Nicosia, Morphou/Gü-
zelyurt, and Famagusta areas or displaced persons in general, transcending 
the boundaries of constituent states; the additional seat could be maintained 
on the basis of rotation across different areas and population groups as cur-
rently practiced with reserved seats in the Indian parliament. 
A Third Alternative: The Ohrid Framework Agreement
The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) negotiated in the Republic of 
Macedonia/FYROM in 2001 resulted to another noteworthy innovation for 
divided societies. Subsequent power- sharing arrangements attempted to bal-
ance the interests and mutual fears of the majority ethnic (Slav) Macedonians 
and minority Albanians in the western part of the country. Even though 
power- sharing has not been formally introduced in the OFA, there is an in-
formal provision for a coalition of the largest ethnic (Slav) Macedonian party 
and their largest ethnic Albanian party. This informal agreement has now 
become the convention. The consociational arrangements used in the Mace-
donian Republic arguably share d’Hondt’s automaticity (albeit in an informal 
way). To some extent this arrangement, which ended up the short civil war in 
the country in 2001, also partly shares d’Hondt’s inclusivity across ethnic 
lines but not with regard to all political parties.
Unlike d’Hondt, the OFA system allows for increased intra- ethnic oppo-
sition within each community. Advocates of the OFA system argue that hav-
ing opposition and rotation of leaders in power is necessary in a 
well- functioning democratic system (Koneska 2012). This argument also 
echoes reactions in Northern Ireland, where the two communities have been 
deprived of the ability to vote out their elected representatives and “turf the 
rascals out” (Hazell et al. 2002). The lack of an opposition, or alternative 
government- in- waiting has been criticized more and more vociferously since 
2013.22 Yet this common argument against consensus democracy has its lim-
itations. For one thing, voters might decide to move away simultaneously 
from all major political parties during major crises, as happened in some 
countries in post- 2008 Southern Europe. For another, even small changes in 
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the electoral map could trigger redistribution of portfolios leading to alterna-
tive policies. Moreover, the experience of Northern Ireland so far testifies 
that parties could be constructive in expressing their differences even in an 
all- party inclusive cabinet; if they are “wrongly” voted out by political rivals 
in the cabinet or assembly, they can turn the disagreements into future elec-
tion items. For these reasons advocates of d’Hondt in Northern Ireland have 
argued in favor of preserving sequential portfolio allocation, as it has served 
Northern Ireland well (McCrudden et al. 2013).
Also, in contrast to cross- voting, the OFA arrangement is neutral toward 
“hardliners” coming to power as d’Hondt. The latter could opt to join the 
government without having to agree on a joint government platform only if 
they succeed in becoming the first party in their community. Therefore, the 
OFA system is as arguably equally “fair and open to all parties” as d’Hondt, 
although its informality with regard to the issue of automaticity has caused 
some troubles in the Republic. With regard to Cyprus, the OFA arrangement 
appears to be the best electoral arrangement historically for the Democratic 
Rally (and possibly for the UBP). As the largest parties, they could both get 
elected to government without the need of forming electoral coalitions with 
others; an electoral provision will enable each party with a plurality of votes 
to win intra- ethnic majority seats in the parliament, as, for example, in tradi-
tional majoritarian democracies (e.g., Greece or the UK).
Yet it is questionable whether the OFA arrangement will be as conducive 
to a viable executive in Cyprus as the d’Hondt executive, since it will be diffi-
cult to imagine a single party alone from each community overcoming the 
obstacles of governing a reunited Cyprus. More important, it will be better if 
Turkish Cypriot moderates are also in government to circumvent a UBP veto. 
The OFA example could nonetheless be a point of reference in future 
negotiations.
Conclusions
Overall, a number of conclusions could be drawn. First, there are multiple 
alternative systems across postconflict societies that have functioned rela-
tively well especially in the last decade and under conditions that seemed 
prohibitive. The Republic of Macedonia/FYROM has been effectively stable 
since the OFA, with all main political parties in each community serving at 
least once in power; more important, even former Albanian paramilitaries 
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have abandoned violence for a share in power (Koneska 2012). Second, in 
Cyprus the OFA would favor the largest parties and, more specifically within 
the Greek Cypriot community, the Rally and the UBP if these two parties 
maintain plurality in the foreseeable future in their respective communities. 
OFA could be a possibility if most political parties insist on a system that 
maintains the role of opposition; however, future mediators should not ap-
pear to be benefiting their narrow and medium- term party interests but 
should communicate the need for broader consensus in decision- making as 
demonstrated in the Northern Irish d’Hondt.
Fostering consensus is a formidable task in postconflict societies, but it 
arguably becomes manageable if societies overcome legitimate fears and em-
brace available institutional innovations. Power- sharing arrangements have 
been successfully negotiated and implemented, even amid heightened inter-
communal mistrust. As demonstrated in this chapter, in Northern Ireland 
the Good Friday Agreement addressed the problem of power- sharing by giv-
ing each political party an automatic representation in Cabinet in accordance 
with the party’s electoral strength. Northern Ireland is not the only example 
of power- sharing which could inspire Cyprus. Similar models have been in-
troduced in other societies emerging from violent conflict (e.g., Burundi), in 
consolidated democracies (e.g., Switzerland, the Netherlands, or post- World 
War II Austria), local governments (e.g., Danish municipal councils) as well 
as international organizations (e.g., committee chairs in the European Parlia-
ment). Consensus democracies, according to several academic studies (Lij-
phart 1977), are better at managing diversity and also run more effective 
economic policies, something critically important in the immediate future in 
Cyprus. By departing from the winner- take- all logic, power- sharing allows 
societies to embrace novel understandings of public responsibility whereby 
the more parties share power, the better the prospects are for effective and 
sustainable management. 
Consensus democracies have several other advantages: facilitating 
decision- making, increasing durability of policies, and strengthening grass-
roots support while allowing the representation of antisystemic elements. 
Switzerland demonstrates that economic vitality and consensual decision- 
making go hand in hand. The country’s so- called “magic formula” (Linder 
1994) enables each party to propose specific candidates to the federal coun-
cil. As stated earlier, these are put under parliamentary scrutiny, and only 
those receiving the support of parliament can take up ministerial positions. 
This procedure facilitates the selection of broadly respected leaders and the 
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exclusion of extremists on the far right. Likewise, South Africa prevented a 
breakdown into racial violence by negotiating an inclusive power- sharing ar-
rangement among all major political parties during the post- apartheid pe-
riod (Guelke 2012). As these examples demonstrate, power- sharing can 
bolster trust in times of transition. Such arrangements could also break the 
intercommunal deadlock in Cyprus. More important, as this chapter demon-
strates, new ideas in Cyprus could incentivize negotiations, bring the two 
sides together and reconcile nationalism and power- sharing in a reunited 
island.
C h a p t e r  4
The Way Home: Linkages, Reciprocity, 
and Lessons from Bosnia
The story of Costas Hadjipavlou, a refugee from the village of Agios Amvro-
sios on the northern coast of Cyprus, made local news in 2002. After losing 
his property in 1974, Costas and his family, including his four daughters, 
joined the thousands forcibly displaced in the areas controlled by the Repub-
lic of Cyprus. Many readers will be familiar with the academic work of Maria 
Hadjipavlou, one of Costas’s daughters; for decades she has been a pioneer in 
shaping the intellectual agenda of Cypriot reunification as well as leading 
various bicommunal initiatives for reconciliation and gender equality across 
the island’s ethnic divide. Since 1974, her father Costas had dreamed of re-
turning home to his native land. Two months before his death in 2002, he 
made a last act of defiance against his displacement (Uludağ 2002). He drove 
his tractor in an attempt to cross the checkpoints, which at the time were still 
closed even for short visits to the North. 
The Turkish Cypriot authorities insisted that the line of partition should be 
permanently sealed for security reasons, and since 1974 divided, Cyprus re-
sembled the border divisions of the Cold War era. When the police stopped 
Costas, he said he had to go home to water his trees. He was forced to turn 
around, but the act became news in the Cypriot media and touched the hearts 
of every refugee in the island.1 As discussed earlier in this book, in 2002– 2004 
the policies of isolating the two communities were challenged in massive pub-
lic demonstrations headed by the Turkish Cypriot left, and as journalist Sevgül 
Uludağ wrote, Costas’s suffering came to symbolize the struggle against the 
“deep state” that has no relation with human feelings (2002). Sadly, Costas died 
shortly after his emblematic and highly emotional protest.
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In this chapter, I address the issue of displacement in Cyprus and offer 
some suggestions on tackling the human rights of displaced persons during 
negotiations on federalism and power- sharing. As argued earlier in the book, 
the success of future negotiations is tied to incentives for displaced Greek 
Cypriots to return home in exchange for recognition by and power- sharing 
arrangements with the Turkish Cypriot community in a reunified Cyprus. 
The tragedy of Cyprus is twofold; since 1974 Greek Cypriots from the north-
ern part of the island (about a third of the total population) have been dis-
placed, but meanwhile Turkish Cypriots who had acquired (with the 
assistance of the Turkish military) disproportionately more land found them-
selves in a legal and political limbo. Four decades later, concessions on both 
sides might foster win- win arrangements on a multiplicity of issues, and if 
these concessions take place in conditions of security and credibility, a com-
prehensive settlement might be catalyzed in the near future. 
As mentioned earlier, since 2004 Turkish Cypriot critics of the settlement 
have argued that Greek Cypriots have no incentive to settle after Cyprus joined 
the EU. The argument seems to have some merit, especially as Greek Cypriot 
management of the post- accession period does not appear to have been excep-
tionally prudent. Yet in any negotiation, sides acting wisely should seek out 
incentives likely to entice opponents across the mediation table; prudent nego-
tiators should aim to make these incentives visible, credible, and achievable. 
On the one hand, as argued earlier in chapter 3, Greek Cypriots should endorse 
inclusive power- sharing arrangements with Turkish Cypriots to secure broader 
support for the settlement and, more important, to catalyze favorable conces-
sions on other issues. On the other hand, if Turkish Cypriots accept generous 
refugee provisions for Greek Cypriots, they will improve their own negotiating 
position with regard to Turkish Cypriot concerns. In other words, the better a 
package Turkish Cypriots can “produce” on return, the higher their chances of 
winning concessions on issues prioritized by their community. 
In a nutshell, this chapter presents various formulas for negotiating the 
right of return and argues that under certain conditions, return will be benefi-
cial for both communities. While other chapters emphasize delinkage strate-
gies (see Chapter 6) in negotiations, I develop here an argument for linkage 
strategies, a process of resolving intractable issues through “package agree-
ments,” which I apply specifically to refugee and settler questions as well as 
negotiations on power- sharing and citizenship. I also highlight the importance 
of reframing images of the other to facilitate improved institutional arrange-
ments and empower a better human rights culture in a reunified Cyprus. 
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The literature on postconflict societies has generally avoided debating 
challenges in settler versus refugee disputes in aspiring federations or conso-
ciations. More important, previous peace plans for Cyprus have been moder-
ately described as “unsuccessful” in balancing human rights with political 
and security considerations (see, e.g., Michael 2009; Adelman and Barkan 
2011). Specifically, they have stipulated various forms of restrictions for in-
ternally displaced Greek Cypriots willing to return under Turkish Cypriot 
administration. This has consolidated a perception among Greek Cypriots on 
bicommunal federalism as a human rights- constraining institution rather 
than one that enhances protection of vulnerable groups, including the inter-
nally displaced. For critics of federalism, the latter will lead to “a state forma-
tion of concealed partition whose functionality requires the withdrawal of 
basic political and human rights from the Greeks of Cyprus”.2 While recog-
nizing the importance of such criticisms, this chapter aims to demonstrate 
institutional innovations that safeguard human rights, particularly for vul-
nerable groups. 
Moreover, in the broader literature little attention has been paid to timing, 
sequence of concessions, linkages, and incentives in negotiating peace. For in-
stance, in Cyprus itself linkages with regard to settler versus refugee disputes 
have rarely been explored in public or academic debates. But for a political 
settlement to work, it must first focus on human rights for vulnerable groups; 
these include refugees and relatives of individuals missing or assassinated in 
the 1963– 1974 period, but other groups should be considered as well, such as 
the “Turkish settlers,” a marginalized population of post- 1974 migrants or col-
onists (depending on one’s perspective) from mainland Turkey. 
But as the introduction hinted in the breakthrough on the issue of miss-
ing (see also Chapter 6), human rights must be carefully balanced with polit-
ical considerations and the needs of each side in the mediation. Previous 
work introduced relevant ideas, suggesting in particular a linkage between 
the number of future returnees, on the one hand, and self- adjustable incen-
tives for the Turkish Cypriot community, on the other (Loizides and Anto-
niades 2009). In this chapter, I expand this framework to examine the 
credibility of such linkages, using available survey data as well as taking into 
consideration international experience from elsewhere and the environment 
of financial and political uncertainty of the Eurozone crisis. 
Conventional wisdom assumes that such crises restrict conflict resolu-
tion prospects; however, I demonstrate how alternative institutional designs 
could instead contribute to a more resilient economic environment in 
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post- settlement Cyprus. To this end, I consider various linkages, including 
land distribution and property issues, immigration from Greece and Turkey, 
and, more important, modified refugee/settler provisions. As in previous 
chapters, to support these arguments I draw on relatively successful cases 
elsewhere, particularly in Bosnia, to inform policy recommendations in Cy-
prus. I conclude the chapter with a normative assessment of the incentives/
linkage approach and an empirical justification of its implementation.
The Cypriot Displacement Experience
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities have arguably faced com-
parable experiences with forced displacement in their recent past. Yet their 
reactions and arguments toward the “return home” have developed in differ-
ent ways. In the post- 1974 period, the Turkish Cypriot leadership tried to 
negotiate institutional arrangements preserving the island’s new demo-
graphic realities, including the presence of post- 1974 Turkish settlers/mi-
grants (Necatigil 1989; Yesilada and Sozen 2002: 275). In their narratives, 
Turkish Cypriots emphasize the period following the 1963– 1964 bicommu-
nal clashes when they were forced to settle in isolated enclaves scattered 
across the island (Fisher 2001: 310; Patrick 1976). Demographic security is 
not an unusual consideration for minorities who have historically felt threat-
ened, as shown, for instance, in the Serbian community in Bosnia (Bieber 
2006) or historically in the Jewish diaspora with regard to the formation of 
Israel (Yiftachel 2006).
On their own part, Greek Cypriots have emphasized the events of 1974 
when Turkey invaded the island, citing their own demographic fears particu-
larly with regard to the Turkish settlers. The invasion divided Cyprus into de 
facto Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sections with absolutely no com-
munication until April 2003, when the two communities were first allowed to 
cross to the other side under restrictions. As mentioned in Chapter 1, during 
the invasion approximately 160,000 Greek Cypriots were forced by the Turk-
ish military to flee their cities and villages, while around 40,000 Turkish Cy-
priots living in the south were coerced or chose to abandon their houses and 
move to the north (Fisher 2001: 311). While the opening of the checkpoints 
led to no frictions, renewed communication between the sides has not yet 
catalyzed a settlement and has even separated the two sides farther in certain 
respects, at least before Mustafa Akıncı’s election (Bryant 2010).
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In previous negotiations, the Greek Cypriot side has framed its discourse 
in human rights terms and stressed the importance of preserving the option 
of refugees to return to their original homes in the northern part of the island 
(Loizos 1981; Anastasiou 2002: 584; Broome 2004: 203). Although Greek Cy-
priot refugees are divided on whether they would actually return, they have 
always emphasized their right to choose and the obligations of the interna-
tional community to pressure Turkey to enforce refugee rights (Zetter 1994, 
1999; Yesilada and Sozen 2002: 275). During the Annan Plan negotiations, 
for example, the Greek Cypriot leadership emphasized the imperatives of ob-
serving international human rights law, the principles of EU acquis commu-
nautaire, and the need for the settlement to be perceived as just by victims of 
displacement, if it were to last.3 
By contrast, in the same negotiations, Turkish Cypriot leaders argued that 
realities on the ground, distrust, and security concerns dictated that return 
for Greek Cypriots should be strictly controlled. The Turkish Cypriots viewed 
property rights in the confines of “bizonality,” interpreted to mean a re-
stricted right of restitution for Greek Cypriot properties in the future TC 
constituent state (Gürel and Özersay 2006; Kyriakou 2009). Similar argu-
ments have been put forward in subsequent negotiations emphasizing the 
property rights of new owners, a dimension highlighted by recent decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR 2003; Christou 2008). 
Both sides have put forward historic, normative, and political arguments 
to confront each other; as the maps below demonstrate, the 1963– 1964 bi-
communal clashes (Figure 2) led to the displacement of Turkish Cypriots, 
since then dispersed throughout the island. Following the 1974 invasion and 
Greek Cypriot displacement from the north, various UN plans have pro-
posed return of land to the Greek Cypriot side, as demonstrated in Figures 2, 
3, and 4 with regard to territorial readjustments proposed in the Ghali Set of 
Ideas and the fifth version of the Annan Plan respectively.
On this issue of external mediation, what makes the Cyprus case particu-
larly interesting for scholars in conflict resolution and refugee studies is the 
way the UN (as well as the EU and ECtHR) has positioned itself across con-
flicting demands and normative considerations (Adelman and Barkan 2011). 
As the Cypriot mediations predate post- Cold war conflicts in the EU periph-
ery by at least a decade, they could arguably also inform comparable cases in 
the post- communist world, including Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), 
Serbia (Kosovo), and most recently Crimea (Ukraine), where internally dis-
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discussed in previous chapters, a major conflict resolution innovation in the 
Annan Plan is that the sides allowed mediators to design, arbitrate, and final-
ize arrangements before separate referendums were held— notably without 
consent of official leaderships as to the final content of the settlement.
How the UN opted to mediate on displacement issues is particularly infor-
mative. During the negotiations, UN mediators argued that international de-
velopments since World War II had favored a settlement based on respect for 
individual rights. Not coincidentally, earlier ECtHR decisions recognized the 
rights of Greek Cypriots in the northern part of the island and allocated dam-
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Annan Plan drafters took into account the positions adopted recently by the 
United Nations and the international community in the former Yugoslavia, 
but also the fact that the events in Cyprus happened 30 to 40 years ago and the 
displaced people (roughly half the Turkish Cypriots and a third of the Greek 
Cypriots) have had to rebuild their lives and their economies during this time. 
Unfortunately, the latter pragmatic consideration overshadowed human rights 
priorities for refugees, thereby contributing to the failure of the peace process 
in 2004. More important, the Annan principle of compensating the internally 
displaced through government guaranteed bonds did not convince the refu-
gees then, despite fiscal stability at the time, which secured minimum risks to 
recipients and investors. Unsurprisingly, such financially risky solutions are 
not applicable anymore following the sovereign debt crisis. By contrast, alter-
native proposals that emphasize a more carefully monitored reallocation of 
properties, through for instance land consolidation, could be more acceptable, 
human- rights friendly, enduring, and cost- effective (Symeou 2012). Land 
consolidation relies on public consultation, and in divided societies could also 
incorporate the personal history of each individual, family, or community and 
its record of displacement or personal loss. These criteria have been issued in 
detail in the 2012 proposals of the Cyprus Academic Dialogue, a bicommunal 
NGO comprising academics from both communities (CAD 2013). 
In short, UN- mediated provisions on the right of return could be refor-
mulated to increase win- win gains in the negotiations and add credibility to 
a settlement. Although there has been an increasing demand for new ideas 
on the right of return, both policy studies and academic research have gener-
ally failed to provide practicable recommendations for effective conflict reso-
lution. As will be shown, however, issues in the negotiations can be linked in 
novel ways that maximize the negotiability and credibility of a future agree-
ment in Cyprus— or elsewhere, for that matter.  
Theoretical Rationale
As discussed in other chapters, there is a need for a broader theoretical ratio-
nale in explaining how mediators use delinkage or linkage strategies to ad-
dress complex issues. According to Lohmann, an appropriate negotiation 
strategy might involve linkage or delinkage; equally, neither might matter 
(1997: 48). Unfortunately, the literature does not say much on selecting strat-
egies that might work for divided societies, partly because this and related 
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concepts are not being used per se in related studies and partly because few 
studies have attempted to develop a broader theoretical understanding of 
linkage or delinkage mediation strategies (see also Kovras 2012). 
Yet negotiation strategies and theorists have long explored how to maxi-
mize gains in mediations, minimize critical uncertainties, and build credible 
commitments for future interactions (Fisher and Ury 1981; Raiffa 1982; Dixit 
and Nalebuff 1991; Schwartz 1991; Bazerman and Neale 1992). A distributive 
negotiation usually involves a single issue— a “fixed pie”— in which one side 
gains at the expense of the other, whereas in an integrative negotiation, sides 
put forward multiple issues that they often value differently (Bazerman and 
Neale 1992: 16– 22). Parties can maximize their gains by making concessions 
on issues about which they care less in exchange for concessions on issues of 
greater importance (Lohmann 1997: 39). Expanding the “mythical fixed pie” 
often requires reconfiguring linkages, even by tying together issues “that are 
not necessarily related in any functional sense” (39). Following this approach, 
mediators in Cyprus and other aspiring federations and consociations could 
identify new ways of connecting the interests of conflicting sides, emphasiz-
ing linkages among issues previously thought of separately (refugees, settlers, 
economic management, etc.). 
Raiffa et al. describe such linkages as “the very art of compromise” (2002: 
482). Yet mediators should go beyond merely identifying these linkages to 
demonstrate their durability and negotiability across alternative future sce-
narios (Courtney et al. 1997; Ringland 1998; Schwartz 1991). Linkages across 
issues could allow sides to be compensated for possible losses in one issue 
with favorable readjustments in another, thus preserving the initial benefits 
that derive from a negotiated settlement. I therefore define a critical linkage 
as one that enables peaceful transformation through compensatory arrange-
ments for those unsympathetic to a peace settlement, engaging their support 
or at minimum, neutralizing their destructive influence. In principle, such 
linkages could benefit both security and justice without requiring a compro-
mise between the two. A note of caution: difficult choices would still need to 
be addressed, compromises would need to be made, and win- win exchanges 
would have to take place in an environment of trust and credible external 
guarantees.  
Linkages and external incentives/guarantees could safeguard the effective 
and credible implementation of an agreement under conditions of uncer-
tainty (Walter 1999, 2002; Lake and Rothchild 1996: 70; Fearon 1997, 1998; 
Raiffa 1982: 187– 204). Fearon has demonstrated the links between ethnic 
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violence and lack of credible commitments (1998). In his view, conflict oc-
curs because one or more groups cannot credibly commit to upholding mu-
tually beneficial agreements reached in the past. When governments, power 
structures, beliefs, economic settings, and the demographic balance between 
groups are unstable, at least one of the groups cannot effectively reassure the 
other(s) that it will not break the agreement. Although not directly relevant 
to Cyprus, Fearon concludes that an examination of the relationship between 
Serbs and Croats or Armenians and Azerbaijanis shows that regardless what 
ethnic leaders agree to at the time of independence, there is no solid guaran-
tee they will not renege in the future (1998). Recognizing this, groups fre-
quently opt out of cooperation to avoid risk of future exploitation. 
By contrast, stable ethnic relations require both a “contract” between 
groups and “safeguards” designed to render today’s agreements self- 
enforceable in the future (Lake and Rothchild 1998: 13– 15). Checks and bal-
ances can stabilize group relations and ensure that no group will be exploited 
by another regardless of future uncertainty. In this regard, demographic link-
ages are key to stabilizing the relationship of groups. Since “real” or “per-
ceived” demographic fears are widespread in divided societies (Van Evera 
1994: 17– 20; Fearon 1998: 109; Horowitz 1985: 177– 79, Stefanovic 2008a: 8, 
17), it is crucial to investigate how the “ethnic balance” of peace settlements 
can be monitored and restored particularly through self- enforceable adjust-
ments. As argued in the previous chapter with regard to the d’Hondt execu-
tive, an element of automaticity in decision- making could reduce frictions 
among those sharing power. While these observations appear to be broadly 
intuitive, at this point, they have only limited application in the design of in-
stitutional mechanisms supporting displaced persons or other vulnerable 
groups in peace processes.
In Cyprus, self- adjustable arrangements will add an element of automa-
ticity and functionality to the settlement. Such effective safeguards are neces-
sary because of mutual distrust between the two communities and popular 
beliefs on both sides that, once in a position of power, the other will renege 
on agreements (Joseph 1997; Yesilada and Sozen 2002: 281; Palley 2005: 145– 
53; Hadjipavlou 2007). At the same time, Cyprus could be also seen as a 
moderately divided society with only limited incidents of violence in the past 
decade, suggesting the potential and value of institutions in sustaining posi-
tive transformation. 
112 Chapter 4
Refugees in the Annan Plan
Unlike previous proposed settlements, the Annan Plan was designed to func-
tion from day one, and to this end it provided detailed provisions on refu-
gees, settlers, and immigrants. The UN suggestions concerning refugee 
resettlement in Cyprus resembled solutions proposed elsewhere, such as in 
Israel and Palestine, focusing on the transfer of land to the side with the high-
est number of refugees.5 More specifically, the Plan foresaw the return of 
120,000 refugees (including descendants) to the new territories under Greek 
Cypriot administration (Markides 2004). At the same time, it implicitly 
linked this concession with proposed restrictions on the right of return of 
approximately another 100,000 Greek Cypriots (including descendants) trac-
ing their origins to the territory of the future Turkish Cypriot state.6 
The rights of potential returnees under Turkish Cypriot administration 
were significantly curtailed to preserve current demographic balances. In its 
five versions, the Plan put forward various restrictions on return for individ-
uals under sixty- five, imposed lengthy time periods for establishing resi-
dency, set limits on property restitution, and limited state and federal voting 
rights for potential returnees.7 A major stumbling block for Greek Cypriots 
was the sequence of concessions and fear of nonimplementation. While im-
mediately making concessions on issues involving settlers, security, and 
power- sharing, they were unsure about implementation of the limited rights 
granted to refugees and doubted the actual intentions of the potential return-
ees, given these restrictions. They were equally concerned about the credibil-
ity and effectiveness of territorial land transfers across the federal border 
(Coufoudakis 2004; Palley 2005). 
In past negotiations, mediators faced difficult dilemmas with regard to 
refugee rights but had little information from surveys on how to maximize 
outcomes. It is important for Greek Cypriots to maintain the right of return 
under Turkish Cypriot administration because of public expectations for an 
improved settlement and refugees’ concerns about fairness. The issue appears 
to take negotiation capital, time, and concessions away from other priorities. 
If, in fact, the majority of Greek Cypriot refugees opt for non- return, the 
more likely outcome given international experience (Adelman and Barkan 
2011; Belloni 2009), the most problematic aspects of return will become ir-
relevant. Yet before the settlement there is no way to accurately predict how 
many refugees will return to their ancestral villages, as the Greek Cypriot 
case is different from “comparable cases” in Bosnia or Bulgaria (see also 
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Vasileva 1992). On the one hand, more than three decades have passed and 
refugees have rebuilt their lives in the South. On the other, the small size of 
the island, commutable distances, and higher income levels might make re-
turn more feasible (see also Zetter 1994, 1999). Thus, two critical questions 
arise. What are the intentions of internally displaced persons and how might 
undecided individuals be encouraged to return in conditions that are also 
seen as favorable for the Turkish Cypriots? 
Intentions of Return Home
As for the former, relevant surveys supply some answers. For instance, the Cy-
prus2015 project, in partnership with UNDP and EU Commission representa-
tion in Cyprus, offers some of the most influential and extensive surveys done 
in the island in the past decade.8 In 2009 Dr. Djordje Stefanovic and I were in-
vited to suggest a set of questions concerning internally displaced Greek Cy-
priots. A sociologist and Balkans expert, Stefanovic contributed to the 
questionnaire with his own knowledge of the Drvar region in western Bosnia, 
which has experienced the return of its Serbian population in the federated 
area controlled by militant Croats (see also Conclusion). We have also com-
pared the experience of this community with that of the Cypriot Maronites in 
Kormakitis (see Chapter 6), aiming to produce a generalizable questionnaire 
as to return intensions among displaced persons in protracted conflicts. 
The Cyprus2015 survey also covered general attitudes on peace, but asked 
different questions to members of each community concerning their expec-
tations from the settlement. The overall sample for each community included 
1,000 respondents randomly selected across the population. An important 
feature of the Greek Cypriot sample was the large number of respondents 
(about a third) who declared themselves internally displaced. The figure is 
consistent with the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre report, which 
ranks Cyprus as the country with the largest percentage of internally dis-
placed worldwide (IDMC 2015).
 Because of identity and security concerns, Greek Cypriots were more will-
ing to return under their own administration (i.e., to newly reallocated villages 
and cities across the federal border) rather than under future Turkish Cypriot 
administration. Looking at the Cyprus2015 sample data, we see that while only 
16.6 percent of displaced Greek Cypriots were willing to return under the 
Turkish Cypriot administration, a much higher 69 percent were willing to 
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return under a Greek Cypriot administration (Loizides and Stefanovic 2012). 
On the one hand, the analysis confirms decisions by UN mediators to maxi-
mize the areas to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration and to limit 
return under Turkish Cypriot administration. On the other, the data suggest 
that the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots hailing from the future 
Turkish Cypriot constituent state are left with no incentive to support power- 
sharing arrangements; understandably, such refugees have formed some of the 
most vocal groups speaking out against bizonal federalism.  
The demographic results are extremely interesting with regard to age: not 
surprisingly, perhaps, the Greek Cypriot elderly are more likely to return. Ac-
cording to Loizides and Stefanovic (2012), the average age of decided return-
ees is fifty- two. These findings are consistent with other studies elsewhere, for 
example, Bosnia (Opacic et al. 2005). In Cyprus, Sitas et al. (2007) found that 
the elderly (and refugees) have been in certain respects more open to rap-
prochement and reconciliation compared to younger persons (and nonrefu-
gees).9 In interpreting these findings, it could be assumed that the elderly 
tend to have stronger attachments to their former homes and land. In addi-
tion, they are more mobile due to their pensions, although one might imag-
ine that younger people might be able to commute to work daily, given the 
proximity of northern Cyprus to the capital city of Nicosia. 
What is also interesting in this analysis is that high- income displaced 
persons are more likely to return to their former houses. The major public 
policy implication of this finding is that integration into a new environment 
does not conflict with return. In fact, the capacity to (re)integrate might offer 
displaced communities more resources, experience, and confidence in deal-
ing effectively with hardships during the return process (Loizides and Ste-
fanovic 2012). The age variable suggests that returnees could be “less 
threatening” than probably imagined by the Turkish Cypriots. High- income 
Greek Cypriot returnees would potentially double the estimated Turkish Cy-
priot benefits from settlement.10 Something often unknown to the parties in 
the peace talks is that direct and indirect taxes in federations are normally 
paid in the place of residence. This implies a positive linkage between im-
proving return conditions for Greek Cypriots and financial sustainability of 
the future Turkish Cypriot constituent state. 
Yet for a skeptical Turkish Cypriot, return of refugees remains a thorny 
issue. On the one hand, a demonstrated respect for the human rights of the 
displaced would strengthen the legitimacy of the Turkish Cypriot constituent 
state. Well- intended Turkish Cypriots might also feel sympathy toward 
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returnees and might agree that their community has no right to deny victims 
of ethnic cleansing the right to return to their native villages. Some form of 
restitution is important in making the North more pluralistic, and departing 
from what anthropologist Navaro- Yashin (2012) refers to as the “make- 
believe space” or “artificiality” of social and political life in the northern part 
of the island. On the other, publicly advocating return for all refugees might 
be politically unfeasible, as the actual numbers of returnees cannot be deter-
mined in advance. In a nutshell, the dilemma for the Turkish Cypriots is ei-
ther to deny human rights for the displaced or risk inviting many more 
returnees than they want. 
The Incentives/Linkage Approach
The incentives/linkage approach described below can help resolve this di-
lemma in an advantageous formula for both sides. The formula (see also 
Loizides and Antoniades 2004, 2009) emphasizes the sequence of conces-
sions and incentives and could take the following form. An agreement could 
first postulate the return of 25,000 Greek Cypriots under Turkish Cypriot 
administration.11 If additionally one more (25,001) opt for return, the Turk-
ish Cypriot side will increase its quota for the naturalization of two extra set-
tlers or immigrants from Turkey (if they so wish) or get equivalent credits 
toward another issue. If only 24,499 resettle, the additional credits will be 
readjusted in favor of the Greek Cypriot side. The sides could agree on fur-
ther linking the refugee/settler formula with tax revenues, immigration quo-
tas, and unutilized land across the federal border. Resources could also be 
used to help potential returnees and émigrés or compensate settlers willing to 
return to Turkey. 
Self- enforceable linkages reduce critical uncertainties of both Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots by maintaining (with self- adjustments) the overall balance 
of the settlement. Greek Cypriots will maintain the right of return, but there 
will be no need for costly concessions unless return takes place first, thus se-
curing a higher degree of cooperation by the Turkish Cypriot side. Moreover, 
by controlling its immigration and naturalization processes, the Turkish Cy-
priot community can become “demographically secure” under different sce-
narios. Meanwhile, by making credible commitments to the demographic 
needs of Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot side can extract concessions on 
other issues. 
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As discussed in previous chapters, it is critical that cooperation is to be 
fostered at the local level by channeling readjustable benefits such as tax rev-
enues to local communities (e.g., through municipalities). Such funds could 
finance development and social welfare programs, as well as integrated polic-
ing mechanisms, educational programs and civil society initiatives aiming to 
facilitate peaceful voluntary return. Related projects could also focus on vul-
nerable groups including women who often carry the heaviest burden during 
resettlement and reintegration. 
Furthermore, a major strength of this formula is its automaticity and 
adaptability across various future demographic scenarios. For instance, the 
hypothetical 25,001st returnee will not be subject to any personal risk of 
being excluded from the return process under previously suggested quotas in 
the different versions of the Annan Plan; rather, any risks and the obligation 
for readjustments are transferred to the federal authorities. The formula’s au-
tomaticity will reduce future frictions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots at 
the federal level. Simply stated, there will be no vetoes on refugee return; de-
pending on the capacity of the system to provide adjustments to initial 
benchmarks, all refugees could benefit and return under the incentives/link-
age approach.
Overall, potential returnees will have more choice as to what they can do 
at a personal level, and no restrictions on returning, voting, or even enjoying 
cultural and political autonomy in an area administered by the other com-
munity. Returnees could be guaranteed group- specific rights, quotas in the 
constituent state assembly of the other community, and participation in all 
levels of local and federal government. Compared with Annan V, the most 
significant advantage of this formula is that it secures a broader set of rights 
for each refugee (except the guarantee of full property restitution) without 
asking either side to make concessions in advance. Reciprocity and signals of 
good intentions are essential in preserving federal stability. Ethnic coopera-
tion often fails, not because of malign intentions, but because sides cannot 
demonstrate that their actions do not aim to harm the other (Posen 1993). 
Fears of perceived “Hellenization” or “Turkification” are easier to control if 
each side reciprocates in kind and if self- adjustable credible mechanisms can 
guarantee timely implementation. In fact, the concepts of reciprocity and po-
litical learning have been promoted by Cypriot academics and NGO repre-
sentatives for decades in Cyprus (Hadjipavlou- Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 
1983). Of course, fine- tuning this proposal with supplementary elements 
might guarantee additional advantages. 
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As stated in previous chapters, the percentages of Greek Cypriots in the 
North versus Turkish Cypriots in the whole island could guide the discussion 
on voting rights as well, for either the shared presidency or municipal elec-
tions. Greek Cypriots could become an electoral minority in the northern 
part of the island, and Turkish Cypriots could receive reciprocal rights in the 
future Greek Cypriot constituent state. For instance, all Greek or Turkish Cy-
priot displaced persons could gain a “double vote” that would enable them to 
vote simultaneously in their “titular territory” and across constituent states as 
a recognized national minority constituting for instance less than a fifth or 
tenth of the electorate. 
Another possibility is to grant quotas or guaranteed seats to refugees 
from both communities, regardless whether they decide to return. If agreed 
upon, electoral inclusivity and interdependence between the two communi-
ties could make local authorities more accountable across ethnic lines and 
add a modicum of moderation to the political system. Such arrangements are 
not mutually exclusive with the consociational nature of d’Hondt arrange-
ments presented earlier in the book. By way of contrast, secured demograph-
ics will maintain ethnic balances and minimize a fear common to both 
communities that the settlement will eventually harm their interests. Through 
the proposed approach, the Greek Cypriot side could be asked to reciprocate 
any rights granted to the Greek Cypriots in the North, thereby avoiding the 
Annan Plan’s various discriminating clauses substituting those with self- 
adjustable incentives for Turkish Cypriots.
Admittedly, critics of federalism in Cyprus will question this approach. 
For one thing, how can linkages be determined, monitored and institutional-
ized? How can possible problems associated with renegotiations be success-
fully addressed? What happens with intra- communal spoilers and violence? 
Can sides really make credible commitments to each other? How could one 
deal with the Turkish settler versus Turkish Cypriot relationship and fears of 
cultural and political alienation of the latter? Is the incentives/linkage ap-
proach normatively and legally defensible? Finally, can the formula draw 
upon successful return efforts elsewhere, and to what extent are renegotia-
tion and arbitration essential in this process? In the next section, I address 
these key questions. 
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Bosnia: Community Engagement and External Arbitration
The case of Cyprus is not unusual in postconflict settings. The Bosnian Day-
ton Peace Agreement is an archetype of what has been envisioned for de-
cades in Cyprus. Territorial adjustments at the time of the Dayton Accords 
allowed the return of the displaced (predominantly Muslims) who were eth-
nically cleansed during the war (Belloni 2009). In the more recent cases of 
displacement in the Balkans, the international community has showed little 
tolerance of ethnic cleansing and has prioritized the rights of the internally 
displaced over other considerations. Unlike UN proposals for Cyprus, the 
property and voting rights of the displaced are clearly entrenched in Dayton 
and universally enforced across the republic through direct involvement of 
the international community (Belloni 2001, 2008; Cox and Garlick 2003). 
Nonetheless, the implementation of the Dayton Accords has not been 
straightforward; instead it has been slowly applied through a process of trial 
and error. The agreement effectively assigned international agencies with im-
plementation policies thereby enabling significant minorities among the in-
ternally displaced to return to their former homes in the war- torn republic 
(Black 2001; Bieber 2006). The Bosnian return process, regardless of its in-
herent limitations, has been one of the first relatively successful attempts to 
reverse ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and the Middle East; before this point, 
it was often assumed that “demographic engineering” in conflict- ridden 
post- Ottoman regions could only lead to irreversible outcomes, as demon-
strated recently in Cyprus, Israel/Palestine, and Southern Caucasus (Yiftachel 
2006; Adelman and Barkan 2011) or shown historically in the population 
exchanges between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s (Clark 2006). 
While the victims of ethnic cleansing have returned home in significant 
numbers all over Bosnia, certain regions across the country have been rela-
tively more successful in peacefully reversing ethnic cleansing. The Drvar 
region in western Bosnia has been one of the most successful ones as it expe-
rienced the return of its Serbian population in the federated state controlled 
by the Croats. In this case, the social networks of the internally displaced 
played a decisive role in the process of return. Mutual trust and communal 
ties enabled, on the one hand, the creation of refugee and displaced persons’ 
organizations and helped, on the other, to foster coordination and overcome 
security challenges to successful and durable return (Stefanovic and Loizides 
2011). More important was the institutionalization of social capital through 
the evolution of distinct electoral rolls for the internally displaced. Even in 
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exile refugees continued to vote together, and this allowed them to maintain 
their institutional ties. Such electoral provisions minimized fragmentation in 
social networks and allowed a determined leadership to negotiate the return 
of ancestral lands with a clear mandate. 
Besides community involvement, neutral arbitration mechanisms have 
been extremely important in the implementation and renegotiation process. 
Bosnia, in particular, has relied heavily on international arbitration and ex-
ternal monitoring. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), entrusted 
with overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Accords that ended the 
war, has the authority to impose solutions when local parties fail to agree. 
The relative success in reversing ethnic cleansing in Bosnia can partly be ex-
plained by the authority exercised by OHR, especially its capacity to readjust 
policies and incentives to encourage refugee return (Black 2001; Cox and 
Garlick 2003; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005).12 
Trial and error efforts have been essential, as it was hard to envision the ef-
ficacy of incentives before their implementation. For example, in 1998, the Of-
fice of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) adopted the Open 
Cities program, granting additional reconstruction funds to municipalities 
willing to accept the return of refugees and displaced persons (Black 2001), but 
this program did not overcome the objections of local authorities to return 
(Petersen 2011). In 2000 the OHR harmonized property laws and expectations 
across Bosnia, creating the legal prerequisite for large- scale return (Belloni 
2005: 440– 42). It was also given the power to remove officials who were not 
fulfilling the Dayton commitments, including the right of return (Dahlman 
and Tuathail 2005: 586). Finally, the Constitutional Court played a facilitating 
role in promoting reintegration by deciding in 2000 that the federal entities 
could not be considered exclusively Serb, Croat, or Bosnian Muslim, but must 
guarantee legal equality to all citizens, including minority returnees (Belloni 
2008: 58– 62). 
International arbitration bodies could be seen as undemocratic. How-
ever, this should not be a major issue in Cyprus, where legal decisions of the 
ECtHR and executive decisions at the EU have direct applicability. Moreover, 
arbitration mechanisms are essential, because in postconflict societies, it is 
not only democratic accountability that matters; so does cross- community 
accountability with regard to the peace agreement and its implementation.13 
At any rate, agreements on readjustments can be set in advance of the settle-
ment or subsequently with the arbitration of third domestic actors, such as 
professional bodies and committees of experts. 
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A related provision might require a quantifiable system of monitoring the 
contribution of each side to the human rights issues and needs of the other 
community. This system could include periodic assessments and key perfor-
mance indicators drawing from the application of metrics currently used in 
many areas of business, government, and scientific life with potential applica-
tions to conflict resolution and politics in general (Tarrow 1995: 474). It is 
important to note that innovative methodologies of measuring human rights 
through quantitative indicators are already available and could be fairly easily 
adjusted to the needs of mediated peace settlements (Landman 2004). Addi-
tionally, the inclusion of more issues in the incentives/linkage approach 
could imply better chances that all sides will have vital interests at stake. It 
will increase the potential of expanding the “fixed pie” in the renegotiations 
and provide additional disincentives to renege from agreements, thus reduc-
ing the likelihood of noncooperation, especially if hardliners come to power. 
The Settler Versus Refugee Linkage
A final major aspect of linkage involves the settler question in Cyprus. The 
issue of Turkish settlers will continue to be contentious in the Cyprus negoti-
ations, as demonstrated in polls following the 2004 referendums (Lordos 
2006). After the partition of Cyprus in 1974, Turkish authorities encouraged 
tens of thousands of Turkish citizens to settle in Cyprus. Although there are 
no official data on the settlers, Hatay estimates the number of naturalized 
settlers to be around 16 to 18 percent of the electorate in the North (2005: 
viii), while Greek Cypriot estimates suggest 50 percent of the population 
(Palley 2005: 67). The Turkish Cypriot community itself is divided on the 
settlers; “ethnonationalist parties” have traditionally supported or tolerated 
the arrival of settlers, while pro- unification forces have generally opposed it, 
seeing it as threatening to the indigenous character of the Turkish Cypriot 
community. For the most part, all Turkish Cypriot political parties have 
maintained a balance between domestic fears of alienation and the need to 
attract new voters from among the settlers (Lacher and Kaymak 2005; Vural 
and Rustemli 2006; Navaro- Yashin 2006). 
Not surprisingly, the Greek Cypriot side sees the presence of settlers as a 
violation of international law and the Geneva Convention (Loucaides 1995; 
Chrysostomides 2000: 197– 215), a view supported by a 1994 Council of Eu-
rope report (Cuco 1994). Data from the 2009 UNDP/EU survey also suggest 
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that Greek Cypriot conditional returnees seem to prioritize security and have 
a deeply engrained fear of Turkish settlers who have occupied their homes 
since 1974 (Loizides and Stefanovic 2012). Yet the expulsion of settlers with 
their families, especially after the passage of decades, is ethically difficult to 
justify and difficult to achieve, particularly given their low socioeconomic 
profile (Carens 2000; Hatay 2005; Akçali 2007). 
On this issue, the Greek Cypriot leadership has taken a pragmatic stance 
despite public pressure to the contrary, and in several negotiation rounds in 
the past decade has accepted naturalization of up to 50,000 settlers. However, 
until a comprehensive settlement is reached in the island, settlers will remain 
in citizenship “limbo,” lacking permanent residency rights. 
In contrast, a permanent settlement will expand human rights options for 
all vulnerable population groups, as it will directly or indirectly involve a 
linkage between the return of displaced Greek Cypriots and the naturaliza-
tion of Turkish settlers. Greek Cypriot concessions on the settler issue will 
signal credible intentions in the negotiations, particularly toward Turkey and 
hardline Turkish Cypriots supporting the naturalization of settlers. Positive 
signals, adherence to human rights standards, and reciprocity are also more 
likely to maintain international support for the settlement. 
The incorporation of settlers into the incentives/linkage formula will ad-
dress a number of key concerns and facilitate the reframing of the settler 
issue in the public discourse. As discussed in previous chapters, popular per-
ceptions and framing processes are linked to institutional innovation; adver-
sarial frames portraying either settlers or refugees as inherently threatening 
could inadvertently turn into self- fulfilling prophecies restricting positive 
transformation even in cases where institutional design could provide appro-
priate solutions. Conversely, pacifist counterframes could emphasize poten-
tial solutions enhancing inclusive narratives of shared entitlement to the 
territory of Cyprus. Such frames and positive images recognize the human 
rights and shared victimhood of all groups and could even embrace those 
initially subscribing as alleged beneficiaries of Turkish colonization. And 
likewise, the mutually beneficial inclusion of refugees and settlers into the 
peace process will help both communities see those groups in a positive light, 
building better foundations for a future federal state.
Admittedly, a difficulty with the proposed settler/refugee linkage is that 
many Turkish Cypriots have developed a double boundary distinguishing them 
from both their Greek Cypriot and settler neighbors, signified by the “othering” 
terms gâvur [infidel] and fellah [peasant] respectively (Navaro- Yashin 2012: 
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57). For many Turkish Cypriots, return of refugees accompanied by naturaliza-
tion of settlers will be a double whammy rather than a quid pro quo. Although 
this is a justified critique, the linkage of the two issues might be one of the few 
options remaining for the Turkish Cypriot moderates to incentivize support for 
the settlement among the Greek Cypriots in a way that is acceptable to Ankara 
and would be voted by naturalized settlers in a future referendum. Moreover, 
the refugee- settler linkage is the only human rights compatible formula to 
guarantee that the majority of the population would be Turkish- speakers, his-
torically the official demand of the Turkish Cypriot and Turkey in the negotia-
tions. Yet the justified fears of the Turkish Cypriot community could be also 
balanced through institutional design in particular provisions of differentiated 
or asymmetrical citizenship for settlers.  
Kymlicka argues that “in a society which recognizes group- differential 
rights, the members of certain groups are incorporated into the political 
community, not only as individuals, but also through the group, and their 
rights depend, in part, on their group membership” (1995: 174). Kymlicka 
describes these rights as forms of “differentiated citizenship” which in the 
case of Cyprus could provide alternative possibilities aiming to guarantee the 
survival of the Turkish Cypriots who are primarily concerned with the his-
torical and political rights of their community. Although it deviates from the 
principle of strict equality, differentiated or asymmetrical citizenship implies 
different rights, protection mechanisms, and obligations for citizens based on 
their group membership. It is not an unprecedented mechanism in address-
ing conflict around the world, including North America, New Zealand, and 
even EU countries, as shown in the case of Hungary (Deeds and Stroschein 
2005).
Asymmetrical citizenship for settlers might include provisions for grad-
ual naturalization with regard to electoral rights but also offer preferential 
treatment as to educational opportunities and migration back to Turkey. 
Even though fewer settlers would be immediately naturalized compared to 
previous peace plans, established settlers could get permanent residency and 
more flexible options if they wish to be financially supported in returning to 
Turkey, including the “right to regret,” which would allow them to resettle to 
Cyprus without losing their previous status if they change their minds. For 
example, Bosnian returnees living temporarily abroad were given the option 
to return to the UK and France if their experience of repatriation proved 
negative (Black 2001: 186– 87). Such arrangements might be even more ac-
ceptable to settlers themselves if they emphasize choice and socioeconomic 
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opportunities for personal advancement. To this point, most settlers seem to 
fit the profile of immigrant populations interested in daily issues and eco-
nomic advancement rather than electoral politics or ethnic nationalism 
(Hatay 2005; Akçali 2007). 
Likewise, for Greek Cypriots gradual naturalization of settlers is a better 
alternative than immediate and unconditional naturalization of “all settlers”14 
proposed in Annan V, particularly if naturalization is tied to refugee return 
and contribution to peaceful ethnic relations. In Cyprus itself, previous pro-
posals for settlement of the Cyprus issue clearly suggested differentiated citi-
zenship for Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but not for settlers who have been 
included in the Turkish Cypriot community. Once a pronounced citizenship 
differentiation is included in the federal constitution, it is only legitimate, if 
not necessary, to consider additional ones involving settlers/migrants. 
At the same time one might not underestimate Greek Cypriot sensitivi-
ties on the issue, even for granting permanent residencies. As argued above, 
the presence of settlers could be one of the most difficult issues to be over-
come in the negotiations. For instance, even if the settler- refugee linkage 
might sound reasonable in principle, the fear of settlers among Greek Cy-
priot returnees is a pronounced feature of relevant surveys. Nonetheless, a 
carefully designed return process might address these fears. As implied above 
in a number of cases, distinct Greek Cypriot municipalities might be created 
for the returnees. The Cyprus Academic Dialogue in its own proposals also 
provides for “unrestricted relocation areas” so that Greek Cypriot returnees 
might be able to form communities.15 Although Greek Cypriot negotiators 
are insisting on full property restitution across the board (as in Bosnia), such 
provisions (even if they were to be accepted by the Turkish Cypriots) will 
prove suboptimal for Greek Cypriots, as most returnees might decide to sell 
their properties in fear of settlers or unwelcoming local authorities. As Sert 
(2008) acknowledges in her comparative study of the two cases, the property 
regime in Bosnia allowed returnees back, but many quickly decided to sell 
their properties in exchange for new homes on their own side of the border. 
To preclude this possibility, reserve lands would allow Greek Cypriots a 
smaller percentage of land (also acceptable to Turkish Cypriots) but ensure 
greater safety, as they would find themselves next to co- ethnics. For instance, 
through the proposal for land consolidation (Symeou 2012), returnees could 
be allocated predominantly Greek Cypriot sections in each village without 
making the divisions too obvious or conflictual. Surveys in other parts of the 
world have shown the importance of community mobilization. For instance, 
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in a survey among displaced Kurds in Turkey itself, community return had a 
very strong impact on chances of individual return, with one unit increase in 
the extent of community return raising the odds of individual return by eight 
times (Stefanovic et al. 2013). 
In conclusion, although relocation of settlers back to Turkey is preferred 
by Greek Cypriots (and many Turkish Cypriots), this might not be a politi-
cally feasible option, especially after the passage of decades. Instead, a linkage 
could be drawn between naturalized settlers and attempts to restore histori-
cal Greek Cypriot communities in their traditional villages. This is consistent 
with international practices on indigenous rights, as well as the OSCE Lund 
recommendations. Similar measures have been implemented (with some 
success) in the decentralization of municipalities in the Republic of Macedo-
nia/FYROM and in Kosovo under the Ahtisaari Plan. Briefly stated, the prin-
ciples of community protection that apply to the Turkish Cypriot community 
as a whole could be also implemented at the local level for Greek Cypriot re-
turnees in designated municipalities. Following the recommendations of the 
Cyprus Academic Dialogue, land consolidation could be informed by the in-
dividual circumstances of each person and family, prioritizing those who 
have suffered the most from displacement or loss of relatives during the 
conflict.
Demographic readjustments could include naturalization of new immi-
grants from both Greece and Turkey. Because of its better employment op-
portunities, the economy in the South has attracted low- wage ethnic Greek 
origin workers (from the former USSR), but more recently highly skilled 
workers have been employed, particularly in the service and higher education 
sectors.16 For its part, the Turkish Cypriot part of Cyprus will need labor and 
skills from Turkey because of reconstruction, the burgeoning tourist industry, 
and the presence of already established universities. In fact, reconstruction of 
the economy of Northern Cyprus might lead to an inevitable increase of its 
population. Thus, without a post- negotiation linkage formula, immigration 
could cause friction between the two communities. But if added to the incen-
tives/linkage formula, immigration could become more manageable; it could 
sustain economic reconstruction and even allow Cyprus to shorten the long 
cycle of recession following the Eurozone crisis. 
In other words, the current sovereign debt crisis might open a window of 
opportunity for the settlement of the Cyprus question; with the housing in-
dustry in deep recession the reconstruction of Famagusta, Morphou/Güzely-
urt, and about fifty villages to be returned to the Greek Cypriots will cost less 
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than at any previous time, save thousands from long unemployment, and 
even allow Cyprus to avoid a deep recession that might last for up to a de-
cade. Unsurprisingly, foreign donor aid will become more important in fu-
ture mediations for power- sharing in Cyprus and even prove to be the 
catalyst for settlement, as both sides are facing the consequences of recession 
at the same time; yet aid might be ineffective if the appropriate institutional 
setting and demographic flexibility are missing. 
Conclusion
Prolonged conflicts tend to be especially hard cases to resolve, often victimiz-
ing displaced persons for generations. These cases are particularly problem-
atic because homes and other properties belonging to the displaced frequently 
come under the control of new owners (Leckie 2003; Adelman and Barkan 
2011). Furthermore, the territory belonging to the internally displaced might 
become part of another group’s imagined “national homeland,” as this group 
may also consider itself forcibly displaced. This could be an internationally 
recognized state such as Israel (with regard to the rights of Palestinians), a 
newly federated republic such as Bosnia (with regard to the rights of the dis-
placed in sections of the country controlled by Serbs, Croats, or Muslims) or 
a potentially autonomous territory in a future federation such as Georgia or 
Moldova (Belloni 2009; Kaufman 1996; Weller and Nobbs 2010).
Cyprus is a paradigmatic case of an unfulfilled federal project. Similar 
issues and institutional challenges are on the agenda elsewhere. For example, 
negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have focused on territorial re-
adjustments to maximize the number of co- ethnics in each state. In Georgia, 
debates on Abkhazia and South Ossetia have focused on the rights of the in-
ternally displaced in a decentralized, potentially asymmetrically federal 
Georgia (Wheatley 2005). These cases suggest that linkage approaches might 
be relevant to conflicts beyond this book’s main case study. 
As the chapter shows, return of the displaced is critically important to the 
negotiability and sustainability of a peace processes. But likewise reframing 
discourses on settlers and refugees is essential in embracing available institu-
tional innovations. On this point, the Greek Cypriot leadership might aim at 
improving the images of “others” in the conflict, especially since oppositional 
discourses on the settlers diminish the chances for a compromise and, more 
important, return intentions among the displaced— a major Greek Cypriot 
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objective in the peace talks. Likewise, Turkish Cypriots should also embrace 
a pluralistic human rights culture; the fact that many of those committed to 
return, such as the late Costas Hadjipavlou, are aging demonstrates the very 
narrow window of opportunity for a settlement. But as demonstrated in the 
introduction of this chapter, the people of Cyprus and their actions suggest 
that there is still space for hope. Following Costas’s death, Uludağ went to his 
village and brought soil from the land there and passed it to his family to 
sprinkle it over his grave. Activists and the media could play a major role in 
reversing negative images of the other and in building a bicommunal spirit. 
At the same time reunification contains major challenges that might require 
credible linkages and complementary compromises across the ethnic divide. 
Equally, in Cyprus the internally displaced will determine in proportion to 
their electoral size the fate of a future peace plan in a referendum. Voting for 
a negotiated settlement is an essential step in the Cypriot peace process, as 
the next chapter will demonstrate. 
C h a p t e r  5
Mandate Peace Referendums: A 
South African Innovation?
In early 1992, Frederik Willem de Klerk confronted one of the most difficult 
dilemmas of his political career. As the last president of apartheid- era South 
Africa (September 1989 to May 1994), De Klerk realized that the policies of 
racial segregation had not only failed but also become politically unsustain-
able by the end of the Cold War (Steward 2012; de Villiers 2012). After his 
election to the presidency, De Klerk initiated a peace process that also ended 
Nelson Mandela’s twenty- year imprisonment. Within two years, however, his 
National Party began to lose critical by- elections, threatening the legitimacy 
and mandate of ongoing peace negotiations. De Klerk was confronted with a 
challenge common to postconflict transitions (including Cyprus), whereby 
moderates gradually lose public support as ethnic outbidders from their own 
community undermine attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement (Horow-
itz 1985; Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Gormley- Heenan and MacGinty 2008).  
De Klerk came to the conclusion that he needed an unambiguous man-
date to proceed. His solution was a referendum asking South Africans to 
focus on a single issue: “Do you support continuation of the reform process 
which the State President began on February 2, 1990 and which is aimed at a 
new constitution through negotiation?” (De Klerk 1999: 232). In a period of 
a few weeks leading to the March 17 referendum, the South African leader 
managed to generate widespread enthusiasm for his reforms, even winning 
the tacit support of the African National Congress (ANC) (Strauss 1993). His 
landslide victory included rural Afrikaner communities and urban English- 
speakers, surprising his own party officials who had optimistically predicted 
a 55 percent “yes” majority. In fact, 68.7 percent said “yes” (Waldmeir 1992: 
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47). As De Klerk admits in his autobiography, his “calculated gamble paid off 
handsomely,” despite the initial misgivings of his colleagues (1999: 234; em-
phasis added). 
South Africa’s innovative use of an early mandate referendum offers both 
inspiration and multiple lessons for other divided societies. Yet successes in 
peace referendums are rare, making this innovation a risky strategy for reso-
lution of conflicts. There are many things to consider before calling a referen-
dum. For example, as previous chapters note, negotiated settlements should 
prioritize not only security concerns but also the needs of vulnerable groups; 
these could include displaced persons, victims of conflict- era aggression, and 
families of the missing. Such groups can play an important role in determin-
ing support for the settlement, including a majority “yes” vote in a referen-
dum. At the same time, the broader public must be consulted throughout the 
process, as a settlement often requires formal endorsement by voters in more 
than one community. 
This chapter considers the extent to which direct democratic processes 
are necessary and useful in the ratification of federal and consociation transi-
tions. It focuses on the main dilemmas in the design of peace referendums, 
highlighting available options and challenges for deeply divided societies. 
Historically, identity and political factors often shape a problematic dis-
course about federal and consociational arrangements. As stated in Chapters 
1 and 2, past failures and contemporary false analogies have shaped strong 
public perceptions concerning the efficacy of such arrangements in the pop-
ular mind. Simply stated, majorities in emerging federations or consociations 
frequently appear hesitant, divided, and often overwhelmingly opposed to 
conflict- regulating arrangements with “others” even when these appear mu-
tually beneficial to a foreign mediator’s eye. Would a public referendum be 
useful in sealing and ratifying a settlement and, if so, how should such a ref-
erendum be designed, monitored, and implemented? 
The Puzzle of Peace Referendums
Although multiple referendums have taken place over the past few decades in 
divided societies, with more being discussed (or proposed), there has been 
no systematic attempt to compare the causes, outcomes, and consequences of 
peace referendums. When and how referendums facilitate a specific media-
tion remains a puzzle, particularly as governments and political parties often 
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take ambivalent positions and people vote in directions that can be hard to 
predict (Oliver 1998; Leduc 2002). While conventional wisdom assumes that 
people should be consulted whenever they face important decisions, referen-
dums could be divisive in emerging federations and consociations where de-
cision rules are unclear, borders are disputed, and citizenship rights are 
contested (Horowitz 1993; Lijphart 2004). On the one hand, referendums 
could add credibility and durability to a negotiated settlement and, if success-
ful, they could intimately engage a broader range of people in the peace pro-
cess (McGarry and O’Leary 2009a). On the other, evidence from divided 
societies suggests that the merits of referendums cannot be overgeneralized, 
particularly as publics might also vote against negotiated agreements. As 
demonstrated elsewhere, federal consociational referendums have a mixed 
record; in the past decades, peace proposals in referendums won the support 
of Iraqi Kurds, Turkish Cypriots, and ethnic Macedonians but failed among 
Greek Cypriots, Bosnian Serbs, and Sunnis in Iraq, in the latter case with 
catastrophic consequences for the future of Iraq. 
Also puzzling is how societies design referendums during federal and 
consociational transitions; interestingly each referendum covered in Table 7 
demonstrates a different design, suggesting a variety of available, albeit un-
derstudied options for policy- makers and mediators. There is a potential 
mismatch between public attitudes and referendum processes. Certain op-
tions and designs could arguably maximize legitimacy and public support, 
but local actors and international mediators are often unaware of their ad-
vantages and disadvantages. While focused toward the Cyprus negotiations, 
Table 7 is particularly instructive for any conflict area considering a referen-
dum in its peace processes 
As demonstrated above, successful referendums can be defining mo-
ments in the development of peace processes, bringing forward new political 
dynamics and acting as a litmus test of the capacity of a divided society to 
overcome deep divisions. Their effects can be decisive in legitimizing other-
wise publically contested results of the peace process, including new federal 
borders, inclusive policing and security mechanisms or power- sharing ar-
rangements which often deviate from the one- person one- vote formula to 
protect ethnic and religious minorities. 
McGarry and O’Leary emphasize the need for peace agreements to be 
inclusive and for people to be consulted, if important institutional changes 
are likely to affect their daily lives and upset the balance of community rela-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mandate Peace Referendums 133
Friday Agreement. In their view, this results from its endorsement by major-
ities on both sides of the divide between Ulster Unionists and Irish National-
ists (2009a: 15– 85). For the most part, paramilitaries in Northern Ireland 
have agreed to gradually disarm and, despite delays in the early phases of this 
process (commonly referred to as decommissioning), Northern Ireland has 
entered an era of unprecedented political and economic stability. 
In societies with militant groups, democratic endorsement of peace pro-
cesses could weaken support for violent actions. But this may require the 
gradual transformation of former rebel groups (or more broadly, the hardlin-
ers) into potential partners in negotiated settlements. If such groups win 
elections within their communities, they should be guaranteed inclusion in 
power- sharing arrangements. Peace referendums are more likely to be won if 
key actors participate in negotiations early enough, assuming local owner-
ship and shared responsibility for a subsequent settlement. These include 
civil society actors, constitutional experts, and elected political leaders from 
both government and opposition parties. As argued earlier in the book, 
broad power- sharing such as the d’Hondt executive increases the negotiabil-
ity of the settlement and its future durability. By contrast, peace referendums 
and the settlement itself could be problematic (even disastrous) if significant 
opposition groups are excluded from negotiations, particularly if these 
groups have the military capacity to undermine the peace process.  
Successful Referendums
South Africa and Northern Ireland in particular provide two important cases 
for inspiration. Political elites as well as external mediators in Northern Ire-
land predicted that setting the stage for referendums could add durability to 
the peace process. Preceding the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, me-
diators talked about the triple lock, referring to the need for the agreement to 
be endorsed by Britain and Ireland, the leaders of the two communities, and 
the public in a referendum (Tonge 2000; Blair 2010). The 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement survived despite “Protestant alienation” and the gradual erosion 
of support among Ulster Unionists. Former hardliners managed to increase 
their support in the Unionist community, which had approved the agreement 
with a slim majority in 1998, but did so only after moderating their positions 
(Mitchell et al. 2009). As discussed earlier, the d’Hondt executive provisions 
could partly explain why Irish Republicans endorsed the agreement in the 
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first place, and why hardliners in the Unionist community first failed to de-
rail it and then adjusted well to its major premises. The 1998 referendum also 
initiated this broad process of public consultation and inclusion. Overall, the 
Northern Irish experience suggests that peace processes are path- dependent 
events; referendums, in conjunction with inclusive power- sharing negotia-
tions and institutions, play a key role in determining future outcomes. 
Likewise, the “yes” vote in South Africa in 1992 added durability to post- 
apartheid South Africa, even though key demands of the white community 
for formal power- sharing were not included in the final constitutional settle-
ment. De Klerk preempted his opponents and safeguarded his credibility 
throughout the negotiation process. Moreover, the popular endorsement of 
De Klerk’s policy added an element of responsibility to ANC elites, which 
later translated into including whites in the ANC and the governing struc-
tures of the country (Ross 2007: 257). In fact, even the successor of De Klerk’s 
party, the New National Party, was incorporated into the ANC in 2005, al-
though the majority of white voters switched their allegiance to the Demo-
cratic Alliance, a historically anti- apartheid party that became the main 
opposition party (De Jager 2012). 
Northern Ireland, South Africa, and other examples from around the 
world1 provide useful lessons for other divided societies; voting for peace 
could help reverse hostile images of the past and transform the picture of the 
“other” in ethnic relations, opening the door for mutual accommodation. If 
successful, referendums can build trust and credible commitments across 
ethnic communities. For instance, in Cyprus, a strong “yes” on the “other 
side of the communal divide” could help convince undecided and suspicious 
voters that the “others” are serious about their commitment to implementing 
the settlement. Even if anti- solution parties come to power later on, referen-
dums have a “long shadow,” making it very difficult for radicals to turn 
against the wishes of their own ingroup. 
But successful referendums should be well prepared and timed to en-
courage a “yes” vote. For instance, the 1998 referendum on the contested 
issue of granting citizenship to Russian- speakers in Latvia took place years 
before the country’s accession to the EU (Morris 2003). The referendum also 
helped cement a long- term process of mutual integration, regardless of sub-
sequent post- accession electoral outcomes. Evidently, promises and commit-
ments to minorities or “others” are more credible if the commitment 
manifests itself in a referendum— an issue implied in the literature of credible 
commitments in ethnic relations (Fearon 1998). If a side in conflict widely 
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commits itself in a peace process through a referendum, it is more difficult 
for it to violently challenge an agreement. 
Failed Referendums: Consequences of The “No” Vote
Obviously, the most critical issue is how people vote in a referendum. A “yes” 
vote means more credibility and durability for the peace process; a “no” vote 
means increased legitimacy for hardliners. Failed referendums could demor-
alize peacemakers and discourage future peace initiatives. Referendums offer 
opportunities not only for the moderates but also for hardliners to further 
entrench divisions among communities. In fact, hardliners may organize ref-
erendums without the support or consent of the international community 
simply to preempt international pressure and obstruct a compromise in its 
infancy. As shown in Table 7, in 1994, Bosnian Serbs under Radovan Karadzic 
organized a referendum in the territories under their military control to pre-
vent a territorial compromise (see also Stefanovic forthcoming). About 90 
percent of the voters opposed the proposed land concessions that, inciden-
tally, a year later helped end the war in the Balkans. 
Beyond Bosnia, the international community has supported referendums 
elsewhere with only partial support of leaders. As discussed earlier, in Cyprus 
during the abortive 2004 referendum, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders 
did not commit themselves to the plan but accepted that a twin referendum 
would take place nonetheless. In the Turkish community, the moderates won, 
but in the areas controlled by the Republic, the Greek Cypriot leadership, 
with the exception of center- right DISY, urged people to vote “no,” effectively 
ending the peace process. The imminent danger with “internationally en-
dorsed” referendums is that if such referendums fail, the international com-
munity must respect the outcome, since foreign mediators initiated the 
process. Moreover, if moderates lose a referendum vote, it becomes difficult 
to shape tactical alliances that would bring them back to power, especially if 
the “yes” parties lose electoral allies and their potential to form coalitions. 
Even more problematic are cases where communities sharing a divided 
space vote in different directions. In Cyprus, for example, following the 
Annan Plan referendum, the Turkish Cypriot side emphasized its determina-
tion for peace by overwhelmingly voting for the 2004 Plan mediated by the 
UN and endorsed by the EU, Turkey, and Greece; therefore, Turkish Cypriot 
representatives insisted in negotiating within the Annan Plan framework 
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(Kaymak 2012). Meanwhile, Greek Cypriot leaders have argued that the 
Greek Cypriot side cannot redeliver in a future referendum provisions previ-
ously rejected by more than three fourths of the Greek Cypriot electorate 
(Kovras and Loizides 2012). Both sides are probably right, and so is the con-
clusion that referendums can cast a long shadow of opposition to the peace 
agreement if they fail. Thus, unlike Northern Ireland, where a referendum 
solidified support for an agreement, Cyprus demonstrates that failed referen-
dums can have long- term path- dependent effects, preventing moderates 
from utilizing constructive ideas previously rejected in a popular 
referendum. 
In other cases, elected leaders have agreed on a compromise but could 
not convince the public to accept it. As demonstrated in Table 7, in both Can-
ada’s 1992 Charlottetown Accord (stipulating Quebec’s status as a “distinct 
society”) and Guatemala’s attempt to provide improved rights for indigenous 
populations, the governments failed to convince voters to support the pro-
posed constitutional amendments (Carey 2004; Cameron and Simeon 2010). 
According to Cameron and Simeon, the Charlottetown Accord failed to win 
the support of the Canadian public even though all governments, most oppo-
sition parties, and Aboriginal leaders supported it. In other words “elite ac-
commodation no longer worked” for the Canadian public (2010: 71). 
This referendum outcome is theoretically even more puzzling as Canada 
has a long history of accommodating ethnic diversity. The failure of the refer-
endums in 1992 came as a surprise to the government of Progressive Conser-
vative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, which had invested much of its 
political capital in the formation of an agreement on Quebec. According to 
Johnston et al., “the 1992 referendum opened a wound and guaranteed that 
the wound would stay open” (Johnston et al. 1996: 253). Canadian voters not 
only rejected a specific product of “elite bargaining,” but as in Cyprus, se-
verely constrained the prospects for a future consociational agreement.
Likewise, the “no” result in Guatemala in 1999 (see Table 7) and the Greek 
Cypriot community in 2004 surprised international mediators because, in 
both cases, people were perceived as voting against their own “best interests” 
(Carey 2004; Pericleous 2009). According to relevant surveys, elites played a 
less significant role in the referendum than imagined. For instance in Cyprus, 
although political party discipline played a role, it was Greek Cypriots’ per-
sonal evaluation of the Plan that most affected voting behavior (Lordos 2006: 
12).
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Could People Vote “Yes?” 
Referendums have been surprisingly successful elsewhere in places assumed 
to be facing deeper divisions than those in Canada. As stated above, in 1992, 
the same year as the Canadian referendum, white South Africans voted to 
move the peace process forward, despite the long history of racism and mis-
trust fostered by the apartheid regime. Often societies such as South Africa 
and Northern Ireland vote “yes” for peace out of a fear of renewed and re-
awakened violence (McGarry 1998b; McGarry and O’Leary 2009a) although 
admittedly not all do so. Unlike Cyprus, in both Northern Ireland and South 
Africa there was a widespread perception that a “no” vote would have major 
consequences leading to new waves of violence or international sanctions re-
spectively. In South Africa international investors such as Volkswagen 
warned employees to vote “yes for their jobs and pensions” while General 
Tire announced “retrenchment of all employees and mothballing the com-
plete plant . . .  as a likely outcome of an unfavorable referendum result” 
(Prinsloo 1992: 3807). 
But sanctions and fear of violence alone cannot explain popular accep-
tance of a peace process. Conflict- ridden areas often produce polarized con-
stituencies and strong reactions to peace agreements, as in Israel/Palestine, 
Bosnia, and Iraq. The difference lies in the design of referendums and in 
combining democratic accountability with incentives that minimize the role 
of spoilers, an issue increasingly recognized as critical in peace processes 
(Sted man 1997: 5– 53; Lee and MacGinty 2012). By extension, management 
of stakeholders is extremely important. This includes “unlikely peacemakers” 
such as political parties with diverse constituencies, victims’ groups, religious 
actors, and paramilitary organizations. The latter’s role in renouncing vio-
lence and doing so in a credible way is critical in any referendum campaign. 
To this end, Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement included the release 
of Republican and Loyalist prisoners, aiming in return for the implicit sup-
port of their official representatives for the “yes campaign” (McGarry and 
O’Leary 2009a). Sinn Féin was also accommodated in inclusive power- 
sharing institutions and as shown in Chapter 3 the Northern Ireland Assem-




As all these examples suggest, timing and strategizing are extremely import-
ant in the design of a referendum. In fact, many of the advantages and disad-
vantages of referendums are both created and mitigated by institutional 
design. In a number of cases, referendums are obligatory through constitu-
tional provisions involving peace processes or related constitutional amend-
ments. For example, on the major issue of establishing the North and East as 
a single province in Sri Lanka, the 13th Amendment of the Constitution sug-
gests ratification by referendum when circumstances permit (Edrisinha 
2009). Unlike Sri Lanka, Cyprus does not have a constitutional requirement 
for a referendum, although it is considered a political requirement for a set-
tlement. Even so, one might well ask why Greek Cypriots have not developed 
a more concrete legal framework to address a future referendum, despite 
their intense preoccupation with other legal dimensions of a settlement. On 
this point, Qvortrup claims that about 70 percent of countries around the 
world have provisions for holding referendums, with most European coun-
tries moving toward greater use of direct democracy (2002: 1).
Interestingly, the two most commonly cited models of consociationalism 
and federalism in Europe (shown earlier to have inspired Cypriot negotia-
tors) tend to take opposite sides on referendums. Specifically, Switzerland 
relies heavily on direct democracy, while Belgium has eliminated referen-
dums at the national level following the divisive experience of a 1950 plebi-
scite when a question on the return of King Leopold III bitterly divided the 
Flemish and Walloon areas of the country (Qvortrup 2002: 22). Likewise, the 
West Indies Federation collapsed peacefully in 1962 when the federal idea 
was defeated in a referendum in Jamaica despite substantial support from 
domestic political elites (Bermeo 2002). Scotland might vote for indepen-
dence in the near future, if promises made in the 2014 referendum for a fed-
eral UK fail to materialize on time. The EU project might equally fail if 
subjected to parallel cross- country referendums; at the least, it would be se-
verely constrained. Finally, federal or otherwise “divided societies” such as 
India, the United States, the Netherlands, and Israel have never called a na-
tionwide referendum, although the Israeli Knesset has debated and often en-
acted laws requiring a referendum before implementation of peace 
agreements with Syrians and Palestinians (Qvortrup 2013; Hoyle 2010). 
Elsewhere in divided societies, we find it an undisputed social norm that 
referendums should take place before ratification of a peace agreement. Such 
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norms are often shaped by constitutional provisions, past agreements, or his-
torical legacies. For instance, in Kashmir an (unfulfilled) referendum was de-
clared in 1947 by Nehru, indicating India’s pledge “not only to the people of 
Kashmir but to the world” to hold a referendum under UN auspices. The aim 
was to determine whether Kashmiris would opt for India or Pakistan (Bose 
2007: 169). Similarly, in Northern Ireland, a referendum was seen as neces-
sary by both sides. Even in Cyprus, few politicians would initiate a public 
debate against a referendum and, ironically, most would refrain from identi-
fying designs differing from those “imposed” by the Annan Plan drafters in 
2004. 
Where referendums take place, they become entrenched in people’s 
minds and embedded in discussions of the future. Referendums are “habit 
forming”; once a referendum fails, the only legitimate way to address a settle-
ment is through another referendum that clarifies public intentions (Butler 
and Ranney 1994). Political elites cannot proceed without the expressed en-
dorsement of the public. This belief is broadly shared, even by those defeated 
in previous failed referendums in Cyprus, and it could freeze peace processes 
for years. Likewise, the experience of a “failed” referendum sets a bad prece-
dent: the Annan plan experience has considerably decreased the possibility 
of mainstream Greek Cypriot political parties using this tool to address other 
issues. In Greece, George Papandreou’s late announcement of a referendum 
has neutralized the use of the same institutional tool for the next few years.2 
Positive institutional legacies from the past may be just forgotten: for exam-
ple, the most contentious aspects of the pre- 1974 Greek politics was resolved 
by the 1975 referendum (Tridimas 2010), yet what comes to mind since the 
post- 2008 sovereign debt crisis is Papandreou’s unsuccessful call for a refer-
endum in 2011 (a move annulled because of the perceived uncertainty it 
could have created for Greece and the Eurozone). 
Moreover, Lijphart suggests there is a danger that referendums might 
serve as instruments of oppression against minorities (2004). For example, 
while the Swiss referendum law and the country’s political culture protect 
established communities, similar protection mechanisms are absent for im-
migrants. The November 2009 referendum prohibiting the construction of 
minarets is one of the most disconcerting developments with regard to com-
munity rights in liberal democracies. Yet a similar vote targeting the Jewish 
community in the country dates back to 1897 and prohibits the slaughter of 
animals according to Kosher rites; in recent decades, attempts were made to 
prohibit imports of Kosher and Halal meat (Steiner 1998: 110). 
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These examples suggest the limitations for aspiring federations or con-
sociations to consistently call on referendums as a systematic dispute- 
resolution mechanism. Chapter 3 presented a detailed proposal on the 
executive, which included a combination of presidential and parliamentar-
ian procedures in governance. Yet relying on referendums (as in Switzer-
land) as an additional layer in decision- making might not be the most 
conflict- mitigating arrangement. As this chapter and international experi-
ence suggest, the risks of referendums largely outweigh their potential ad-
vantages; therefore they should be embraced with caution even in places 
with decades- long public expectations for a referendum, as in the two com-
munities in Cyprus. 
Yet even in this case there are difficult questions of who is eligible to vote 
for what, how majorities are calculated in different units, and whether refer-
endums have binding authority. The question of eligibility reflects the out-
come of the federal transition itself. In fact, agreeing to a specific referendum 
option is a partial endorsement of the peace process and the rules of how a 
peace processes should be decided (Özersay 2007). For this reason, in refer-
endums concerning the future of the Republic of Macedonia/FYROM and 
Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia, as well as in Northern Ireland in 1973, boy-
cott campaigns were attempted by those opposing the design and timing of 
the referendum, adding to the polarization of ethnic communities (Babuna 
2000; Bose 2007). Interviews in Cyprus also suggest that the main partner in 
the coalition government, AKEL, considered abstaining from the 2004 refer-
endum to minimize the damage of the “no” vote.3 
As with institutional mechanisms and innovation in general, the specifics 
of referendum design, timing, and participation are often contested for a va-
riety of reasons. Even though the cases of Cyprus and Northern Ireland are 
frequently compared in the conflict studies literature, their peace referendum 
designs are quite different. In Cyprus the endorsement of the Annan Plan 
required simultaneous majorities from both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot 
sides; in Northern Ireland there was no formal provision for concurrent 
Unionist and Nationalist majorities. As for kin states, there were no provi-
sions for referendums in the UK or Greece, but the Annan Plan required 
ratification by the Turkish Parliament. In Northern Ireland, a referendum 
took place in the Republic of Ireland but not in Great Britain. In Northern 
Ireland there was no requirement for a double majority support in both com-
munities, and it would have been unthinkable to divide voters into separate 
community polls on the basis of religion or political affiliation (Oliver 2009). 
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Yet majority support was implicitly crucial for enactment of the planned 
changes, given the nature of the inclusive d’Hondt power- sharing executive. 
There were fears that a weak Protestant vote would lead to executive dead-
locks, particularly given the opposition of the DUP to the agreement. 
What made referendum design less contentious in Northern Ireland is 
the absence of contested citizenship practices. In contrast, in many cases 
around the world, referendums could handicap the peace process because of 
the presence of recent settlers. In Western Sahara, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, New 
Caledonia, and Kashmir, to name only a few, if newcomers (settlers/immi-
grants) become eligible to vote in a referendum, they could even determine 
the final status or nature of the peace process (Loizides 2011). Experts have 
raised similar concerns in the case of many former Soviet states, where “the 
recency of the Slavic immigration compounds the illegitimacy of the settlers’ 
claims” (Horowitz 1993: 24). Settler voting might be legitimized by the needs 
of the peace processes, but it is against the letter of international law and 
often in direct conflict with the wishes of indigenous voters. On a related 
case, the UN General Assembly decided that as a settler colony, Gibraltar 
should not be allowed self- determination even if people vote for it (UN Gen-
eral Assembly 2009). 
Surprisingly, in Cyprus, the UN with the tacit acceptance of the otherwise 
legally minded Greek Cypriot leaders allowed “TRNC” citizens of Turkish 
settler background to vote in the 2004 referendum (Sözen and Özersay 2007). 
An explanation for this puzzling development is that Greek Cypriot hardlin-
ers saw an opportunity to use referendums to derail the 2002– 2004 peace 
process. By voting “no,” the Papadopoulos government demonstrated vividly, 
albeit unwittingly, that the Greek Cypriot side was causing the protracted Cy-
priot deadlock, thereby losing the international sympathy which Greek Cy-
priots enjoyed since 1974. As Table 7 demonstrates, the only other recent 
comparable case where an ethnic community organized an anti- peace refer-
endum to telegraph its intransigence is Bosnian Serbs under Radovan 
Karadzic in 1994. 
An additional design issue concerns the rights of constituent people or 
federal units and whether each has a right to veto an agreement. In Canada, 
the Charlottetown referendum was a nonbinding guide for the ten provincial 
assemblies. Just as Irish voters alone could prevent the ratification of the EU 
Lisbon treaty, a “no” vote in any one of the Canadian provinces could derail 
the Accord.4 This design privileged each federal unit but deprived, for exam-
ple, the First Nations of a formal veto role. 
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Similar issues were raised about the design of the referendum on the con-
stitution in Iraq. Under Iraqi law, the constitution would have failed if a two- 
thirds majority in three of Iraq’s 18 provinces voted against it. Though a 
majority of voters rejected the constitutional proposal in the three largely 
Sunni provinces of Anbar, Salahuddin, and Nineveh, the latter vote was fairly 
close, with 55 percent voting “no”— a percentage that fell short of the two- 
thirds veto majority required. The other two Sunni provinces rejected the 
charter by more than a two- thirds majority but this was not enough to derail 
the constitutional approval (see Table 7). The referendum eliminated the 
need for comprehensive cross- community support by following a format that 
failed to prevent polarization across sectarian lines. The absence of explicit 
consociational principles in the design of the Iraqi referendum meant a Sunni 
“yes” vote was not a requirement in deciding the constitutional future of the 
country (Feldman and Martinez 2006). Unsurprisingly, the provinces that 
voted “no” in the referendum have been the breeding grounds for the rise of 
Islamic State in the following years. 
Options for (Non)Referendums
Elsewhere as in postwar Bosnia following the Dayton Accords, the interna-
tional community has opted for less risky options taking into consideration 
the drawbacks and risks of referendums. The reason for the international 
community’s reluctance to directly engage the public was simply the certainty 
of being outvoted. As demonstrated above, in a previous Serb- only referen-
dum, about 90 percent of voters opposed arrangements later reflected in the 
Dayton Accords. Here, the international community prioritized the urgent 
need to pacify Bosnia, leaving democratic legitimization for a later stage. 
If peacemakers are right about the benefits of peace agreements, sooner or 
later, the public will rally behind a negotiated settlement. In post- Dayton Bos-
nia, for instance, low levels of violence and the partial return of refugees have 
added an element of legitimization to the agreement (Belloni 2008). Leaders, 
elected governments or parliaments could also ratify agreements: silent elite 
pacts could be a better alternative than noisy, destabilizing referendums. This 
is not politically feasible elsewhere for instance in Cyprus. Luckily, the island 
does not face immediate violence or the possibility of renewed conflict; feder-
alism and consociationalism have to win the hearts and minds of Cypriots on 
their own, not as an alternative to war and violent conflict. 
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Should fear of secession and violence prevent referendums? Even in the 
successful cases of Northern Ireland and South Africa, marginal groups op-
posed the peace process or tried to scare moderate voters. According to the 
New York Times, in the weeks leading up to the 1992 South Africa referen-
dum, more than 220 blacks were slain in township violence (Wren 1992). 
Similarly, in Northern Ireland, both Loyalist and Republican dissident groups 
participated in violent attacks months before the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement. In the 1999 referendum in East Timor, the UN administration 
has been criticized for organizing a premature referendum while failing to 
guarantee the security of the voters, leading to widespread massacres against 
innocent civilians (Paris 2004: 219). Since any compromise will meet with 
some opposition, it is important to distinguish violent opposition by small 
and marginalized groups from the opposition of established popular move-
ments or organized militaries. In Cyprus, even during the contentious 2004 
referendum, there was no major direct violence. For the most part, the “no” 
camp in both communities has reacted in a polemical yet nonviolent man-
ner, but if a future referendum seems likely to succeed, hardliners might re-
sort to scare tactics.
If referendums include such political risks, it is important to understand 
why leaders opt for them in the first place. Reasons could vary depending on 
the local context. The value- added of peace referendums is that they offer a 
clear mandate, stronger than opting for a moderate leader in elections as 
demonstrated in the 1990s in Sri Lanka and Israel/Palestine or more recently 
in Georgia and Colombia. De Klerk suggests in his autobiography that he 
rejected an election on a constituent basis because it would not give the same 
weight to every vote and because in elections all sorts of matters such as un-
employment and the state of the economy influence voters’ decisions (1999: 
232). In theory, direct democratic processes such as referendums can delink 
peace processes from other internal priorities such as the state of the econ-
omy. People could vote on the basis of their preference for a peace settlement, 
setting aside domestic politics and party sympathies. Yet a number of cases 
suggest that this delinkage might not always be possible. For instance, as 
Table 7 suggests, many Canadians voted “no” in the 1992 referendum to vent 
their anger at the political and business establishment of the country gener-
ally and at Prime Minister Mulroney specifically (see also the defeat of 
Jacques Chirac in the 2005 European constitution referendum in France).
Moreover, practitioners emphasize that hidden agendas and party poli-
tics are important and can dominate other nonpartisan interests. As the 
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Greek and Guatemalan examples below demonstrate this is more common in 
referendums than elections. According to Manfredo Marroquín, a political 
analyst in Guatemala, the ruling Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) pub-
licly supported reforms to please the international community but called on 
its party to vote “no.”5 Likewise, former Greek prime minister Costas Kara-
manlis supported the Annan Plan but did very little to promote it among 
Greek Cypriots for fear of damaging his relationship with the conservative 
grassroots of his party. And in Northern Ireland, the pro- peace Ulster Union-
ist Party (UUP) did not fight for a whole- scale referendum campaign. Even 
though the party supported the agreement, few senior politicians actively 
participated in the “yes” campaign, with the exception of David Trimble, and 
he lacked the charisma to appeal to the masses (Kane 2009). 
In the absence of active party politics, campaigning particularly in the 
Unionist community was taken over by civil society organizations, what an-
thropologist Dominic Bryan calls “the respected establishment of Northern 
Ireland” (2009). On this issue, what makes Northern Ireland and South Af-
rica exceptional is that significant civil society actors supported the ‘yes’ cam-
paign. In both cases a remarkable prior transformation took place in the 
business community, relatives of victims’ associations, women’s groups and 
even among church leaders with linkages to transnational peace networks, 
notably the ecumenical movement (Sandal 2011). Civil society initiatives of 
comparable strength are missing in Cyprus, particularly among the Greek 
Cypriots. 
In addition, both Northern Ireland and South Africa benefited immensely 
from polling during the mediation process; according to leading South Afri-
can academic pollster Robert Mattes, 23 different indigenous organizations 
initiated or commissioned surveys about the relative strengths of the con-
tending political parties and leaders between 1990 and 1994 (forthcoming). 
More important, opinion polls helped De Klerk and his advisors calculate 
their risk, target specific constituencies and frame the question in the refer-
endum (Mattes 2012). But in Cyprus, negotiations for the Annan Plan have 
taken place behind closed doors, without polling people’s preferences. As 
mentioned in previous chapters, the Cyprus2015 and other polling initiatives 
(see for instance Lordos et al. 2009) have introduced a positive step in public 
consultation. However, Cypriot leaders have refrained from broadening the 
negotiations and in particular have refused to include opposition parties or 
civil society actors in the mediation. In the meantime, the public appear to 
have lost hope as to a future settlement (Cyprus2015 2012). As a common 
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response to the lack of consultation, leaders point out that the two communi-
ties will eventually be asked to ratify the agreement in a referendum; this 
unintentional effect of direct democracy could be simply termed the moral 
hazard effect of peace referendums. 
Informal Mandate Referendums
Taking into consideration the problematic nature of referendums, on the one 
hand and the fact that Cypriot leaders have committed themselves to a future 
referendum, on the other, the book proposes a South African style early 
mandate referendum as a potentially promising and transferable alternative. 
The idea is simply to put before the people not the complex provisions of a 
constitution as in the Annan Plan but general guiding principles that are 
more easily perceptible. In a mandate referendum, a leader presents a general 
idea or a framework of a peace arrangement to the public and asks his or her 
community for a conditional or unconditional mandate to finalize the agree-
ment. By authorizing leaders to finalize a compromise, they could maximize 
both democratic legitimization and credibility in negotiations. In fact, man-
date referendums strengthen the position of conciliatory leaders and offer 
alternative institutional arrangements that could solve many of the problems 
raised above. 
The South African white- only referendum of 1992 is an example. Given 
its apartheid origins, it has received little attention from political scientists6 
and its transferability to other settings has not been debated, even though it 
legitimized and facilitated the end of one of the most repressive regimes in 
the twentieth century. As mentioned above, the referendum was triggered by 
the Potchefstroom by- election, which led to the defeat of the National Party 
and questioned De Klerk’s authority as chief negotiator (Butler and Ranney 
1994: 9). Challenged by his opponents, particularly the Conservative Party, 
De Klerk asked voters to reject or endorse his reform policies to negotiate an 
end to white minority rule through talks with the black majority. Rather than 
presenting a final settlement, the referendum asked voters whether they sup-
ported the reform process and a new constitution. The referendum took 
place in the context of the apartheid regime but De Klerk’s justification for 
limiting the vote to white electorate was that they were the ones divided on 
the necessity of constitutional transformation (De Klerk 1999: 232). De Klerk 
said he would regard majority support as granting him a mandate to sign 
146 Chapter 5
“binding agreements” in constitutional talks. What makes the South African 
case particularly interesting is that De Klerk said it would be “meaningless” 
to ask white voters to reauthorize such agreements unless the final settlement 
was substantially different from that envisaged by his party (see Table 7). 
De Klerk linked the referendum with his own personal fate and political 
future. He promised to resign and hold elections if his reforms failed to win a 
significant majority. His threat targeted, on the one hand, the South African 
moderates and businesses leadership who feared a return to international 
isolation and black revolt and, on the other hand, the ANC leadership who 
informally rallied behind his campaign.7 Blacks were not invited to partici-
pate in the ballot, nor were Indians or persons of mixed race; nonetheless, De 
Klerk skillfully won Mandela’s discreet agreement (Butler and Ranney 1994: 
9). 
In Cyprus winning the implicit support of the other side during the si-
multaneous referendums proved impossible, as leaders aimed exclusively at 
convincing their own communities, often using arguments boosting their 
own gains and influencing moderates negatively across the divide. For in-
stance, once Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appeared in front 
of the media “celebrating the agreement,” Greeks and Greek Cypriots shifted 
their attention to the negatives of the Annan Plan (Anastasiou 2008). The 
same dilemmas apply for international mediators having to justify positions 
that harm campaign efforts in one of the two communities participating in a 
peace process. 
Yet the multiple advantages inherent to De Klerk- type referendums could 
inform Cyprus and potentially other divided societies. First, they are less 
risky; if politicians lose the mandate, they could opt to step down without 
sacrificing the essence of the peace process during critical moments. Second, 
they allow communities to prepare themselves for peace negotiations. Pre- 
referendums can provide leaders feedback and priorities to be addressed in 
finalizing an agreement. Assigning a mandate to an elected leader balances 
democratic accountability with pragmatism in the negotiations. De Klerk 
could negotiate a credible end to apartheid without fearing a risky referen-
dum at the end of the process. As his advisors and third experts point out, the 
mandate referendum allowed De Klerk to take calculated risks rather than 
face a volatile and uncertain future (de Villiers 2012; Mattes 2012; Steward 
2012). 
More important, the referendum proved to be catalyst itself in the negoti-
ation process. It prevented the outflanking of De Klerk by the country’s 
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dominant security forces or the growing power of the Conservatives. In this 
way, De Klerk preempted ethnic outbidding, safeguarding the peace process 
from the unavoidable reversals in public opinion common to most peace 
processes. In the words of a National Party member of the South African 
House of Assembly, what could have been “a triumphant march” for hardlin-
ers and the Conservative Party “turned into their funeral procession” 
(Jordaan 1992: 1968). 
Pre- referendums also improve leaders’ negotiating strategies and chances 
of reaching a settlement. By providing certainty, they allow disputing sides to 
demand (and receive) more concessions at the negotiating table. In addition, 
while a successful informal referendum will have positive effects, a failed ref-
erendum is limited in its consequences, because no formal international bod-
ies are involved in the process. This of course could not apply to referendums 
encouraged by the UN or imposed by other external actors. 
 Finally, internal referendums frequently target only one of many com-
munities involved in a conflict. It is often much easier to have one commu-
nity rather than multiple players agree to hold a referendum. A critique of the 
EU in Cyprus is that accession was already secured for the island by the time 
of the referendum; therefore, Greek Cypriots had no immediate incentive to 
vote “yes.” A counterfactual might be useful in realizing the importance of 
mandate community- specific referendums. Had the EU required Greek Cy-
priots to vote alone earlier to endorse a peace framework for the entire island 
(when Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were refusing to do so), a compromise 
could have been possible. Critics of Greek Cypriots often cite the community 
change of mind in the 2003– 2004 period; the truth, though, is that many of 
those involved in the mediation at the time ignored the suggestion of provid-
ing the Clerides administration the option of unilaterally endorsing an im-
proved version of the Annan Plan in late 2002 (Loizides 2003a, b). 
As the above examples make clear, linkage strategies allow politicians 
with public credibility to mobilize support, even among constituencies hesi-
tant about settlement. Alternatively, however, referendum processes could 
delink sensitive issues from the broader political agenda. For instance, plans 
for a settlement in the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict have focused on internally 
displaced persons, proposing the participation of only IDPs in a referendum 
for the future status of the disputed territory (Johansson 2009). Referendums 
in Uruguay (2009) and Turkey (2010) focused on a single issue, namely that 
of revoking amnesty for crimes committed during the countries’ respective 
dictatorships. And in the case of the monarchy referendum in post- 1974 
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Greece, the issue of the monarchy was delinked from the broader post- civil 
war conflict to allow the public to bring closure to a controversial and con-
tentious issue (Tridimas 2010). Voters in Cyprus and other divided societies 
could take a similar route to settlement, focusing on specific issues and split-
ting peace negotiations into smaller, more easily resolved components. The 
following chapter will examine this idea of gradual mediation more closely.
Conclusion
Comparing and contrasting referendums in divided societies could provide 
general guidance for policy- makers in Cyprus. The chapter stresses here that 
no model is undeniably “better” than its alternatives without significant qual-
ifications as to the context of each case. The chapter summarizes a number of 
alternative designs, noting their likelihood of success in emerging federations 
and consociations. It connects the design and timing of referendums to un-
expected outcomes and suggests how to stimulate positive public engage-
ment in peace processes to forestall failure. 
Referendums have many advantages. They can create cross- cutting links 
transcending ethnic and communal boundaries and even shape a shared po-
litical vision of the future among peacemakers. And even if popular support 
for a settlement diminishes, as in Northern Ireland and South Africa, prior 
endorsement of a settlement in a referendum could sustain the settlement. In 
other words, successful peace referendums extend into the future and add 
legitimacy and commitment to a settlement over a longer period than in 
elections. 
At the same time, referendums can inflame situations in conflict- prone so-
cieties. They entail political risks for incumbent leaders and can further divide 
constituencies internally. If leaders in any of the new or old flashpoints in the 
Middle East or the Balkans and beyond endorse a peace plan to settle an issue, 
it might be “unnecessary” to risk its implementation, especially given the 
weaknesses of democratic processes in many postconflict societies. 
Aspiring federations could learn from this chapter that each referendum 
might require a unique design, if it is to accomplish its purpose for legitimacy 
and public support; in other words, the context is key. In the case of Bosnia, 
no referendum followed Dayton, but the agreement worked relatively well, 
and unlike other comparable cases, it enabled the end of violence and mas-
sive return of displaced persons and refugees. But in Iraq, bloodshed 
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followed a successful referendum ratifying a new federal constitution. The 
cases of Northern Ireland and South Africa but not Canada (1992) and Gua-
temala (1998) suggest that referendums can play a positive role; in the latter, 
referendums left issues unresolved and even led to the possibility of secession 
and renewed conflict. Finally, South Africa and Northern Ireland offer mod-
els that have been ignored in relevant studies. 
The chapter reaches two important conclusions for policy- makers. These 
could apply to Cyprus but also other cases of power- sharing transitions. First, 
referendums could be avoided if there are already strong indications on the 
ground that at least one main ethnic group might resort to violence in an at-
tempt to express its dissatisfaction with the referendum announcement or its 
specific design provisions. A referendum overwhelmingly opposed by a sub-
stantial minority will violate the core logic of consociational democracy and 
therefore fail to promote a peace settlement leading to violence. Second, even 
well- intentioned referendums might fail due to timing, design, and other 
considerations. If circumventing potentially risky referendums is not possi-
ble, parties in peace mediations might use “least destructive” designs such as 
mandate referendums aiming for the ripe moment to catalyze a successful 
outcome in a peace process. 
As discussed earlier, the Anastasiades- Eroğlu joint statement in February 
2014 included as one of its provisions that the “leaders will aim to reach a 
settlement as soon as possible, and hold separate simultaneous referenda 
thereafter.” Were the leaders right to make prior commitments to a referen-
dum in their joint statement? As stated earlier, referendums are generally 
seen as habit- forming and the belief that there should have been separate si-
multaneous referendums has already been broadly shared across the political 
spectrum, even by those defeated in 2004. Although there are multiple bene-
fits for De Klerk- style mandate referendums in general, this option might be 
very difficult to be implemented as such in Cyprus because the public have 
already assumed they are entitled to the final decision. In essence, the joint 
statement confirmed what was already the general expectation. On the one 
hand, the positive side of this statement is that it provides an early roadmap 
on what to expect and how to prepare for it. On the other, these prior provi-
sions for referendums maintain counter- incentives for leaders not to proceed 
forcibly with negotiations, an issue that became more evident in Cyprus by 
late 2014. Many Greek Cypriots feel that a second failed referendum on their 
side will lead to permanent partition of Cyprus. This might prevent the Greek 
Cypriot leadership from making decisive steps in the process in the first 
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place, as moderate Greek Cypriots might not wish to “risk their last chance.” 
This drawback can be addressed, however, if current and future mediators 
plan early for alternative post- failed referendum scenarios to continue nego-
tiations even under the least desirable outcome of a new stalemate. Another 
problem already seen in each round of renewed negotiations in Cyprus is 
that hardliners start their anti- deal campaigns early while moderates focus 
primarily on the negotiations. Thus the former may have a definite advantage 
during the process as their time and energy will be devoted in convincing the 
public to reject a new peace settlement. 
The chapter also demonstrated additional pitfalls of referendums with re-
gard to leadership, such as the moral hazard effect of not consulting the pub-
lic in the period prior to the referendum. 
Overall, Chapter 5 highlights the broader relevance of referendum de-
signs for negotiated settlements in divided societies not just Cyprus. With 
regard to the latter, one way to address some of the potential side effects of 
the joint statement is to revisit mandate referendum options. But unlike 
South Africa, where white voters were asked to give more or less a blank 
check to De Klerk, in Cyprus leaders could finalize and endorse the agree-
ment and then ask for a mandate to sign its final form following another 
short round of post- referendum negotiations for minor mutually agreed 
amendments. For one option, this a mutually beneficial strategy in negotia-
tions strongly recommended by theorists and practitioners of negotiation 
theory (Raiffa et al. 2002). For another a short round of renegotiation, will 
also address some of legitimate concerns of the public that could inevitably 
emerge as well misinformation common in referendum campaigns. 
C h a p t e r  6
“Stalemate Theory”: A Humanitarian 
Breakthrough in Cyprus 
The “frozen conflict” of Cyprus can tell us a theoretically informative story 
about stalemates and prolonged deadlocks in deeply divided societies. This 
chapter compares the options of comprehensive and gradualist approaches to 
peacemaking in Cyprus and offers an alternative conceptual framework for 
negotiating peace in divided societies. I argue that successfully addressed 
conflicts, previously seen as “stalemated,” can be particularly enlightening in 
addressing intractability. In particular, this chapter attempts to challenge and 
amend Zartman’s (1985, 2000) concepts of ripeness and “ripe moments.” As 
one of the most prominent paradigms in peace and conflict studies, “ripe-
ness” emphasizes primarily critical times and opportunities when it is most 
appropriate to take action in contested peace processes.
In its place, this chapter proposes a more gradual process aiming to take 
advantage of ostensibly less promising times in peace talks. More specifically, 
it argues for the effective use of dormant moments in peace negotiations, in-
troducing a novel conceptual framework defined as “stalemate theory.” The 
chapter applies the theory to various examples from Cyprus, focusing in par-
ticular on two contrasting cases. First, it emphasizes among other cases the 
relatively successful example of the Committee for Missing Persons (CMP). 
Based also on earlier co- authored work (Kovras and Loizides 2011, 2012), it 
demonstrates how the CMP was reactivated under prohibitive conditions 
following the collapse of the Annan Plan in 2004. It then considers why a 
similar gradual approach has not been implemented in a comparable hu-
manitarian issue involving the Greek Cypriot deserted suburb of Varosha in 
the city of Famagusta. 
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As discussed in previous chapters, until now, efforts to resolve the Cyprus 
problem have failed, despite external incentives, involvement of international 
organizations and the island’s own emerging peace culture. The 2002– 2004 
peace process was a turning point, albeit with high expectations, failing to 
deliver the promised outcome at the time of Cypriot accession to the Euro-
pean Union. Conventional wisdom would assume that the next opportunity 
to confront the Cypriot stalemate would appear after the Greek Cypriot side 
enters a period of economic recovery or around the time of Turkey’s own 
accession to the EU (see also Chapter 7). This line of reasoning emphasizes 
ripe moments and the role of external players in determining reunification 
politics in Cyprus, assuming, of course, that EU accession would still be a 
priority in Turkey in the near future. Unavoidably, the growing pessimism on 
whether Turkey will be eventually admitted to the EU is implicitly reflected 
in the renewed peace talks in Cyprus. All things equal, Turkey is expected to 
be “less enthusiastic” in endorsing concessions in Cyprus before securing an 
element of certainty with regard to its own accession to the EU. 
For these reasons, substantial periods of time have been described as dor-
mant, even “dead” time in the ongoing attempts to mediate a peace settle-
ment in Cyprus— as well as other frozen or protracted conflicts around the 
world, including Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Os-
setia), and Azerbaijan (Nagorno- Karabakh). The book questions this reason-
ing and offers a broader theoretical rationale for exploiting less favorable 
times in peace talks, not only in the Cyprus conflict, but also in mediation 
and negotiation studies more broadly. 
Optimism in pre-2015 Cyprus meant swimming against the current. 
Simply stated, the Cypriot experience itself suggests that those who did so in 
the past have often challenged the logic of partition, arguably with relative 
success. Cyprus features a number of positive stories in peace mediation that 
demonstrate how societies can choose to mitigate even the most difficult as-
pects of their territorial division. Admittedly, complete reversals of contested 
partitions have been rare, difficult, and inundated with unintentional conse-
quences (Lustick 1997; Sambanis 2000; O’Leary 2007). However, countering 
conventional wisdom, progressive peace actors in the island have taken brave 
steps toward conflict transformation in the past four decades. 
For instance, even in the immediate aftermath of the Turkish invasion in 
1974, the mayors of Nicosia devised a plan to address the city’s most difficult 
sewerage and drainage problems, effectively “reuniting the underground” of 
Nicosia City (Papadakis 2005: 167– 68). Although the projects had been 
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envisioned before the division, in 1979 the two municipalities introduced a 
set of informal but practical arrangements for the shared sewerage and drain-
age system. During this process they also found out that a Master Plan for 
Nicosia as a whole was not only inevitable but also possible due to the close 
working relationship of the two mayors, Lellos Demetriades and Mustafa 
Akıncı (Hadjri 2008). The mayors relied not only on their undeniable cha-
risma but also on expert advice to alert the public of the imminent dangers of 
an acute environmental crisis in their backyards, if bicommunal cooperation 
was once more derailed.1 
These steps, however, did not allow ordinary citizens from the two sides to 
communicate more freely at the time. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the line 
dividing Cyprus remained hermetically sealed until April 2003, with very little 
unmonitored movement of people across the island’s militarized checkpoints. 
Yet Turkish Cypriot protest culture gradually began to emerge since the 1990s, 
challenging official partitionist discourse. The Bu Memleket Bizim (this home-
land is ours) movement succeeded in mobilizing Turkish Cypriots for peace in 
2002– 2004.2 Thousands of people in the streets demanded an end to Turkish 
Cypriot isolation and for accession to the EU (with the Greek Cypriots), and 
objected to Turkey’s interference in their domestic affairs (Hatay and Bryant 
2008; Vural 2012; Navaro- Yashin 2012). The Bu Memleket Bizim movement 
suggests that while institutional design matters, there are often important so-
cial dynamics behind institutional change, as indicated in the example of 
grassroots mobilization for recovery of the missing persons.3 The movement 
also contributed to the peaceful opening of the checkpoints in 2003, to the 
election of moderate leaders from the Turkish Cypriot left, and, more import-
ant, to an impressive “yes” vote in the 2004 Annan Plan referendum. 
While Greek Cypriots failed to ratify the Plan, “success” stories began to 
emerge even in the aftermath of the failed peace process. The Democratic 
Rally (DISY) had been the only major Greek Cypriot party to endorse the 
Plan, despite the fact that it partly draws its origins from the Greek Cypriot 
ethnonationalist tradition and the anticolonial enosis (union) movement that 
attempted to unite Cyprus with Greece in 1955– 1959 (Sandal and Loizides 
2013). The Rally itself swam against the current and risked its party unity by 
supporting the 2004 Annan Plan. Even more interestingly, it devised a set of 
successful electoral strategies to defend the party’s “logic of pragmatism” that 
surprisingly increased its popular support among voters, making the Rally 
the largest political force in the island leading to the election of its leader to 
the presidency in 2013 (Moore et al. 2014). 
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On an even smaller scale, the Maronite community of Cyprus has 
achieved an important concession by regaining limited but effective access to 
its historic village of Kormakitis, despite decades of forced displacement. 
Studies of the Cyprus problem have often ignored smaller indigenous com-
munities in the island, such as the Cypriot Maronites, Latins, and Armenians. 
There are around 6,000 Cypriot Maronites descending from eighth- century 
migrants/refugees from today’s Syria and Lebanon (Hourani 1998; Varnavas 
2002). All four ancestral Maronite villages, Agia Marina, Asomatos, Karpa-
shia, and Kormakitis, are located in the northern part of the island, with their 
native populations largely displaced. Maronites faced multiple problems in 
returning to their habitual residencies, including delays in implementation of 
resettlement laws, destroyed properties, and military restrictions in entering 
two of their villages. 
Yet despite the protracted stalemate in the bicommunal negotiations, the 
overwhelming majority of Cypriot Maronites managed to rebuild their 
homes in Kormakitis for permanent or temporary accommodation by 2007. 
The return process followed a promise by Serdar Denktaş permitting Ma-
ronites to resettle to northern Cyprus, formally ratified in 2006 (Leonidou 
2006). The success of Maronite mobilization could be primarily attributed to 
the strength of its community organizations during displacement. Cypriot 
Maronites retained their own churches, schools, sports teams, and networks 
of business groups. Maronite civic organizations have been crucial in the re-
turn process by lobbing the Vatican and “Catholic” governments to pressure 
Turkey and Turkish Cypriot authorities to allow and facilitate return. Ma-
ronite associations have also built close ties with Turkish Cypriot politicians 
across the political spectrum and put positive pressure on fellow community 
members to join the return process by sharing information and logistical 
support (Stefanovic and Loizides 2011). 
These different but interrelated examples highlight the context under 
which actors in societies make a choice of peace that could catalyze and sus-
tain stable power- sharing arrangements. An even more interesting example 
is the Committee for Missing Persons (CMP) in Cyprus, which has emerged 
as the most successful bicommunal project since 2004 (Sant Cassia 2005; 
Bozkurt and Yakinthou 2012; Kovras 2013). CMP mediation is critical for the 
study of Cyprus and peace processes in general, not only because of the diffi-
culties associated with addressing an emotionally sensitive issue but because 
an agreement was reached roughly after the failure of the Annan Plan settle-
ment (Kovras 2008, 2013). The institutional innovations in mediating the 
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CMP stand in stark contrast to the failure of Greek and Turkish Cypriot lead-
ers to reach agreements on other humanitarian issues, including the unin-
habited suburb of Varosha, leading to its gradual environmental destruction. 
In both cases there have been cycles of ripe and unripe moments for conflict 
resolution, but so far only in one case was a solution found. The reason for 
success lies in the innovative use of institutional design in dormant time fol-
lowing the derailment of a peace process.
Defining Dormant Time
“Dormant time” in a peace process could be defined as the period when it is 
least likely to reach a settlement in a given negotiation. Protracted conflicts 
and frozen moments have generally received little attention from scholars 
(for exceptions, see Azar 1985; Lederach 1995; Bahcheli et al. 2004). More 
important, very few studies have attempted to identify proper mediation for-
mulas that use such periods constructively. This chapter highlights that ap-
propriate use of “dormant times” (which tend to be plentiful) can result in 
better time management and multitasking in intercommunal peace talks. 
By extension, strategy and institutional design are at least as important as 
the structural determinants of peace processes. On the one hand, Zartman’s 
(1985, 2000) emphasis on ripeness and proper timing in negotiations should 
not be underestimated in the broader picture. Ripe moments are certainly 
the most critical factor in peace processes, especially when mutually destruc-
tive stalemates or attractive external opportunities create the momentum 
necessary to resolve a dispute. On the other, I demonstrate that opportunities 
can be found in less critical moments as well. This framework could be par-
ticularly relevant if important actors face competitive elections or if interna-
tional incentives and sanctions appear weak. Can sides in a given mediation 
adjust their negotiating strategies accordingly to offset these structural 
weaknesses? 
The answer is yes. In a nutshell, during these “dormant periods” interna-
tional diplomacy could focus on the following steps. First, mediations could 
preserve progress already made in previous negotiation rounds. Second, they 
could introduce novel ideas likely to be resisted in the short term but already 
tested successfully elsewhere. Risky and assertive experimentation during 
ripe moments is less likely, as time pressure constrains mediators and conflict 
sides into more cautious approaches in mediation. Third, mediators could 
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identify new areas of policy innovation based, for instance, on institutional 
innovation combined with technological breakthroughs, as suggested below 
with regard to DNA identification for missing persons. Finally, mediators 
might attempt to investigate potential areas where one side might make uni-
lateral concessions at an earlier stage in the mediation hoping that the other 
will be encouraged to reciprocate in the future. 
Another related argument to be raised is the fact a divided society being 
in a “frozen status” for a long period of time might well provide fertile ground 
for solution (of specific problems), precisely because the background condi-
tions might suddenly change. The passage of time, for example, brings change 
in attitudes toward the “other” (although admittedly not always positive). For 
example, since 1974 a new generation of Cypriots has grown up without di-
rect experience of violence (Bryant 2010). Moreover, when external media-
tors face intransigent positions by leaders whose popularity is already 
declining, the international community could bypass total spoilers by di-
rectly engaging the grassroots. The role of emerging grassroots actors is im-
portant in changing the framing of a particular problem. Unilateral grassroots 
gestures of goodwill could arguably empower such actors by constructively 
and credibly engaging the “other” side. 
Finally, as stated in the previous chapter, mediators could use dormant 
time to test the grounds for a renewed effort toward a comprehensive settle-
ment. Early ratification processes, particularly the possibility of winning 
early public mandates for a renewed round of peace talks through elections 
or peace referendums, could be critical particularly if a future ripe- moment 
is conceivable. For instance, if the assumption in the Cypriot peace process is 
that Turkey’s EU accession will catalyze future peace talks in Cyprus, a 
broader conceptual framework in negotiations would consider what should 
be done in the meantime to prepare the two sides for the “Cypriot- Turkey 
endgame.” To make this possible, sides might engage with mini- package 
(gradual) deals to mitigate conflict and catalyze a comprehensive peace 
agreement at a later stage. As will be shown below, despite the difficulties as-
sociated with a “frozen conflict,” successful accommodation of human rights 
might be possible, benefiting the lives of thousands of relatives of victims, 
even though admittedly it might not catalyze an overall breakthrough in 
comprehensive negotiations. Nonetheless, the experience of the CMP is par-
ticularly puzzling and instructive in theorizing “stalemate moments.” 
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The Committee for Missing Persons
The Committee for Missing Persons (CMP) was established in 1981 but re-
mained inactive for almost twenty- three years. Its reactivation in 2004 has 
been described as the most successful bicommunal project following Cyprus 
EU accession (Sant Cassia 2005, 2006; Kaymak 2007; Kovras 2008). This 
stands in sharp contrast to other failed steps initially envisioned to incentiv-
ize the Cypriot peace process, such as Famagusta, discussed at greater length 
below (see also proposals by Cyprus Academic Dialogue 2012). Despite the 
political deadlock in 2004, the CMP resumed its activities in the same year 
contributing to the exhumation of 941 human remains by April 2013 (CMP 
2013). 
The CMP has been generally described as a success story for other pro-
tracted conflicts (Jaquemet 2009; Kovras 2012), while in 2011 the Elders in-
cluding South Africa’s Desmond Tutu visited the island to film a documentary 
“about the Committee’s valuable work.”4 At the initial stages the CMP relied 
on the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF), which was selected 
to design and coordinate the archaeological and anthropological phases of 
the project. EAAF was established in 1984 to investigate the cases of at least 
10,000 people who went missing in Argentina during the military dictator-
ship of 1976– 1983. 
The CMP case demonstrates that conflict transformation is possible at 
least on humanitarian issues, despite the absence of an overall political settle-
ment. In fact, the issue of exhumations of missing persons has often been 
considered one of the most complicated aspects of post- civil war negotia-
tions. For example, despite decades of progress in the Northern Irish peace 
process, there has been little breakthrough on the issue of the disappeared 
during the “Troubles.” There were very few disappearances in Northern Ire-
land in the 1970s, yet the fate of some of the missing remains unresolved de-
spite the overall satisfactory record of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
(McGarry and O’Leary 2009a; McCaffrey 2011; Kovras and Loizides 2011). 
The South African case provides another interesting contrast to Cyprus 
on the issue of the missing persons. In both South Africa and Cyprus there 
have been approximately 2,000 reported cases of missing persons (CMP 
2013; Aronson 2011).5 Debating the limitations of South Africa’s search for 
its own missing, Aronson (2011) argues that the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) managed to officially recognize only 447 individuals as 
missing, of which only 66 were exhumed. In other words, the much 
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celebrated “South African model” produced only a tiny portion of exhuma-
tions compared to the less- known “Cypriot alternative,” where almost half 
the missing have been exhumed under conditions of a protracted stalemate.
Inevitably, numbers and the reasoning behind such comparisons could 
be questioned, yet there is little doubt that the reactivation of the CMP has 
been largely successful for the conditions of Cyprus. According to TRC lead-
ing researcher Nicky Rousseau, the broad mandate of the Commission in 
South African politics and society obstructed policy- makers from specifi-
cally focusing on the issue of the missing (2012). By contrast, in Cyprus the 
issue of the missing was delinked from the political process and all related 
efforts prioritized exhumations. More precisely, the CMP process operated 
with a “restricted mandate” and included effective political and legal guaran-
tees against persecution in exchange for anonymous information leading to 
exhumations (Bozkurt and Yakinthou 2012). In other words, it introduced an 
alternative model of addressing political exhumations to those in South Af-
rica, where amnesty was linked to formal public acknowledgment of events, 
or more recently in the Balkans, where international justice has prioritized 
convictions for perpetrators. Additionally, the CMP model was based on im-
plicit reciprocity between the two communities. As demonstrated in previous 
chapters, proportionality and reciprocity are critical in resolving protracted 
conflicts. The forced disappearances in Cyprus were fairly proportional, af-
fecting both communities; therefore each had an incentive in cooperating 
and sustaining the process. 
The Cypriot Context 
In Cyprus there are missing persons from two different periods. According to 
official figures, the Turkish Cypriots suffered approximately half their losses 
during the bicommunal hostilities of 1963– 1974 while the other half went 
missing in the July– August 1974 period. The Greek Cypriot community ex-
perienced most of its losses during this second period (Kovras 2014). In 
1981, with Cypriot approval, the UN established a tripartite Committee on 
Missing Persons (CMP), consisting of a Greek- Cypriot, a Turkish- Cypriot, 
and a member directly appointed by the UN Secretary General. Although the 
Committee’s primary objective was to investigate the fate of these missing 
persons on both sides, there were no exhumations for more than two 
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decades, with the exception of the body of a U.S. citizen of Greek- Cypriot 
descent following Congressional intervention. 
In their work on the CMP, Sant Cassia (2006), Kovras (2008), and Boz-
kurt and Yakinthou (2011) have identified multiple reasons for these initial 
failures despite the pressing needs of relatives on both sides. First, the CMP 
was formed on the principle of consensus among its members, something 
that has led into failures in implementing major decisions (Kovras 2013). 
Given the partition and protracted stalemate in the island, there was no effec-
tive mechanism to arbitrate deadlocks or force any side to implement its ob-
ligations. In general, the UNFICYP in Cyprus has failed to enforce any of the 
agreements signed by the two sides, for instance, as mentioned earlier, the 
1975 Vienna Accords stipulating respect for the rights of 20,000 Greek Cy-
priots residing at the time in enclaves under Turkish Cypriot administration 
(Sambanis 1999). 
Second, the ethnonationalist narratives of each side obstructed rational 
decisions on the issue. Despite the intensity of bicommunal violence, the 
overwhelming majority in both communities had very little knowledge of the 
existence of the other side’s missing persons. Relatives of the missing them-
selves have been instrumentalized in the national narrative and have often 
been formally employed in government posts to propagate official positions 
abroad. On the Greek Cypriot side, the number 1,619— denoting the figure 
of Greek Cypriot missing persons— became an emblem of public victimhood 
(Sant Cassia 2007; Kovras 2008). Likewise, on the Turkish Cypriot side, the 
missing of bicommunal violence in 1963– 1964 were perceived as martyrs 
who sacrificed their lives for their nation. 
Unlike their Greek Cypriot compatriots, Turkish- Cypriots accepted the 
fact that their missing had lost their lives; they too employed a number, in 
this case 803, denoting the forcibly disappeared (Sant Cassia 2006: 116; 
Kovras and Loizides 2011). Official bureaucracies, particularly on the Greek 
Cypriot side, assumed the responsibility for presenting the issue in interna-
tional forums. Even when subsequent evidence was presented that a missing 
person was dead, authorities tried to suppress information but also revised 
their catalog to maintain the symbolic figure 1,619. During a related work-
shop on Cyprus at the University of Portland in 2007, Andreas Paraschos, 
former editor of Politis newspaper, compared the foreign policy treatment of 
the missing with soccer, pointing that each side kept a “reserve team” using 
substitutes of missing to maintain its symbolic figure intact.6 
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As shown in previous chapters, framing national narratives could often 
influence available options in conflict resolution. Ultimately, framing the 
missing acquires such intensity, ethnonationalist bias, and status that resolu-
tion of the problem became next to impossible (Kovras and Loizides 2011). 
Yet 2004 marked a turning point and exhumations began across the island 
despite conditions that seemed prohibitive. By May 2015, more than a thou-
sand remains had been exhumed from burial sites across the divide.7 As 
shown in polls and several related studies, the CMP has become the single 
most successful bicommunal project in the island; its work is publicly sup-
ported by both communities as well as foreign governments, including Tur-
key, which have been financing its operations (Sant Cassia 2007; Kaymak 
2007; Kovras 2008). In a 2007 survey commissioned by UNFICYP, 92 percent 
of Greek Cypriots and 74 percent of Turkish Cypriots evaluated the presence 
of the CMP in Cyprus as positive (UNFICYP 2007). 
Breaking stalemates does not happen in a vacuum, of course. The re-
sumption of CMP activities was preceded by significant civil society initia-
tives. In 2000, thousands of Greek and Turkish Cypriots put aside years of 
division and gave blood samples with the hope of finding a compatible donor 
for a bone marrow transplant for a six- year- old boy. Creating the infrastruc-
ture and especially the public knowledge for DNA extraction was extremely 
important because later on the government appealed to Turkish Cypriot rel-
atives of the missing to give blood samples in its effort to match the missing 
with their families. 
Journalists in both communities equally aimed to challenge the domi-
nant views in their communities emphasizing the common victimhood of all 
families of the missing. A prominent example has been Sevgül Uludağ, whose 
articles and books were published on both sides of the divide, despite perse-
cution and continuous threats on her life (Uludağ 2006).8 On the Greek Cy-
priot side, new media outlets such as Politis, along with a number of 
investigative journalists such as Andreas Paraschos and Makarios Drousiotis, 
began to challenge the official narrative. Individual cases of relatives de-
manding unilateral exhumations in areas controlled by the republic also re-
ceived considerable attention by local media (Drousiotis 2000; Sant Cassia 
2005, 2006). 
Given the groundswell of interest, by the mid- 1990s the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, which had for decades had assumed responsibility for the issue, 
realized that the gains from the existing policy were minimal; key ministry 
officials accordingly decided to put forward a revised policy to break the 
“Stalemate Theory” 161
stalemate (Kovras 2013). According to Kasoulides, who led the effort in the 
MFA at the time, the new policy delinked the issue of the missing from the 
wider prospect of a political settlement. It also initiated unilateral endorse-
ment of exhumations by the Greek Cypriot side, combined with strong, cred-
ible incentives offered to Turkish Cypriot relatives to cooperate with the 
Republic (Kasoulides 1999, 2010). Kasoulides himself in an interview with 
the author suggested the importance of delinking the humanitarian aspects 
from the political ones, as well as acting in accordance to European norms 
regardless of the actions of the other side to (Kasoulides 2010). As in De 
Klerk’s decision in the 1992 South Africa referendum, this policy reorienta-
tion required a “calculated risk” the Clerides government was willing to take. 
This seemed a sensible unilateral step, but it entailed a high- risk strategy 
unusual for the reticent Greek Cypriot diplomacy. Previously, any reference 
to Turkish Cypriots missing before the Turkish invasion would have seriously 
delegitimized Greek Cypriot predominant discourses; it would have opened 
a Pandora’s box letting out all sorts of inconvenient questions (Kovras 2008: 
377), particularly the extent to which institutions of the Republic were re-
sponsible Turkish Cypriots who went missing in the 1960s (Kovras and 
Loizides 2011). More important, Kasoulides himself was a leading member 
of the Democratic Rally and its official nominee for the presidency of the 
Republic for the 2008 elections. Greek Cypriot perpetrators likely to be asso-
ciated with the EOKA movement or EOKA B, and their descendants over-
whelmingly vote for the Democratic Rally, particularly in its rural 
strongholds. On the one hand, the unilateral opening to the Turkish Cypriot 
community entailed electoral risks not only for DISY but also later on for 
President Papadopoulos, who has also been associated with the EOKA move-
ment. On the other, the CMP “restricted mandate” made it easier for those 
affected to tolerate (even support with information) the recovery of the miss-
ing process. As in the case of the d’Hondt, the CMP example suggests that 
peacemaking arrangements might be more sustainable if they avoid antago-
nizing directly opposing groups (see Stedman 1997). 
Moreover, the Greek Cypriots had won a number of relevant legal deci-
sions at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the issue; how-
ever, these decisions alone could not secure progress for the issue of the 
missing. For Greek Cypriots, the passage of time discredited the previous 
policy of internationalization, aimed at exposing Turkey rather than resolv-
ing the problem (Kovras and Loizides 2011; Kasoulides 2010). Policy- makers 
who realized the limitations of such policies sought new arrangements that 
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allowed delinkage between the political and humanitarian aspects of the Cy-
priot question (Kovras 2012). 
The delinkage strategy followed by the Greek Cypriot side fits nicely the 
prevailing conditions at the time. First, by initiating exhumations the Greek 
Cypriot side relied less on “propaganda” and more on legally sound stan-
dards of evidence, thereby incentivizing the Turkish Cypriot side to recipro-
cate. As stated above, the Turkish Cypriots were already in the process of 
challenging their regime, and therefore it was a matter of time for moderate 
Mehmet Ali Talat to sustain a process that would eventually benefit his own 
community as well. This strategy was also more appropriate as international 
organizations, the ECtHR, and local associations (as well as the media) 
started investigating the issue of the missing in more depth. The Greek Cy-
priot side could not avoid its own responsibilities on the issue; doing so could 
have ended up in a legal dispute in Cypriot and ECtHR courts. Therefore a 
proactive unilateral step was necessary and potentially beneficial. 
More fundamentally, this unilateral approach also shaped the overall 
scope of the process. Unlike the case in Bosnia or South Africa, in Cyprus 
attention focused primarily on exhuming the missing. As the CMP operated 
with a “restricted mandate,” the conditions of disappearances and follow- up 
legal processes were left to be decided later. Overall, the two sides in Cyprus 
endorsed a minimalist approach to truth recovery, setting legal and political 
mechanisms to protect perpetrators in exchange for anonymous information 
leading to identification of missing persons.
Concerning the Turkish Cypriot side, two additional developments also 
explain its gradual endorsement of the CMP process in 2004. The first was 
the consecutive ECtHR decisions condemning Turkey for violating the fun-
damental human rights of the relatives of the missing.9 These decisions were 
backed by several resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe; thus each side needed to act unilaterally to avoid finding itself on 
the wrong side of a future ECtHR ruling. More important, even groups of 
relatives themselves have gradually endorsed the CMP process (Kovras 
2012). Although admittedly such initiatives made only a marginal contribu-
tion to public discourse, they allowed leaders to balance priorities more care-
fully with regard to the legal and political consequences of noncooperation. 
Investigating positive transformation is central in understanding what 
leads societies away from decades- long stalemates and intractable conflicts. 
The success story of the CMP provides an instructive example of how conflict 
mediation can be effective in addressing human rights issues in postconflict 
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settings, even in situations where a political settlement has not been reached 
and where progress seems stalled. 
Returning Home to Varosha
The CMP experience was not replicated in Varosha. The city of Famagusta 
was home to 31,960 Greek Cypriots according to the 1973 census, mostly re-
siding in its now deserted sector of Varosha. The city with its deepwater port 
and thriving tourist industry enjoyed the reputation “Cypriot Riviera” in the 
1960s. It was abandoned by its terrified population just before the arrival of 
the Turkish troops on August 14, 1974, and since then has been sealed be-
hind barbed wire, with access restricted to Turkish military patrols. In 1979, 
the two sides reached a high level agreement under the auspices of UN 
Secretary- General Kurt Waldheim confirming that 
Priority will be given to reaching agreement of the resettlement of 
Varosha under U.N. auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the 
consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial 
aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has 
been reached it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of 
the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.10
Despite this clear statement of intent, nothing has happened since then. 
Discussions of Varosha reemerged several times as Turkish Cypriot policy 
vacillated between conditional offers to return the town and threats to colo-
nize it (Clerides 1989– 1993). The threats intensified after the unilateral dec-
laration of independence of “TRNC” in 1983 and the exodus of minority 
Bulgarian Turks into Turkey in the 1980s. The 1984 UN Security Council of-
fered some hope to the original inhabitants, condemning settlement threats 
and calling “for the transfer of that area to the UN administration.”11 Eventu-
ally, Denktaş rejected the UN proposal, claiming it treated the Turkish Cy-
priot side unfairly (Michael 2009). Following the collapse of the Ghali Set of 
Ideas in the early 1990s, Clerides and DenktaȘ attempted to negotiate 
confidence- building measures (CBM) that included returning Varosha to 
Greek Cypriots in exchange for lifting Turkish Cypriot economic isolation. 
Subsequent diplomatic initiatives focusing on Famagusta since the 1990s 
have been so far unsuccessful despite promising incentives for both sides.
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The failure to reach an agreement to resettle or at least restore the disinte-
grating town poses a puzzle for mediation studies. As Varosha is an empty 
territory, return of the now sealed area will result in no displacement or other 
immediate negative repercussions for the Turkish Cypriot side; in fact, Turk-
ish Cypriots and Turkey will gain benefits from “equivalent” Greek Cypriot 
and EU concessions. The deprived Turkish Cypriot sector of Famagusta 
would be the major beneficiary, in fact, as the city’s tourist industry, commer-
cial port, and local universities such as the Eastern Mediterranean University 
(EMU) would flourish following a compromise. 
This ostensibly mutually win- win arrangement has failed for a variety of 
reasons. First, the humanitarian aspect of abandoning a city has yet to attract 
wider international attention and foreign governments have not mobilized 
on the issue. While other postconflict societies face issues of missing persons, 
Varosha is almost unique in terms of emerging international norms and rele-
vant legal frameworks. As mentioned above, international law and norms 
have facilitated the breakthrough on the missing in Cyprus and other post-
conflict societies (Sikkink and Walling 2007; Kovras and Loizides 2012). Fa-
magusta is probably one of the few deserted cities of its kind (see also Ağdam 
in southwestern Azerbaijan); therefore international law has yet to play a fa-
cilitating role in enabling its return. 
Second, Greek Cypriot Famagusta residents at least until recently did not 
find the appropriate legal/political formula to incentivize Turkish Cypriot co-
operation. Unlike the relatives of the missing or the Cypriot Maronites dis-
cussed above, Famagustians have not engaged in effective international 
diplomacy to make their cause known around the world or to build an inter-
nationally vibrant support network. Nor have the municipalities in Fama-
gusta learned from Demetriades and Akıncı’s examples in Nicosia with 
regard to employing informal but effective policies of reconciliation. Al-
though prominently represented, Greek Cypriot Famagusta leaders have 
been isolated for decades in nationalist politics, maintaining only limited in-
ternational networks of influence. For the most part, Famagustians have been 
on the margins of Greek Cypriot politics, and have not achieved direct repre-
sentation or involvement of their municipality in the peace mediations. In 
the past years, commemorations of the city’s occupation have even led to 
controversial public incidents between Mayor Alexis Galanos and President 
Demetris Christofias as to the mishandling of the reunification policy. Even 
after the presidential victory of Nikos Anastasiades in February 2013, no 
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Famagustian was selected to his first cabinet, despite the fact that the prov-
ince has been the traditional stronghold of the Democratic Rally. 
More important, the often necessary unilateral steps required to entice 
cooperation from the Turkish Cypriots have been missing here. In fact, the 
European Commission itself has mismanaged the issue, despite its intense 
involvement in the Cyprus peace talks (Faustmann and Kaymak 2007; Tocci 
2007, 2008). EU leaders arguably promised direct trade and financial assis-
tance to reward Turkish Cypriots for their support of the Annan Plan in 
2004. Turkish Cypriots took these promises for granted even though none 
were made formally or on record. Previous negotiations, however, had linked 
these same issues to the return of Varosha. Since then, Turkish Cypriots have 
insisted on easing of trade and flight restrictions in return for their 2004 vote, 
while Greek Cypriots maintain such changes to the status quo could only be 
considered as part of a comprehensive settlement or a mini- package priori-
tizing Varosha as stipulated in the 1979 High- Level Agreement.
There is a fourth and more fundamental reason why mediation on Varo-
sha has failed. In theory, gradualist approaches are effective if the issues ad-
dressed require minor risks and are delinkable from the broader peace 
process. But the return is such a large undertaking that it creates severe risks 
and uncertainties for both sides. Turkish Cypriots fear that after returning 
Varosha, Greek Cypriots will completely lose interest in reunification. For the 
most part, the Turkish Cypriot side is not willing to accept the return unless 
it is part and parcel of an overall agreement ratified in a referendum. On their 
part, Greek Cypriots fear so- called “Taiwanization” of northern Cyprus, if 
Turkish Cypriots receive significant concessions on international trade prior 
to a settlement. Given the importance of Famagusta, it is to be expected that 
Turkish Cypriots will demand such concessions, as they already feel entitled 
by virtue of EU promises to free trade and economic assistance. Further-
more, Greek Cypriots fear Turkish Cypriots will not return additional terri-
tories if they resolve their own financial problems and start entertaining state 
rights as a de facto separate entity. Greek Cypriots are unwilling to concede 
on trade and direct flights as they are already alarmed by the gradual “recog-
nition” of the north through indirect international legal ties. Finally, return-
ing a large area like Varosha is a large undertaking with major political risks 
for Greece and Turkey. If something goes wrong, a senior Turkish diplomat 
told the author in an interview “the return of Varosha will be a confidence- 
destroying rather than confidence- building mechanism” (Uras 2010).
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Stalemates and “Calculated Risks”
These are justified fears; however, as mentioned earlier, “calculated risks” are 
necessary in peacemaking. In this respect, confidence building in Varosha 
will be much easier to tackle than a comprehensive settlement as publicly 
advocated by Ankara. More important, lack of cooperation in Cyprus with 
regard to either scenario might be devastating for Turkey’s EU accession pro-
cess; while Turkey might feel confident in its current economic model and 
foreign relations, there are absolutely no guarantees the crisis will not affect 
wider Europe. Greek Cypriots themselves paid a huge price for believing in 
the invincibility of their own financial model, failing either to take early mea-
sures five years into the financial crisis or to build those alliances to secure 
more favorable terms in addressing the sovereign debt crisis. As the next 
chapter demonstrates with regard to alternative scenarios for Turkey, there 
also no guarantees the EU will not prioritize its own domestic markets at the 
expense of third countries, or that a major financial crisis will not hit Turkey 
unassisted. For Turkey itself it would be unwise to risk a decade of unprece-
dented development and prosperity for maintaining the “solvable” Cypriot 
dispute. 
As this book demonstrates, many of the concerns and fears of Turkish 
Cypriots in the island are potentially manageable and could be supported in 
the new institutional designs proposed for reunification. But if mediations 
fail to accommodate equally important Greek Cypriot concerns, Turkey will 
simply remain an occupying power of a member state of the EU, its largest 
trading partner. The richer Turkey becomes, the higher the risks to its pros-
perity from complications in Cyprus and its strategic orientation in the EU. 
Equally, Greek Cypriots should “calculate risks” with regard to their own 
concessions in return for Varosha, but as suggested with the CMP example 
above, do so with a legally sound formula and assertiveness. The term “Tai-
wanization” is another false analogy wrongly employed in the Greek Cypriot 
discourse, used widely but with little or no knowledge of the politics of East 
Asia. As mentioned earlier, divided societies have to be creative on 
confidence- building measures if they wish to avoid future worst- case scenar-
ios. China has demonstrated this kind of creativity with regard to its unifica-
tion with Hong Kong, while in the Taiwanese case it combined tough- resolve 
rhetoric with positive engagement with the island’s public. For instance, for-
eign airlines fly to Taipei only under condition of receiving permission from 
the Chinese authorities, in a measure that protects the legal position of the 
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official state but allows the Taiwanese direct flights with third countries. Like-
wise, in Georgia the authorities recognize university degrees from Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia but use their own legal procedure in the accreditation pro-
cess. Ker- Lindsay (2012b) offers an array of insightful cases and examples 
from the Balkans and Caucasus on how to facilitate engagement without 
risking recognition. This insightful legal/political analysis could strengthen 
the Famagustian leadership in defending itself against accusations of endan-
gering the legal position of the Republic of Cyprus or the prospects for a 
comprehensive settlement in the island. 
As demonstrated in this chapter, the essence of peacemaking in con-
tested territories is transforming crises and dormant time into opportunities 
for peacemaking. The 2013 financial crisis could be a future point of refer-
ence. On the one hand, in 2013 the elected Greek Cypriot leadership felt let 
down by the unexpected treatment of its EU partners. Peace processes re-
quire credible external allies, and in their absence the Greek Cypriot side 
might rightly be unwilling to take major risks. At the same time, the treat-
ment by the troika has caused a wave of sympathy, particularly as Greek Cy-
priots are gradually recovering from the crisis. By engaging in intensive 
negotiations, Anastasiades will maintain increased leverage in current nego-
tiations, minimizing political risks. More important, the two sides should 
avoid negotiating behind closed doors by broadening the agenda to include 
opposition parties and civil society actors, especially those municipalities 
representing refugees. As Akıncı made the return of Varosha to its original 
Greek Cypriot inhabitants a central theme of his April 2005 campaign, he 
provided an unprecedented political opportunity for a more active involve-
ment of the Famagustians, combining international diplomacy to support 
their cause with the appropriate legal/political formula to incentivize Turk-
ish Cypriot cooperation.
Conclusion
Overall, Cyprus tells an insightful story about such moments in peace pro-
cesses, including how timing in negotiations might or might not lead to con-
flict resolution. The 2004 accession process arguably met almost all necessary 
conditions of Zartman’s ripeness thesis. But ripe moments can contribute to 
miscalculations and deadlocks. Previous chapters have shown this with re-
gard to EU enlargement in the Eastern Mediterranean, while this chapter 
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documents the false start and subsequent resumption of the Committee for 
Missing Persons in Cyprus. 
When ambiguity prevails in public discourse, no matter how ripe the 
conditions may be, key actors tend to draw on past experience to determine 
future actions. In this fashion, conflict- ridden societies lacking trust toward 
“others” maintain their narratives of conflict. The nationalist frames inherent 
to such narratives can lead to maximalist expectations and policy failures. 
Because challenging perceptions and narratives takes time, it is important to 
consider the use of gradualist approaches to conflict resolution. A key policy 
lesson from the CMP is how less promising “dormant times” can be used in 
negotiations to build trust and credible expectations among key actors for 
future mediations.
The resumption of the activities of the CMP and the resolution of the 
problem of the missing in Cyprus may also provide insights on how to deal 
with human rights and transitional justice issues in other postconflict societ-
ies where the EU is highly interested in enhancing positive change, such as 
the post- Arab Spring Middle East or the Caucasus. In this respect, the Cy-
priot case offers an alternative model to South Africa’s Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission (TRC) or similar alternatives in Latin America. More 
broadly, the relative success of the CMP offers suggestions for addressing the 
complex interplay between incentives and framing processes in conflict reso-
lution; a key area of inquiry for this book. Admittedly, outside incentives to 
resolve the issue of the missing were important, but no more so than in other 
failed mediations, as demonstrated by the Varosha case. 
Inevitably, the issue of the missing has served to frame the “other” in Cy-
prus for some time— on both sides of the divide. Yet even when confronted 
with sensitive and emotional issues in protracted stalemates, societies could 
identify the strategies and innovative institutions required to meet the chal-
lenges of truth recovery. As in the case of the d’Hondt executive in Northern 
Ireland or the mandate referendum in South Africa, the CMP case suggests a 
path by which innovative institutions could overpower nationalist frames 
and narratives. The relative success of the CMP is not based on social engi-
neering or transforming the “other”’s perceptions. Both adversarial and co-
operative frames in Cyprus have remained largely unbroken at the political 
level, but policy- makers have managed to delink the issue of the missing 
from political competition and more important address it effectively. As ar-
gued in the Introduction, institutional innovation could coexist with eth-
nonationalist frames in a stable symbiotic relationship, and, as the CMP 
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example suggests, this might be the only available option in emotionally sen-
sitive issues involving missing persons in postconflict societies. 
Furthermore, the experience of the CMP points to the need to delink 
sensitive human rights issues from negotiations for a wider political settle-
ment in Cyprus and possibly elsewhere. Once actors recognize the limita-
tions of using humanitarian issues for broader political objectives, delinkage 
strategies become more credible in negotiations. International experience 
suggests several examples of effective delinkage strategies, from the Sinai 
Peninsula in the Camp David negotiations to environmental politics in con-
tested Kashmir. Overall, peace agreements often require delinking an issue 
from the broader political agenda and identification of areas where one side 
could make unilateral concessions in the hope that the other side will recip-
rocate. As shown in previous chapters, taking “calculated risks” are critical in 
initiating a cycle of cooperation, something sadly lacking in other confidence- 
building measures, especially in Varosha. 
The story of the CMP could be seen as an instructive example of how to 
address issues of victimhood, reconciliation, and trust, without necessarily 
relying on ripe moments, social engineering, or comprehensive political set-
tlements. Yet one might also point to some of its limits in particular with re-
gard to the extent families of victims are satisfied by nonjudicial arrangements, 
which inevitably restrict punishment for perpetrators. On the one hand, 
families and the broader public might be relieved once they receive the re-
mains of their beloved ones. On the other, cases against authorities for negli-
gence are still pending in Cypriot and European courts. It is also hard to 
identify a representative sample of victims in Cyprus and survey those specif-
ically, as demonstrated in Chapter 4 with regard to the internally displaced. 
Finally, the public might not be familiar with the legal and political alterna-
tives offered in other cases. On this issue, our previous survey work in 
Rwanda has demonstrated that victims are more likely to opt for reconcilia-
tion than justice even in post- genocide situations (Megwalu and Loizides 
2010) while our 2013 survey in Bosnia (Hall et al. forthcoming) suggested 
that this might be also depended on postconflict institutional compromises 
(e.g., returning homes to their original owners). In Cyprus itself a Cy-
prus2015 survey has demonstrated that the public would like to engage more 
deeply with the island’s past and to see the establishment of a Truth and Rec-
onciliation commission, but with the view to mutual forgiveness and recon-
ciliation. Large majorities in both communities— 72 percent of Greek 
Cypriots and 77 percent of Turkish Cypriots found this proposal satisfactory 
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in 2011 (Cyprus 2015 2013). But more important are the views of the rela-
tives of missing and those most affected by forced disappearances; therefore 
future specialized surveys should cover this important gap. 
Another conclusion of this chapter is that the least promising times for a 
settlement are suitable for introducing gradual steps in negotiations, which 
may become the catalyst for a subsequent settlement. While stalemates and 
domestic/international crises admittedly divert attention from peace talks, 
interrupting mediations during these times has often been grounded on 
wrong assumptions. Even during elections and major domestic crises, appro-
priate conflict resolution processes might generate incentives and mandates 
for catalyzing a peace process. The dilemmas between gradualist and com-
prehensive approaches will be particularly relevant in future mediations, as 
Akıncı proposed in 2015 a parallel mediation process involving on the one 
hand the issue of Varosha and on the other the overall settlement of the Cy-
prus problem. 
In conclusion, the rationale for exploiting “least critical” periods in a pro-
tracted negotiation is that these periods allow mediators to perform con-
structive experimentation, take gradual steps, and test innovative ideas. 
Extending this idea farther, the development of related theories of how to 
examine, address, even break deadlocks could prove invaluable for interna-
tional mediators in Cyprus and beyond. By contrast, during ripe moments, 
mediators must make careful use of their time, often sidelining options that 
are promising but complex, time- consuming, and likely to be at least initially 
resisted by the conflicting sides. Ripe moments are also more prone to mis-
calculation, as demonstrated by the rising expectations of both sides during 
the Cyprus- EU accession process, and subject to sudden geopolitical shifts. 
Finally, a large set of innovative ideas is often produced in pre- peace talks 
which are essential in bringing sides together but cannot fit within the tough 
timelines of ripe moments. The post- April 2015 momentum in negotiations 
would not have been successful in gaining public support without the net-
works, ideas, and bicommunal spirit produced by peace activists years 
earlier.
C h a p t e r  7
Europeanization and Hydrocarbons: 
Alternative Scenario Planning in the Levant
The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. 
— Thucydides, 431 BC
In Cyprus and other conflict- ridden societies in wider Europe, the long- term 
stability of power- sharing arrangements will inevitably continue to be linked 
to the prospects of EU enlargement. Yet, as stated in previous chapters, EU 
accession for Cyprus and its ongoing prospect for Turkey have failed to in-
centivize a comprehensive settlement in the island. In explaining this failure, 
the book has highlighted several factors, including the lack of clarity in the 
pre- accession incentives, the adverse effects of ethnonationalist rhetoric, the 
wrong timing of the 2004 referendums, and, as argued here, failures in iden-
tifying alternative scenarios and cross- issue linkages. This is an unfortunate 
outcome, given that international organizations such as the EU could offer 
the resources, credibility, and vision required to negotiate and sustain a fed-
eral Cyprus. 
Accession advocates in the early 1990s predicted a rosy future, proffering 
a broad vision of how EU membership would unite Cyprus and help both 
communities prosper and feel secure (Christou 2004; Joseph 1997; Theopha-
nous 2003). Similar views dominated policy and media debates on enlarge-
ment across Europe. Optimism was based on the assumption that the EU was 
uniquely qualified for peace mediation and capable of transforming the in-
centive structures of the parties in a conflict (Diez 2002a). For the most part, 
these expectations have not materialized in Cyprus. Instead, the island has 
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remained divided (albeit in less visible ways than in the pre- accession pe-
riod). Even the prosperous Greek Cypriot side faced major financial difficul-
ties due to the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone and the unprecedented 
tax levy on depositors in March 2013, with only few moderate signs of recov-
ery in early 2015. 
These negative developments drive the book’s argument on how societies 
choose (or fail to choose) to achieve peace or, more broadly, how they handle 
the expectations of their citizens. As highlighted in Chapter 2, peace media-
tions are inevitably affected by past history, unfriendly neighbors, or new cri-
ses transforming the balance of power among actors. Alternatively, friendly 
states and external peace allies such as the EU could incentivize a compro-
mise and help sustain peacemaking. 
The debt crisis has shifted priorities and demonstrated the limitations of 
extensive EU engagement in its wider neighborhood, yet such crises might 
inadvertently turn into opportunities if societies react wisely and decisively. 
To this point, the most critical factor in determining the occurrence, imple-
mentation, and sustainability of peace settlements is a society’s own choice of 
policies and institutions. Particularly in conflicts where previous rounds of 
negotiations have failed repeatedly, openness to institutional innovation 
could be critical. Cross- country learning could also maximize Europe’s soft 
power capabilities and help actors reconceptualize Europeanization as a cat-
alyst for peace. 
Alternative Scenario Planning
This chapter focuses on decision- making theories and demonstrates how al-
ternative scenario planning can directly or indirectly affect a prospective 
peace settlement. Alternative scenario planning is a strategic planning 
method defined by two components: a diagnostic element assessing potential 
uncertainties for each side with or without a compromise, and a prognostic 
element evaluating relevant policy prescriptions aiming to minimize critical 
uncertainties or their consequences. Because the world we live is more vola-
tile than ever and surprises are inevitable, scenario planning could not be 
simply about attempting to predict the future. On the contrary, experts have 
introduced scenarios in decision- making as a way of minimizing risks and 
resourcefully preparing for the future, while acknowledging that narrow 
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predictions focusing on a single direction to guide policy- making are 
doomed to fail in the long term (Courtney et al. 1997; Ringland 1998; 
Schwartz 1991). 
Planning alternative scenarios is essential to institutional innovation in 
peace processes, as it allows each side to anticipate unexpected events and 
become more adaptable in the face of future uncertainties. Scenario planning 
contributes to increased understanding of these uncertainties, incorporation 
of alternative perspectives in governance, and greater resilience of decisions 
in surprising situations (Peterson et al. 2003). 
A question frequently asked in any mediation is whether a prescribed 
solution eliminates the most fundamental fears of each side. To answer this 
question, it is not enough to identify issues and recommendations to sustain 
peace; one must also produce alternative scenarios that demonstrate the du-
rability of the recommendations across time and space. Scenario planning 
could preserve the initial benefits that derive from a peace settlement while 
eliminating critical uncertainties or their overall effects. As demonstrated 
from the Cypriot debt crisis and across the globe, societies failing to address 
alternative futures are more likely to pay a high price in the presence of ad-
verse shocks.  
More important, alternative scenario planning allows each side not only 
to minimize undue risks but also to avoid excessive conservatism con-
straining peace mediations. By encouraging “calculated risks,” alternative 
scenario planning can help societies address protracted stalemates and 
their consequences. Leaders willing to take such calculated risks are more 
likely to deliver a peace settlement as shown in the book’s earlier examples 
of the peace referendum in South Africa and the committee for the missing 
in Cyprus.
Alternative scenario planning and other strategic planning methods 
could be extremely relevant for Cyprus and its immediate region. For one 
thing, new issues have emerged, including the financial crisis and the discov-
ery of natural gas reserves, which inevitably influence debates on the Cyprus 
question. For another, the methodology of alternative scenario planning was 
first developed in business by the oil and gas industry. Interestingly, most 
studies in the field of decision- making cite the successful applications of sce-
nario planning by Royal/Dutch Shell. The company was a pioneer in estab-
lishing scenario planning in the business world in the early 1970s, defeating 
its commercial opponents in oil price forecasting and in interacting with 
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governments under conditions that seem unpredictable (Schwartz 1991; 
Schoemaker and van der Heijden 1992). 
Knowledge transfer in this area will be critical for policy- makers in Cy-
prus. In addition, there are precedents. As Schoemaker (1995) suggests in a 
highly cited study on scenario planning, the Anglo- American Corporation’s 
use of scenario planning contributed to the fall of the apartheid regime in 
South Africa. As early as 1984, the company began to identify global trends 
and key uncertainties about its future in South Africa; in light of these global 
trends, it developed two domestic scenarios: “high road” and “low road.” The 
former scenario required power- sharing and democratic welfare (as in Swit-
zerland), eventually transforming South Africa into a significant global actor, 
while the latter assumed continuous violence, turning the country into an 
economic wasteland (36). According to Schoemaker, the “Anglo scenarios” 
were not just an intellectual exercise; they were “powerful means of shaping 
the agenda for political action in South Africa” (36). 
It is essential that institutional proposals in peace processes be targeted 
toward alternative scenarios. Negotiation theorists have long demonstrated 
how institutional design, which considers alternative scenario planning, re-
duces uncertainties and sustains a negotiated settlement in the long term 
(Raiffa 1982: Schwartz 1991). Precisely because worst- case scenarios are ef-
fectively addressed, peace settlements become more secure and negotiable in 
the first place. And regardless of developments in the Cyprus peace process, 
scenario planning will be particularly relevant for the region. For one thing, a 
critical factor is the discovery of natural gas reserves south of the island and 
Israel’s renewed interest in cooperating with Cyprus, Greece, and if possible 
Egypt and Turkey. For another, the post- 2008 sovereign debt crisis requires 
academics and policy- makers to discuss alternative scenarios of active or 
limited involvement of the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Such 
options might include the possibility of the EU not endorsing Turkey’s acces-
sion in the near future or the worst- case scenario of the EU facing repetitive 
crises that might eliminate any impact in transforming Turkish foreign pol-
icy priorities. Finally, alternative scenario planning is useful because the size 
of potential natural gas reserves is still unclear, future prices are unpredict-
able, and, more important, regional and global geopolitics are shifting. 
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Will Turkey Be Admitted to the EU? 
What are Turkey’s accession prospects and how do these affect a future settle-
ment in Cyprus? Critics of past settlement proposals on the Greek Cypriot 
side have posited two opposing and arguably contradictory scenarios. “Opti-
mistic” critics argued that after the island’s accession to the EU, “Cyprus 
would [be] in the strongest negotiating position since 1974,” and “the appli-
cation of EU laws and regulations will protect more effectively the rights of 
all Cypriots” (Coufoudakis 2004: 12). “Pessimistic” critics maintained that 
Turkey would not implement the agreement, especially if denied EU mem-
bership (Papadopoulos 2004; Palley 2005). Even on issues where concessions 
were agreed on by both sides, such as the return of land, critics argued that 
Turkey would renege on its obligations (Papadopoulos 2004).
The first argument has been proven wrong, to judge from the failure of 
the Greek Cypriot hard line leadership to renegotiate a better settlement in 
the post- Annan era. The main political parties who rejected the Annan Plan, 
DIKO and AKEL, had the opportunity to shape or dominate the policy 
agenda on the Cyprus issue for a decade. But Presidents Papadopoulos and 
Christofias have both failed to gain even rhetorical support from any major 
EU country for an improved settlement on critical issues such as security and 
displacement. The largest casualty of both consecutive presidencies was the 
declining public confidence in the possibility of a settlement. In contrast, 
other communities with arguably worse and more recent experience of war 
and ethnic cleansing, such as Bosnia or even Kosovo, have done much better 
in engaging in their respective peace processes, even partly implementing the 
right of return for the displaced (Belloni 2008). 
Cyprus remains an outlier case. The island’s future initially seemed rosy 
within the EU, while in early 2008, the island’s economy was deemed vi-
brant enough to join the Eurozone. In the second half of 2012, the Republic 
of Cyprus held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, a 
highly prestigious distinction for the small state. In reality, however, the 
island’s current condition has been an unfortunate reflection of its last 
4,000 years of turbulent geopolitics. An EU member but divided, Cyprus is 
occupied in the North by Turkey, forced to accept the British (sovereign) 
military bases in the South, and following the sovereign debt crisis, finan-
cially indebted to the Russians, Germans, and others, including the tech-
nocrats of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European 
Central Bank (ECB). At least for the immediate future, decisions on the 
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island’s finances will be largely made outside the influence of elected lead-
ers in Nicosia. 
The second scenario presented by the critics— non- implementation of 
the settlement by Turkey— requires more cautious assessment. Turkey re-
mains a country with many unknowns despite the declining role of its mili-
tary. The essential rationale for reaching a settlement in Cyprus is for both 
communities to be safeguarded against future conflict. A Cyprus settlement 
must eliminate once and for all the possibility of war or even limited political 
violence in the Greece- Turkey- Cyprus triangle. In a nutshell, if Turkey is not 
to be trusted as a partner to the settlement, it should not be trusted as a part-
ner to the de facto partition. De facto partition might turn into a permanent 
condition or lead to a major confrontation over unresolved issues such as gas 
and oil explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
As demonstrated in the Greek- Turkish Crisis and Negotiations database 
(Loizides 2009b), Greece and Turkey have faced at least one near- war situa-
tion each decade since the 1950s, with the exception of 1999– 2014 (see also 
Bahcheli 1990; Heraclides 2001). Developments unrelated to Cyprus might 
force the region back to its confrontational past, particularly if support for 
moderate political parties continues to decline in the two countries; the un-
precedented rise of the extreme right in Greece is another source of worry for 
the future. This does not imply that a settlement itself does not have its own 
geopolitical risks. Rather, both sides and the international mediators should 
use the opportunity of the settlement to safeguard peace in the region against 
future uncertainties. 
Strategic planning should seek to eliminate a repetition of the 1960s vio-
lence feared by the Turkish Cypriot side and the non- implementation of the 
peace agreement feared by the Greek Cypriots. Stability in Cyprus and its 
immediate region will require a strong bicommunal Cypriot peace enforce-
ment mechanism monitored and assisted by the UN. In addition, there could 
be a “motherland” Greek- Turkish dimension to the regional security mecha-
nisms and, equally important, an EU/NATO presence and mutually agreed 
on external guarantees for the implementation of the settlement. Such ar-
rangements would be enhanced by Turkey’s integration into European insti-
tutions and full membership to the EU, but in the absence of this accession, 
alternative arrangements could be identified. An innovative linkage might 
involve the simultaneous settlement of both Cyprus and the Aegean issues 
tied to additional NATO/EU guarantees for implementation of the settle-
ment. As argued broadly in the literature, Turkey’s accession is a catalyst for a 
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future settlement in Cyprus (Ker- Lindsay 2005; Tocci 2004; Richmond 2005). 
It is equally obvious that failure to integrate Turkey into the EU would mini-
mize positive incentives in the Cypriot peace talks. 
Alternative Scenario Planning: Turkey- EU Accession 
The complexity of the current negotiations can be summarized as follows. If 
Turkey comes close to its EU accession goals, Greek Cypriots could, in prin-
ciple, increase their leverage in the negotiations. Delaying the Cyprus settle-
ment might force Turkey and, more important, Turkish Cypriots into a 
worsening negotiating position. Thus, Turkish supporters in Europe (includ-
ing both Cyprus and Turkey) have an incentive to settle the Cyprus problem 
before having to face the choice of either “re- suspending” Turkey’s accession 
or making politically “unfeasible concessions” in Cyprus. Inevitably, Turkey’s 
own critics of a Cyprus settlement might be unwilling to endorse even pre-
liminary steps in a bargaining process unless the country receives “credible 
guarantees” that accession would be secured in the near future. But such 
guarantees are not possible in EU’s complex decision- making mechanisms, 
and given past records, any promises might be unconvincing. Thus, both 
sides might have an incentive to delay negotiations until outcomes become 
clearer as to Turkey’s EU accession. Sadly, this might lead to a lose- lose out-
come. Moreover, the experience of 2002– 2004 suggests that waiting for “last- 
minute” bargaining might not be the best option, as all sides in the region 
have been prone to miscalculate when threatened with tight deadlines. 
Could decision- making theories and, more specifically, alternative sce-
nario planning help us address such uncertainties? The answer is yes. One 
possibility is to link settlement provisions in the Cyprus peace talks (particu-
larly on issues of security and guarantees) to Turkey’s final status in the Euro-
pean Union. All sides could agree on a “re- adjustable peace settlement” 
comprising two scenarios (with or without Turkey’s EU accession): 
•  Peace settlement (Scenario A) would be implemented immediately and 
regardless of Turkey’s entry to the EU and would be slightly closer to the 
Turkish Cypriot and Turkish positions. 
•  Peace settlement (Scenario B) would be introduced along with Turkey’s 
EU membership and would be slightly more favorable to the Greek Cy-
priot side. 
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In Scenario A, Turkey, along with Greece and the UK, would maintain its 
guarantor status in a reunited Cyprus but with additional monitoring from 
the EU and UN. After Turkey’s EU entry (Scenario B), any military presence 
would gradually be removed; “motherland” guarantees would also be termi-
nated, with a prenegotiated security mechanism within EU institutions sub-
stituted in their place. Security could be one of the linkages, but others could 
be envisioned for issues critical to both communities. 
By linking Turkey’s EU accession to the Cyprus problem, mediators could 
aim for self- enforceable incentives: all interested sides would work toward 
the best scenario leading to Turkey’s accession. Understandably, the peace 
settlement would include a prior commitment for Greece and Cyprus not to 
veto the accession, since an improved settlement would accompany acces-
sion through the process of automaticity described elsewhere in the book. 
This is not a novel idea. A related linkage appears in an early provision of 
the Annan Plan aiming to minimize the “EU ambiguity and hope factor” en-
trenched in the 2002– 2004 negotiation. But as stated in previous chapters, 
nationalist agitation and oppositional frames are frequently the worst com-
panions of institutional innovation. In protracted mediations, promising me-
diation formulas commonly fall into oblivion or are simply forgotten. Even 
prominent scholars criticizing the Annan Plan have failed to recognize the 
utility and logic of this linkage. For instance, Anderson (2008) interprets it as 
aiming exclusively at serving broader western interests in Turkey’s EU acces-
sion process, downplaying the fact that if this were the case, Cyprus would 
have not been allowed to enter the EU as a full member in the first place. 
Interestingly, like other critics of the Annan Plan discussed in Chapter 1, 
Anderson (2008) examines the prospects of Cyprus vetoing Turkey’s EU ac-
cession. Although he identifies the shortcomings of such an approach, he ar-
gues that smaller countries can sometimes defy great powers. Anderson 
concludes his essay by arguing that “the more likely outcome remains, in one 
version or another, the sentence pronounced on another Greek island: ‘the 
strong do what they can, the weak do what they must.’ ” By “misquoting” 
Thucydides (431 BC) (see also Yiorgos Lillikas’s same slogan for the 2013 
presidential elections), 1 Anderson probes the popular narrative whereby 
strong nations act according to self- interest while the weak but noble fight for 
justice and morality. By contrast, Thucydides’ dictum that “the strong do 
what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (emphasis added) offers a 
familiar and centuries- old warning to all sides not to deviate from political 
realism when dealing with intractable conflicts. 
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This is not to say that ideals and morality do not matter in contemporary 
international relations; rather, small nations and communities should be cau-
tious in their choices, especially not to miss sensible and timely opportunities 
for peace. Accordingly, while sharing the concerns of Anderson (2007) and 
other critics about the gaps of previous peace proposals, this book also situ-
ates its own recommendations, specifically institutional innovation, in a tra-
dition of political realism. 
 Revisiting old and potentially feasible ideas can be useful, and, to para-
phrase Horowitz, using leftover ideas might help future settlements (2002b). 
But there is much more to be done than merely recycling old formulas. Novel 
linkages could be identified by reexamining the Cypriot experience or by 
looking beyond Cyprus to other divided societies. As demonstrated in previ-
ous chapters, comparative analysis could identify alternative ideas for a Cy-
prus settlement and contribute to the broader theme of institutional 
innovation. 
Returning now to Turkey, several other factors should be considered in 
debates of the effect of Turkey’s EU accession on Cyprus. As discussed in 
previous chapters, Turkey has experienced unprecedented growth since 
2002, making it an increasingly reliable and attractive partner for the EU. It 
goes without saying that in EU negotiations, Turkish political and economic 
elites will try to safeguard the progress and negotiate appropriate arrange-
ments to maintain the country’s growth performance and positive economic 
outlook. Especially following the negative publicity in the 2013 anti- 
government protests in Gezi Park, refocusing international attention and 
changing the agenda domestically will be beneficial to all actors. 
 Alternatively, under the current international financial climate and Tur-
key’s internal polarization, Erdoğan’s financial successes could be easily for-
gotten and undermined in the country’s murky politics. During a visit to 
Ankara in April 2012, I interviewed former ambassador Faruk Loğoğlu, lead-
ing foreign policy figure for the CHP (Republican People’s Party), the main 
opposition party. Following the mismanagement of the Syrian crisis, Loğoğlu 
criticized AKP for failing to keep its promise of “zero problems with its 
neighbors,” instead leading the country to a situation with “zero neighbors 
without problems,” an eloquent comment, suggesting how critical a foreign 
policy success in Cyprus would be for Turkey the next decades. 
As stated above, AKP will have an incentive to do endorse a settlement in 
the last phases of its administration or if the party retains power in order to 
regain its international status following domestic protests. But similar logic 
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applies to a future CHP government, particularly as the party appears to have 
returned to its moderate leftist orientation; it even claims, and rightly so, that 
the successful breakthrough in Greek- Turkish relations in the post- 1999 Hel-
sinki era was its doing. 
If a Turkish government signs a settlement in Cyprus in the next decade, 
whether it hails from Kemalist CHP or pro- Islamist AKP, it is unlikely to re-
nege from its commitments. Political or military fallout will have unpredict-
able financial consequences and, as a result, preclude Turkey from taking any 
unnecessary actions against another EU member. In addition, the regional 
trend is for Turkey increasingly to focus its attention on the geopolitical chal-
lenges on its eastern frontiers. In simple terms, the much- feared future un-
provoked invasion of Cyprus is not a possibility. 
Instead, Turkey might retain an important yet reasonable influence in 
Cyprus through the Turkish Cypriot community and its European connec-
tions. Such influence might even be channeled toward exercising friendly 
pressure on hardline Turkish Cypriots to collaborate in the implementation 
of the settlement. These channels of “motherland” influence should be insti-
tutionalized, transparent, and accountable to international organizations, not 
indirect and invisible. 
Admittedly, “hostile neighbors” and related risks are generic problems in 
all power- sharing settlements. However, by making the appropriate decisions 
and using the right mechanisms within the EU, such risks could be also min-
imized. For their part, Greek Cypriot political elites should negotiate with 
more confidence in the next decade, while aligning their island’s interest to 
the broader geopolitical developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. The 
Greek Cypriot leadership should develop informal but credible communica-
tion channels with Ankara. It is surprising that this has not yet happened, 
given the preference of the AKP government for low key mediations, as com-
municated in an interview with the author by Yaşar Yakış, former minister of 
foreign affairs, and by various political figures and peace activists. Finally, the 
Greek Cypriot side should support Turkey’s accession negotiations, avoiding 
vetoes aiming to delay the process. If Greek Cypriots opt to veto accession, 
they should do so in the final stages of the process to maximize leverage for 
the settlement.
In terms of the critical issue of regional security in the Levant, it is im-
portant to note that not every type of proposed settlement would work in 
Cyprus. Alternative arrangements would certainly exhibit different levels of 
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viability and resilience. In essence, the workability of the settlement with re-
gard to Turkey depends on two additional scenarios. 
The first is the breadth of the settlement and whether it also resolves the 
Greek- Turkish Aegean controversies and the increasingly thorny exclusive 
economic zones (EEZ) disputes. The second is whether the international 
community is in a position to guarantee such a settlement and eliminate the 
possibility of its (non)implementation. 
More specifically, the Cyprus- Aegean linkage might involve three com-
ponents: (1) resolution of Aegean disputes, including issues of delimiting the 
EEZs of Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece; (2) NATO/EU guarantees for imple-
mentation of the agreements through a reformulation of Article 5 of the 1949 
NATO Treaty2 or otherwise; and (3) military aid to Greece for a limited pe-
riod until the country recovers from the current crisis and develops a more 
stable revenue basis (e.g., with the discovery of natural gas in its own EEZ). 
Modeled around the 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, 
these arrangements would entice Greek- Turkish cooperation in areas where 
Greece is legally strong (e.g., the extension of EEZ around the island of 
Kastellorizo), but where Turkey has an equally strong political argument 
based on geography. This linkage would be better for both Cyprus and the 
international community assisting its reunification. The more comprehensive 
and international a settlement is, the better the chances for its negotiability 
and durability. 
Alternative scenario planning encourages fresh perspectives in debating 
the negative and positive dimensions of EU enlargement in the Eastern Med-
iterranean. Pessimists might say that the post- 2009 sovereign debt crisis will 
reduce the scope of influence and commitment of the EU in the region. It is 
possible to imagine the scenario of a multi- tier EU, with the Mediterranean 
South left to its own devices. One could respond by saying that peace settle-
ments carry their own special weight and importance and that the debt crisis 
could be constructively linked to the Cyprus peace talks. Either way, the 
commitment of international organizations, guarantors, and donors will be 
tested in current and future negotiations; as the book highlights, a successful 
settlement in Cyprus is important for the international community, as it will 
provide a much needed model for the Middle East and beyond. 
On this issue, a special advantage of the Cypriot peace process is the size 
of the island in terms of population; its small size makes any commitment 
from a foreign perspective negligible in comparative terms. This advantage is 
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seldom noted in discussions of the Cyprus peace process. Paradoxically, pre-
vious administrations have opted not to involve the EU in the mediations, 
sacrificing a major advantage. As a result, the willingness and capacity of the 
EU to assist in the reunification of Cyprus have not been tested. Arguably, a 
reunited Cyprus is likely to benefit from European Union support, while a 
(non)settlement Cyprus will receive minimal support despite its growing 
economic and security problems. 
Overall, the Cyprus- EU accession debacle shows how past Cypriot peace 
mediations could have been designed and timed differently. Cyprus should 
have been encouraged to join the EU either with a settlement or, in its ab-
sence, with a minimum political understanding on what such a settlement 
would look like from EU and Cypriot perspectives. Based on alternative sce-
nario planning, I made a suggestion before Cyprus’s EU accession (see 
Loizides 2003a, b) that stipulated a Greek Cypriot unilateral endorsement of 
a modified Annan Plan (based on version III). This could have been done 
through either a formal unilateral endorsement of the Plan or an informal 
memorandum with the EU. Yet the option of using a “ripe moment” to insti-
tutionalize unilateral progress already made in the peace process was largely 
ignored by the various actors. Instead, the Turkish side insisted on canceling 
the accession process altogether, a demand European governments over-
whelmingly rejected. 
Understandably, the EU chose not to appease the Turkish Cypriot leader-
ship at the time for its intransigence. However, it could have minimized the 
damage by committing the Greek Cypriot leadership to a shared understand-
ing about the future peace. To avoid scenarios countering the interests of ei-
ther community, any prior concessions could have been reciprocated by the 
international community; the EU, for instance, could have taken a more ac-
tive part in guaranteeing a future settlement. As argued earlier, this is an area 
where EU member countries continue to have leverage among Greek Cypri-
ots, particularly among center- right and conservative voters, who tend to be 
more receptive of international security guarantees. By extension, the politi-
cal incentives of accession for the Greek Cypriots could be complemented by 
security guarantees, once the two Cypriot sides reach a settlement. Such 
credible security mechanisms were absent in the Annan Plan and subsequent 
mediations, failing to incentivize widespread support among undecided 
voters. 
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EU Engagement and the Future
Looking into the future, the best scenario for all Cypriots is to maintain close 
ties with the EU and other international actors, including the United States, 
using these links to catalyze the reunification of Cyprus. This scenario includes 
a more integrated and assertive federal Europe (a new institutional make- up 
aiming to address the current crisis), where significant decision- making rele-
vant to a reunited Cyprus could be made at the EU level. As demonstrated ear-
lier, because of the complexities of current (and future) bailouts, each community 
in Cyprus might maintain a level of independence in negotiating with the EU, 
while Turkish Cypriots might opt for the best timing to join the Eurozone. 
Equally important, with a settlement, borders and the contentious issue 
of illegal immigration from Turkey will be regulated in accordance with 
Schengen, and key legislation, from fisheries to environmental regulation, 
will be drawn up in Brussels. In fact, Europeanization of decision- making 
might be one reason no federation has collapsed within the EU, despite prob-
lems with emerging nationalisms in Belgium (Erk 2005), bitter feelings of 
injustice and victimization in the Basque country and Catalonia (Conversi 
1997), and “absence” of perceived incentives for England and Scotland to stay 
together (Keating 2005). 
This is not to say the EU makes the state opaque— quite the contrary. In 
the case of Cyprus, the reunited Republic would assume effective authority 
over such issues as crime, security, and migration. A number of workable 
decision- making models (such as the Belgian one) at the European level 
could be also applicable to Cyprus; these arrangements would allow federal 
administrators to have a voice when the two communities agree on an issue 
and to abstain in the event of a disagreement.3 Such an arrangement would 
provide an incentive for the two sides to work together in areas of common 
interest; they could negotiate concessions at the EU level in return for con-
cessions at the federal one, thereby minimizing conflict on both levels (Bey-
ers and Bursens 2006). Moreover, the EU would provide a safeguard for 
functionality at the higher political level because it is against the best inter-
ests of its members to maintain a dysfunctional member or collapsing feder-
ation. Partition of a federated Cyprus would imply similar considerations in 
Spain, the UK, and Belgium, with unprecedented and undesirable conse-
quences for the whole continent. Finally, by endorsing a federal settlement, 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots would link their future security, national integ-
rity, and prosperity to fellow European citizens. 
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Even in the worst- case scenario of a weakened Europe, maintaining the 
settlement of the Cyprus problem within EU parameters is advantageous. 
Balance of power is of critical importance. The rise of Turkey as a regional 
power could only be confronted by the Greek Cypriot side through its insti-
tutional ties within the EU. By the same token, these negotiated institutional 
ties could serve Turkish and, more important, Turkish Cypriot interests. Un-
avoidably though, any such institutional ties that involve the EU and other 
international actors will require sacrifices in domestic and international 
sovereignty. 
Planning Against Spoilers: EU and 
International Arbitrations
Unlike other federations “forced together” in the former Soviet block or post-
colonial countries, a reunited Cyprus will be arguably formed out of a nego-
tiated agreement endorsed by the public through democratic processes and 
with major global actors having a stake in its durability. Cyprus meets several 
criteria to which scholars point when discussing the factors influencing the 
success of federalism and consociationalism.4 A very important criterion is 
how deeply divided a society is in terms of ethnicity and identity boundaries. 
It could be argued that today’s Cyprus is a moderately divided society, com-
pared to the deeply divided society of the 1960s or other deeply divided soci-
eties around the world that continue to suffer from ongoing violence. O’Leary 
(2001b: 44) argues that consociational settlements may be more practical in 
moderately divided places than in deeply divided societies. 
Yet there is a limit in presenting this optimistic scenario for Cyprus. For 
one thing, the island has been divided for decades with little interaction 
among the members of each community. Reversals of such prolonged parti-
tions tend to be rare if not unprecedented (O’Leary 2007). Federalism and 
consociationalism are difficult to effectuate in prolonged stalemates, espe-
cially as these areas might resort to federalism or power- sharing when it is 
too late— too much blood has been shed in the past, and any central author-
ity or shared institutions including political parties have been absent. 
As stated earlier, a crucially important structural factor constraining re-
unification in Cyprus is identified in the consociational literature with regard 
to the island’s past failures (Lijphart 2007; McGarry 2011). The dual imbal-
ance of power adds a critical uncertainty to the reunification puzzle, as there 
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are only two groups and one of them, the Greek Cypriots, are in overwhelm-
ing majority. Finally, even if a future settlement is approved through demo-
cratic processes (e.g., twin referendums), there will be significant 
constituencies voting against the settlement and framing any compromise as 
an imposition by the international community, Turkish invasion (Greek Cy-
priots), and continuous international isolation (Turkish Cypriots). 
As highlighted in this chapter, one should take into consideration alter-
native scenarios for the future. Planning for middle scenarios is not the ap-
propriate decision- making strategy; instead policy- makers should be 
prepared for “extreme scenarios” even if they do not necessarily assign them 
the highest likelihood to occur. Cyprus might evolve as a moderately divided 
society but also reverse back to grievances, ethnic mobilization, and mutual 
vetoes. For one thing, the second scenario will require effective decentraliza-
tion (as argued in Chapter 1) and external guarantees including the presence 
of international peacekeepers to contain negative actions. For another, alter-
native arbitration mechanisms will prove essential in addressing spoilers, 
sustaining cooperation during difficult times and maintaining a positive 
equilibrium that no side has an incentive to change. 
A simple aspect of the Annan Plan that was heavily criticized was the in-
troduction of foreign arbitration, described by critics as constituting an un-
acceptable and undemocratic violation of Cypriot sovereignty (Coufoudakis 
2004). Specifically, the Annan V settlement included an arbitration mecha-
nism in the form of a Supreme Court intervention. The court was meant to 
comprise an equal number of Cypriot judges from the two communities and 
foreign judges appointed by the UN; the foreign judges were expected to be 
established legal experts with previous international experience. Apart from 
making judicial decisions, the Supreme Court was to settle disagreements 
over the interpretation of the Annan Plan and resolve deadlocks at the exec-
utive level. 
As this book has made clear, many of the critiques of the Annan Plan 
could be appropriately addressed. For example, Chapter 3 has proposed a 
semipresidential arbitration mechanism, adding another democratic layer of 
governance to the reunification structure and creating a buffer zone between 
the executive and the constitutional court. Under this mechanism, arbitra-
tion decisions will be made first by the co- presidents, and then by the Su-
preme Court in rare occasions when everything else fails. Alternatively, the 
European Commission could be responsible for final arbitration, avoiding 
the politicization of the judiciary. Credible arbitration systems could address 
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alternative scenarios critics tend to ignore— but which, as the book points 
out, can be extremely useful. For example, arbitration systems will make it 
impossible for hardliners to sabotage decision- making as in the 1960s. More 
important, going through the court system necessarily entails loss of time and 
possibly of reputation, necessitating that sides carefully consider their posi-
tions before vetoing a decision, especially as the court would reject unfair or 
unconstitutional demands, causing local and international embarrassment.
Countries in the EU including Cyprus have already granted part of their 
sovereignty to the EU (at executive, fiscal, and legislative levels) and to the 
ECtHR (at the judicial level), in the expectation that the benefits of partici-
pation will outweigh the potential loss of sovereignty. As discussed above, it 
is hard to imagine how critics can maintain their emphasis on sovereignty 
issues following the challenges Cyprus has faced in the post- 2012 era. One 
might argue in favor of inviting foreign (especially legal) expertise to help 
in decision- making, especially in resolving contested human rights issues. 
The decisions of international legal experts have a normative appeal, as they 
protect minorities and vulnerable groups of the weaker sides (e.g., Greek 
Cypriots displaced). Because they trigger interest beyond national bound-
aries, internationalized judicial processes become more costly for aspiring 
violators. 
Institutional design requires ingenuity, and sovereignty cannot be an ex-
ception. Divided societies have to be creative on the sovereignty question if 
they wish to survive bigger challenges; China demonstrated this kind of cre-
ativity when negotiating reunification with Hong Kong, making “major con-
cessions,” including appointment of foreign judges in Hong Kong’s Supreme 
Court (McCall 2001: 101). Likewise, parties in Bosnia have accepted limita-
tions to the country’s sovereignty and included provisions in the Bosnian 
constitution allowing foreign judges to work with local institutions (Belloni 
2006; Bieber 2006: 123– 29). 
Northern Ireland offers another appropriate test case of arbitration mech-
anisms as a way of addressing the worst- case scenario of noncooperation. 
Soon after the signing of the Good Friday Agreements, a deadlock led to sus-
pension of the provincial government and direct rule by London (with Dub-
lin’s contribution). Ian Paisley and the DUP, who “spent most of his career 
deriding reform- minded Unionists as traitors” (McDonald 2007), initially 
refused to share power with Irish Nationalists. However, the cooperation be-
tween the two governments, Ireland and the UK, had a moderating effect, 
leading to the landmark St. Andrew Agreement of 2006. On the one hand, 
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foreign arbitration did not lead to major sanctions against the voters in the 
province (except new water taxes that sparked some anger). On the other, 
local politicians including the DUP could no longer survive “direct rule” 
from Westminster without assuming power in the province themselves. Fur-
thermore, the revised d’Hondt procedure offered leaders an attractive exit 
strategy from the deadlock. Hence, by 2006, the two sides had reconsidered 
their views and reached a compromise implemented a year later. Indeed, a 
former opponent in the Unionist camp, admitted he “was convinced Paisley 
was a changed man and his party had been transformed” while Paisley de-
scribed Sinn Féin’s subsequent support of policing arrangements as miracu-
lous (McDonald 2007). 
Alternative Scenario Planning and Hydrocarbons 
Unsurprisingly, the unprecedented damage caused by the Eurozone crisis has 
expedited the need to provide alternative resources for the ailing Cypriot 
economy. Yet the Greek Cypriot side lacks the financial resources and more 
importantly the proven hydrocarbon reserves to plan for its own exclusive 
infrastructures. On the one hand, building a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plan 
will make pipelines redundant by allowing direct exports throughout the 
world, East Asia in particular (see also ICG 2012). On the other, this option 
will cost an estimated by the Cypriot government $10 billion with no guaran-
tee that unproven natural gas reserves will ever exceed the costs of the origi-
nal investment (Gürel et al. 2013: 81). Because of the uncertainties as to the 
size, quality and future prices of nature gas, interested companies have sug-
gested planning for alternative future scenarios. For instance, scenario A of 
potentially “low profits” (limited reserves) could be addressed with pipelines 
to Cyprus and Turkey while Scenario B of “major profits” (additional proved 
discoveries) could justify the LNG plan, especially if export prices in the 
Asian markets rise in the future. The 2014 Crimean crisis could favor Sce-
nario A by creating incentives for Germany and other EU countries to simul-
taneously expedite Turkish accession, settlement of the Cyprus problem, and 
transportation of Cypriot natural gas to Europe as an alternative to Russian 
gas. Alternatively, the Cyprus government could remain primarily interested 
in the LNG option (or exports through Egypt) aiming to minimize depen-
dency on Turkey. Yet, as in the past, planning for only the optimistic scenario 
will cost Cypriots both financially and politically.
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For one thing, sharing the oil and natural gas profits with the Turkish 
Cypriots is politically wise, especially in safeguarding international support 
and refuting claims as to the legality of the Cypriot exclusive economic zone.5 
For another, exports of natural gas through the Turkish port of Ceyhan might 
be the most economically efficient route for Cyprus and Israel (ICG 2012). 
The whole region could gradually be connected natural gas and electricity 
consumption, creating larger economies of scale. The Greek economy and 
the rest of Europe will also benefit from natural gas and electricity exports 
through Turkey but also Israel and Cyprus.
Moreover, the positive effects will not only be financial but also political. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Varosha could become a possible first 
step in a future incremental peace process. The return of the suburb could be 
also tied to natural gas transforming the city into a development hub for Cy-
prus and Southern Turkey. Furthermore, a second mini- deal package could 
be envisioned for the future municipal area of Morphou/Yeni Güzelyurt. 
Morphou which was almost entirely Greek Cypriot in 1974 (home to 6,480) 
was included in each of the five versions of territorial adjustment in the 
Annan plan as well as in previous UN proposals such as the Ghali Set of Ideas 
of 1992 (see also Figures 3 and 4). Because of the near certainty of the town’s 
return (if there were a settlement), the current inhabitants live in a limbo 
situation with very little private investment in the region. Through either a 
second settlement package or preferably a comprehensive settlement, the 
land around the broader Morphou/Yeni Güzelyurt municipality will be re-
distributed, with the original Greek Cypriot inhabitants regaining the south-
eastern parts and Turkish Cypriots retaining legal titles for the coastal areas 
in the northwest in exchange for their properties in the south. The new city of 
Yeni Güzelyurt would be rebuilt either in a coastal location or farther north 
adjacent to the new Cyprus METU (Middle East Technical University) cam-
pus. Furthermore, the Republic of Cyprus could commit substantial profits 
from the oil and gas reserves for the Famagusta and Morphou regions, while 
local residents will also benefit from new infrastructure projects tied to the 
hydrocarbon industry. 
Mutual interdependence could be the key for securing peace in Cyprus 
and the Levant region. Admittedly, most societies might not want to sacrifice 
their “sovereignty” and allow “foreigners” to assume critical roles in natural 
gas transport or security issues and political arbitration. If the issue of foreign 
involvement is so contentious in Cyprus, despite the influence of European 
institutions, one can well imagine the limitations of adopting comparable 
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arrangements in the Middle East, the Balkans, or elsewhere with much lower 
levels of trust in western and international institutions. This is an inherent 
weakness of conflict- mitigating proposals and institutions and might explain 
why federalism and consociationalism have not expanded more quickly and 
broadly around the globe. However, as the conclusion demonstrates, outside 
support and interdependence, even at the expense of “sovereignty rights,” 
might be critical in addressing worst- case scenarios and planning for durable 
settlements. 
Conclusion: Can Divided Societies 
Learn from Each Other?
This book has examined the failure to reach a federal agreement in Cyprus 
despite intense diplomatic efforts since 1974. Unlike other divided societies 
that transcended their stalemates, Cyprus has remained divided for decades, 
even though the two communities have tentatively agreed on the general pa-
rameters for reunification since the High- Level Agreements of 1977 and 
1979. Although unfulfilled, the federal vision has been shared, helping to 
scale back the negative public sentiment following the 1974 de facto partition 
of the island. Despite the gradual rapprochement of Turkish and Greek Cy-
priots, however, UN mediation attempts have so far failed in reunifying Cy-
prus. Yet 2015 marked a new ambitious effort to resolve the intractable 
Cyprus problem. 
The experience of Cyprus is not unique. Protracted stalemates have pre-
vented power- sharing arrangements from being negotiated or implemented 
in Sri Lanka, Georgia, Moldova, Kirgizstan, and Afghanistan, among other 
conflict- ridden places. Even within the EU, power- sharing arrangements 
have encountered significant difficulties. Belgium suffered a record- breaking 
541 days without an elected coalition government in 2009– 2010, while 
Northern Ireland (until 1998), Catalonia, and the Basque country have faced 
violence and/or severe constitutional frictions. 
When we look at the failed consociational and federal arrangements in the 
neighborhood surrounding Cyprus, specifically the post- Ottoman Balkans 
and Middle East, we find no obvious, immediate, or overdetermining histori-
cal reasons for these failures. In fact, the post- Ottoman lands shared legacies 
of toleration at both the imperial and grassroots levels that maintained diver-
sity for centuries; these could have provided favorable political and cultural 
conditions for power- sharing. In addition, examples of successful federal 
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movements in Western Europe are readily available and fairly well known in 
the region. Even more important, popular federal movements advocating cul-
tural or regional pluralism have emerged, suggesting an alternative to ethnic 
nationalism. Yet federal or consociational engagements have failed to prevail 
over narrowly defined, exclusionary, and often violent nationalist movements. 
Aspiring federations such as Moldova, Georgia, or Cyprus might therefore 
conclude that federalism is not inevitable. 
Moreover, there are problems in negotiating power- sharing, particularly in 
those cases where past failures have consolidated anti- federalist/consociational 
biases in mainstream ideologies (see the discussion in Chapter 2 on the Balkans 
and Middle East). Yet these short- term problems in the negotiability or in the 
early phases of implementation should not cloud our appreciation of the advan-
tages of federal and consociational arrangements. As the Introduction mentions, 
an impressive 40 percent of the world live in countries that are formal federations 
or can be described as such (Watts 2002). Although critics of power- sharing ar-
rangements often assume otherwise, no federation has failed within the Euro-
pean Union or among post- World War II industrial democracies (Bermeo 2002; 
McGarry and O’Leary 2009a). Likewise, Bermeo demonstrates that no minority 
in any developing- world federal democracy was engaged in armed struggle in 
the 1980s with the exception of India (2004: 475), which has also made remark-
able progress in restoring ethnic relations since then (Kohli 2001, 2004). 
In their comparative study of power sharing, Hartzell and Hoddie (2003: 
319) note that about 97 percent of civil wars ending through mediation since 
World War II have embraced power- sharing; more important, their findings 
suggest that when communities increase their engagement with power- 
sharing, the likelihood that peace will endure also increases. Quantitative 
studies might even under- report the positive aspects of power- sharing, espe-
cially if introduced too late in a conflict. Even its critics agree that, at the very 
least, power- sharing does not seem to have a negative effect on post- election 
peace (Jarstad 2009). In fact, across conflict- ridden societies power- sharing 
has transformed highly volatile environments, including “least likely” cases 
such as Liberia (Soderstrom 2011), the Republic of Macedonia/FYROM 
(Koneska 2012), India (Kohli 2004), and Burundi (Vandeginste 2009), as well 
as Russia on Tatarstan (Stoner- Weiss 2004) and Iraqi Kurdistan (O’Leary 
2012). Power- sharing not only contributes to the immediate objective, of ter-
minating open warfare but also encourages better quality democracy, ac-
countability, and effective governance, although admittedly the latter remain 
conditional on multiple other factors. 
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While recognizing the critical limitations of power sharing, this book 
highlights a set of noteworthy innovations in institutional design and identi-
fies the necessary conditions for durable power- sharing arrangements. It fo-
cuses on the constitutional aspects of power- sharing and the quality and 
durability of such arrangements, particularly with regard to human rights, 
reconciliation, and truth recovery. It is challenging but not impossible to pri-
oritize human rights of vulnerable groups in a peace settlement. Groups most 
likely to be affected by a peace settlement (or failure to reach a negotiated 
agreement) include displaced persons, relatives of missing persons, and set-
tlers in federalizing societies. The book suggests a number of relevant media-
tion models, also noting how the methods used to ratify peace agreements 
can impede or facilitate the process. 
Properly designed peace processes could win the support of those most 
likely to be negatively affected by peace at the ratification, implementation, or 
long- term sustainability phases. Simply stated, peace agreements should aim 
to serve as many people as possible, including constituencies historically as-
sociated with ethnonationalist traditions. Settlements should appeal not only 
to moderates supporting peace but also to hardliners willing to engage in 
transformative mediation. The latter could be strategically positioned to pre-
vent a settlement unless an agreement satisfies their own critical needs; if 
satisfied, they could join with moderates to form majorities in their commu-
nities and work toward lasting and sustainable peace. In other words, recog-
nizing ethnic antagonisms but working to reduce future tensions is essential 
in peace mediations.
Undeniably, institutional innovation requires a specific set of skills for 
policymakers. As this book demonstrates, there is now a well- stocked “tool-
kit” of analytical options to those studying institutional innovation; these in-
clude critical cases such as Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and South Africa, the 
various crises and confidence- building measures in Cyprus and its immedi-
ate region, and finally surveys of public intentions across divided societies. 
Although these analytical tools have significant limitations applied individu-
ally, integrating all three could facilitate innovative design and positive learn-
ing across divided societies. 
In particular, the innovations presented in this book could be applicable 
to a wide range of issues in aspiring federations and consociations, especially 
the so- called “frozen conflicts” in Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia) especially with regard to encouraging constructive 
engagement with their breakaway regions; Nepal and Colombia with regard 
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to the d’Hondt mechanism in their respective transitions to power- sharing; 
Israel/Palestine with regard to debates on ratifying a future peace agreement 
in referendums; and finally Azerbaijan (Nagorno- Karabakh) and Sri Lanka 
(Tamil Eelam) with regard to displacement and settler related conflicts. 
Institutional innovation is critical for divided societies. In Cyprus, for ex-
ample, peacemakers have frequently demonstrated that even with little out-
side help, local communities can reverse the most difficult aspects of their 
territorial division. As early as the 1970s, the two mayors of the capital Nico-
sia, Demetriades and Akıncı, resorted to an ad hoc institutional design to 
address the city’s impending environmental disaster caused by the absence of 
a sewerage system. But the innovative thinking, charisma, and popularity of 
Lellos and Mustafa (as widely known with their first names) has not found 
imitators in other domains; perhaps surprisingly, this includes the leaders 
involved in seeking innovative ways to repopulate the deserted part of Fama-
gusta with its former inhabitants. Likewise, while the Bu Memleket Bizim 
movement brought together pacifist forces in the North and mobilized the 
Turkish Cypriot community in massive peace rallies, the quiet revolution 
failed to spread to the South despite the fertile ground even among tradition-
ally pro- peace Greek Cypriots on the left. Sadly, in protracted mediations 
positive pro- peace realignments in the political landscape of one community 
often miss equivalent initiatives in the other by years, even months. 
Another unexpected challenge of the island’s partition highlighted in this 
book comes from the Greek Cypriot right. The 1993– 2003 decade saw the 
center- right Democratic Rally (DISY) in power in the Greek Cypriot com-
munity. A paradox from its very inception in the post- 1974 era, the Rally 
hosted the moderate center- right along with former paramilitaries associated 
with violence against Turkish Cypriots and left alike. As discussed earlier, the 
Rally’s decade spearheaded the steady transformation of Greek Cypriot poli-
tics and steered the vulnerable Republic of Cyprus toward accession to the 
European Union. More important, it led to the gradual transformation of the 
Rally itself. In its last years in government, DISY leader Glafkos Clerides ne-
gotiated the main parameters for reunification of Cyprus under the Annan 
Plan. As the main opposition party, DISY voted for the Plan in the 2004 ref-
erendum and since then has steadily advocated reunification. 
Yet the Rally’s transformation has also limits. Future mediation in Cyprus 
will have to address the challenges raised in Putnam’s seminal analysis of the 
two- level game theory mediation model (Putnam 1989; see also Evans et al. 
1993). More specifically, a future agreement may receive ratification by the 
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Rally leadership, but convincing the public, its own diverse constituency, and 
future electoral allies to do likewise is another question. Putnam distin-
guishes two stages in the process of such negotiations: bargaining at the in-
ternational (or intercommunal in this case) level between the negotiators, 
leading to a tentative framework agreement (Level I), and separate discus-
sions in each group’s constituencies about whether to ratify the agreement or 
parts of it (Level II) (Putnam 1989). Putnam adds an interesting “two- table” 
metaphor, with each leader appearing at both game boards: “across the inter-
national table sit his foreign counterparts, and at his elbows sit diplomats and 
other international advisors. Around the domestic table behind him sit party 
and parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies, representa-
tives of key interest groups, and the leaders own political advisors” (Putnam 
1988: 434). In divided societies, the “domestic” table might include the imag-
ined community of voters (including past and future allies) whose preferences 
and intentions are either negative or undecided ahead of peace mediations. 
Following the February 2013 elections, the positive story of the Rally’s 
transformation turned into another disappointment, once external actors 
failed to understand the dynamics of internal politics in the Greek Cypriot 
community. Following Anastasiades’ victory, there was renewed optimism in 
the island reunification process and justified reasons to be hopeful. To begin 
with, the Rally and Anastasiades himself emerged as a classic example of an 
“ethnic tribune” as defined by Mitchell et al. (2009). Polls ahead of the Febru-
ary 2013 elections showed him as “the most effective leader to negotiate with 
the outside world,” even higher than his voters’ base (CYBC 2012b), suggest-
ing that Greek Cypriots could follow his determination even if they did not 
necessarily agree with him on all issues. At a talk at the London School of 
Economics (LSE) in November 2012, he used the term “institutional innova-
tion” to underline his own determination for a better quality settlement in-
formed by international standards and experience. 
Anastasiades’ electoral outreach increased after the alliance with DIKO, 
making him a clear favorite for the February 2013 elections. He went on to 
receive a 45.46 percent of the vote in the first round of the elections and then 
to secure a 57.48 percent in the runoff elections, the largest popular mandate 
for a Cypriot president in decades. But Anastasiades had little time to enjoy 
his well- deserved victory. The most important turning point came only 
weeks following his election, in the devastating decision at the Euro Group 
summit on March 1, 2013. The European Commission, European Central 
Bank, and International Monetary Fund (the troika) proposed a €10 billion 
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loan for Cyprus, provided the government introduced an unprecedented levy 
for bank savers. The decision initially affected all savers including smaller 
ones, but eventually concentrated on depositors above €100,000 in the two 
largest banks of the island. 
In a matter of weeks, Cyprus lost its most important industry, interna-
tional banking, which for critics would have been essential in repaying future 
loans. In the eyes of the average Greek Cypriot this was seen as a devastating 
deal, and regardless of the responsibilities of the Christofias presidency some 
of the blame was attributed to Anastasiades himself. Ironically, his party his-
torically believed in and advocated a “federal Cyprus within a federal Europe.” 
Anastasiades’ presidential campaign a month earlier emphasized how the EU 
could help reunite the two communities. He was elected because of his pro- 
Western vision, but, with the March 2013 bailout plan the Greek Cypriot pub-
lic at the time lost its trust toward Europe’s values and leaders. At the beginning 
it looked as if Europe had lost a committed partner in bringing peace in the 
volatile Eastern Mediterranean region. And despite the bold start of a new 
peace settlement mediation following the February 2014 joint statement, ne-
gotiations were again interrupted in the fall of 2014 following the entry of the 
Turkish research vessel Barbaros into the Cyprus exclusive economic zone, 
only to be resumed after the election of Mustafa Akıncı in April 2005. 
Yet, as argued in this book, in Cyprus there are several examples of how 
peacemakers have managed to overcome past difficulties. For instance, an-
other surprising Cypriot success story concerns the Maronite residents of 
Kormakitis, who succeeded in convincing the Turkish Cypriot side to return 
their village in 2006 despite the failure of the peace process two years earlier. 
The informal mediation on Kormakitis is a stand- alone paradox, as it hap-
pened at a time of major disappointment for Turkish Cypriots following the 
Greek Cypriot “no” vote in the 2004 referendum. More puzzling was the in-
volvement in the mediation of hardliner Serdar Denktaş. Convinced of the 
necessity of supporting the Maronite cause, Denktaş was central to the agree-
ment. This has improved his local and international image; his photo now 
decorates the village coffee shop of Kormakitis. The Maronites have played an 
increasing role in the rapprochement of the two communities. Admittedly, 
the remaining three villages belonging to the Maronites remain mostly inac-
cessible, but the gradual return of Kormakitians to their ancestral space 
marks the beginning of the process of reversing ethnic cleansing and its bitter 
legacy in the island. 
The Maronite case provides valuable qualitative data to examine return 
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processes and design provisions for the remaining Greek Cypriot displaced 
population. The book matches these data with qualitative observations with 
similar case studies in Bosnia. The data also inspired our participation on a 
large- n survey of the internally displaced, contacted by Cyprus2015 and 
funded by the UNDP and the EU Commission representation in Cyprus. For 
instance, Stefanovic and I concluded that nationalist constituencies are not 
monolithic in their preferences (Loizides and Stefanovic 2012). In other 
words, those who vote for hardline candidates are more likely to express their 
intention to return to their pre- 1974 homes following a negotiated settle-
ment. By extension, the leaders of and voters for the hardline parties might 
be less inclined to oppose a settlement, if it includes better arrangements for 
return in their post- 1974 communities.  
Chapter 6 looks at another successful Cypriot mediation, this one accom-
plished by the Committee for Missing Persons (CMP). The CMP appears to 
have produced better results than the comparable cases of Northern Ireland 
and South Africa, enabling the exhumation of about half the missing from 
the 1963– 1974 period. As Northern Ireland and South Africa are often set 
against Cyprus (in this book and the broader literature), the contrast is both 
puzzling and counter- intuitive. Despite a decade of progress in their respec-
tive peace processes, there has been only a modest breakthrough on the issue 
of the disappeared in both Northern Ireland and post- apartheid South Af-
rica. In contrast, despite the political stalemate in Cyprus the reactivation of 
the CMP was accompanied by an extensive process of exhuming the missing, 
widespread public support, and emergence of new bicommunal civil society 
groups eager to challenge the core assumptions of the island’s ethnonational-
ist partition (Kovras 2014).
 The findings of this book have important implications for theoretical 
perspectives emphasizing framing processes and its relationship to institu-
tional innovation. As discussed in the Introduction, institutional design and 
innovation could, in principle, address competing grievances aiming to es-
tablish the foundations for a durable peace settlement. Yet adversarial frames 
often eliminate the scope of novel institutional designs. This is hardly a new 
argument in policy- making, or more broadly in the history of scientific in-
quiry; the scope of innovation in the natural sciences, for instance, has fre-
quently been restricted by the opposing paradigms dominating a particular 
era (Kuhn 1962). Likewise, embedded frames divert a society’s attention 
from feasible solutions while restricting policy transfer and lessons from 
elsewhere. 
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Yet as the CMP example suggests winning the hearts and minds of di-
vided societies for compromise often entails an alternative “peace frame,” de-
fining the common ground between communities in conflict. Frames 
propagated by peace movements and moderate politicians also enable con-
flict resolution by transforming the symbolic landscape of ethnic relations. 
Cross- issue linkages and alternative scenarios emphasized in the previous 
chapter could also challenge existing paradigms. Alternative scenario plan-
ning makes peace frames more credible by eliminating worst case scenarios 
but at the same time it requires the “intellectual courage to reveal evidence 
that does not fit our conceptual maps, especially when it threatens our very 
existence” (Schoemaker 1995: 38– 39). 
At the same time, the book’s main case studies demonstrate how institu-
tional innovation could also neutralize the impact of ethnonationalist frames, 
or coexist with them in a stable symbiotic relationship allowing ethnic com-
munities control in gradually adapting their narratives in respective peace 
processes. Unlike its South African alternative, the CMP in Cyprus did not 
engage in a broader reconciliation process or social transformation but sim-
ply focused on its specific mission of identifying and exhuming the missing. 
This symbiotic relationship between conflict management and national-
ism is not unique to Cyprus as a divided society. For instance, the ruling 
VMRO- DPMNE in the Republic of Macedonia/FYROM, which has been for 
the most part committed to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, has also 
maintained a strong emphasis on ethnic nationalism demonstrated in the lu-
dicrous spending for the Skopje 2014 project, which involved construction of 
impressive monuments, national museums, and statues, including a 22- meter 
statue of Alexander the Great.1 The giant statue of Alexander in post- OFA 
Macedonia is reminiscent of the Orange Parades in Northern Ireland, both 
supported by actors who have otherwise engaged constructively in peace 
processes under the d’Hondt system or its alternatives. 
On this point, Wolff (2010) argues that the successful transformation of 
intractable conflicts is conditional on the presence of three interrelated fac-
tors: diplomacy, leadership, and institutional design. Of these, I argue that 
the choice of institutions is the most critical. “Frozen conflicts” such as the 
one in Cyprus lack a pre- agreed institutional framework. Therefore in medi-
ation attempts, these societies aim to build institutions almost from scratch. 
The first steps in institution- building are likely to be difficult, but emerging 
federations can draw lessons from recent institutional innovations elsewhere. 
Their early choices could set a (dependent) path that would positively 
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influence future constitutional frameworks. In addition, if we assume that 
leaders and geopolitics change very slowly, institutional innovation becomes 
a “flexible” critical factor able to nudge a protracted stalemate in the right 
direction at the right time. Equally, a lack of innovation might cause a failure, 
as conflicting sides are unlikely to accommodate on preexisting institutional 
arrangements. 
If we look specifically at Cyprus, we see that the enduring Cypriot stale-
mate has demonstrated “heightened moments” of EU, U.S., and UN diplo-
macy, especially during the Cypriot- EU accession process. Unfortunately, 
this resulted in the aborted 2004 referendum. An equally critical moment 
occurred in 2008– 2010, when for the first time moderate leaders from the left 
were elected on both sides of the divide. Despite high expectations, negotia-
tions have been wasted on technicalities and domestic issues of minor im-
portance. Focusing on each issue individually in the negotiations restricted 
cross- issue linkages, as suggested particularly in Chapters 5 and 7. 
Admittedly, institutional design per se is not a panacea; as shown in 
Chapter 4, novel ideas such as cross- voting endorsed by the leading moder-
ates and civil society groups in the island failed to catalyze the peace process 
during the Christofias- Talat mediations. Drawing lessons from other divided 
societies was the missing ingredient in these failed efforts, particularly as the 
two sides opted for a “mediation process owned by Cypriots” limiting the 
input of foreign and UN experts, advising against presidentialism and cross- 
voting at the time. Lessons from elsewhere and critical innovations could 
have better met their respective needs and fears. As I demonstrate, alternative 
designs and innovations can be imported from one setting to another, if they 
are properly timed, refined, and framed for the local sociopolitical context. 
One might assume that given the importance of institutions, aspiring fed-
erations and consociations would invest significant amount of time and en-
ergy in identifying the most suitable institutional designs, and even become 
knowledgeable on the options potentially available. Yet even in societies with 
high human and political capital such as Cyprus, there is generally little in-
vestment in the study of other divided societies. Deeply divided societies sel-
dom look outside themselves, simply because forming comparisons with 
others would contradict their unique image of suffering and victimization. 
As Petersen (2011) eloquently demonstrates in his critique of rationalist ex-
planations in civil war, conflict- ridden societies frequently fail to act in “rea-
sonable terms.” Creativity and ingenuity under these conditions is not only 
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rare but also incompatible with a divided society’s recent historical trajectory 
(see also Homer- Dixon 2000). 
But what is most puzzling here is not the conservative outlook of deeply 
divided societies, which may be expected, but the failure of peace studies and 
academia in general to highlight relative successes, providing a broader 
methodological and theoretical framework for study of the efficacy of institu-
tions in transforming deeply divided societies. Much of the relevant hypoth-
esizing in the literature is plain and intuitive, suggesting, for example, that 
forcibly displaced persons would not return to areas where they would as-
sume a minority status (Adelman and Barkan 2011) or that ethnic federalism 
and consociationalism will promote further conflict (Snyder 2000; Wimmer 
2003; Aitken 2007). Exceptions that this book has demonstrated exist and are 
underemphasized in the literature, which so far has underplayed the varia-
tion in the experience of divided societies. 
Countering conventional wisdom, I offer four examples in challenging 
the intractability of conflicts in divided societies. One occurs in Cyprus: as 
suggested in Chapter 6, the CMP breakthroughs form is a crucial or “least 
likely” case study. As argued in the Introduction, a case study is described as 
crucial when it is “least likely” to fulfill a theoretical prediction but does so, 
thereby going against theoretical predictions at a given time (Eckstein 1975; 
Gerring 2007). As demonstrated in this book, even in crucial case studies 
that initially seemed unlikely to follow a peaceful transformation, an en-
abling institutional design provided the catalyst to nudge ethnic relations to 
the right direction. By extension, the book defined crucial cases of successful 
transformation as those that initially evidenced high levels of ethnic division 
for a variety of reasons, but where actors had nonetheless introduced an in-
novative institutional arrangement to shape a peaceful postconflict environ-
ment. One partial example is Cyprus with regard to the issue of missing 
persons. Others are South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Bosnia with regard 
to specific aspects of their peace settlement. 
Besides the considerations given in the Introduction, institutions should 
meet a set of criteria to be considered innovative or “exportable” to other 
settings. Drawing from the discussion above, the first criterion is for institu-
tions to have worked fairly well under difficult, even prohibitive conditions. 
Although conflict experts have generally failed to define what “fairly well” 
means for peace processes in divided societies, certain processes have re-
ceived widespread praise in policy and academic settings. If a favorable 
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context or good timing (Zartman 1995) explains the transformation to peace, 
then institutional innovation might be less important. However, as I argue in 
preceding chapters, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, and South Africa achieved 
peace in extremely trying conditions. Arguably, the situation in Cyprus was 
even more difficult when CMP was reactivated following the Annan Plan 
failure.
The second important criterion is to ground recommendations in an es-
tablished theoretical tradition. Although there is a burgeoning literature on 
mediation in Cyprus and divided societies, policy prescriptions and institu-
tional innovations are rarely linked to theories of ethnic relations or conflict 
resolution. As Walt argues, policy debates rest on competing theoretical vi-
sions and typologies. Theoretical insights are essential for “diagnosing events, 
explaining their causes, prescribing responses, and evaluating the impact of 
different policies” (Walt 2005: 23). Reliance on false or flawed theory distorts 
the assumptions that guide policy decisions and could lead to failures in eval-
uating the causal link between institutions and outcomes, thereby limiting 
the import/export of institutions to a different setting. 
The third criterion required to make institutions exportable is their “fit” 
in the new environment. Institutions are judged not only by their long- term 
performance but also by their immediate effect in mediations. Simplicity in 
design and presentation could be particularly useful. Innovations need to be 
simple enough for parties to embrace them in the first place and negotiable at 
both inter- and intracommunal levels, uniting moderates while dividing 
hardliners. If the hardliners form a majority in their communities, then a 
degree of hardliner transformation is necessary for endorsement and dura-
bility of a peace settlement. Institutions should incentivize the support of un-
initiated constituencies, particularly those with the capacity to veto an 
agreement. 
Institutional innovation should also reduce critical uncertainties. Media-
tors in divided societies should be aware of the dynamics and risk calcula-
tions, including related perceptions of each side, in order to adjust their 
proposals accordingly. Sides might shun seemingly beneficial agreements if 
they entail critical risks. Even if things are unlikely to go wrong, sides might 
still opt for nonagreement if there is no safety net in the event of a potentially 
devastating outcome. The Cypriot context also demonstrates that groups 
might make different risk assessments. 
By extension, it is important to acknowledge that the risk structures for 
communities in conflict might differ. For the less prosperous and less 
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recognized side, a peace settlement might be a “low- risk, low- return” option, 
while for the prosperous and internationally recognized side, the agreement 
might be a very risky, high- return option. Institutional arrangements should 
factor in these risk calculations. For example, linkage models minimize the 
effects of worst- case scenarios through self- adjustable arrangements. In pre-
ceding chapters, I have made a number of security, power- sharing, and de-
mographic proposals, all including self- adjustable arrangements. Here, the 
concept of automaticity in peace settlements drawn from O’Leary (2005a) 
and McEvoy (2006, 2014) is invaluable. Automaticity is a critical component 
of institutional innovation; it reduces future frictions, reliance on minority 
and majority vetoes, and renegotiations on critical issues for any of the sides.
 To this point, institutional innovation should consider alternative sce-
narios with a view to minimizing negative effects for all sides. If worst- case 
scenarios are still possible, even well- intended moderates will probably reject 
a peace settlement. Although linkages could mitigate uncertainties, each side 
should be prepared to take calculated risks, as these are inevitable in any me-
diation. Likewise, sides should be expected to make compromises on signifi-
cant issues, as there are also limits to the “merits” of institutional design. 
Waiting for risk- free solutions will create longer and deeper stalemates in the 
absence of decisive leadership. At the same time, however, there is a limit to 
the risks any party in a conflict would afford, and by extension mediators 
should be in a position to craft proposals that minimize critical uncertainties 
for stakeholders. 
A final point focuses on a set of qualifications as to how “novel” innova-
tions should be in order to be described as such. As stated in the Introduc-
tion, Homer- Dixon (2000) uses the related term “ingenuity,” which according 
to him includes ideas that though not fundamentally novel are nonetheless 
useful. Ingenuity is not only technical but also social, and includes for in-
stance the choice of institutions, leadership styles, and frames. Social theo-
rists have long pointed that ingenuity is key to social well- being and economic 
development (230– 32). O’Leary (2005a) recognizes that the d’Hondt execu-
tive procedure is not necessarily a unique Northern Ireland invention; it has 
been employed elsewhere, for instance, in the municipality of Copenhagen 
since 1938. Likewise, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, De Gaulle relied on a 
mandate referendum in 1961 while variations of the CMP model have also 
been implemented in Spain and Latin American countries (Kovras 2014). Yet 
my choice of the term “innovation” follows that of O’Leary (2005a), suggest-
ing that these mechanisms have generally not been well known even among 
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specialists on peace processes in divided societies. Aiming to cover this gap 
in the literature, I drew extensively from novel institutional examples and 
designs across the world. As argued in the previous chapters, such innova-
tions include the 1998 d’Hondt executive in Northern Ireland, the 1992 man-
date referendum design in South Africa, and the 1995– 1999 Dayton 
provisions for repatriation of the internally displaced in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
Moderation Through Inclusion: The 
Northern Irish d’Hondt Executive
As Chapter 3 demonstrates, the d’Hondt executive is a Northern Irish exam-
ple in power- sharing that entitles political parties automatically to translate 
their electoral representation into ministerial positions. Parties cannot veto 
one another’s choice of ministerial positions; therefore even parties linked to 
former paramilitaries such as the IRA could be included in government. By 
inviting everyone to join the Cabinet, d’Hondt skips a problematic and 
lengthy aspect of consociationalism, that of forming interethnic majority co-
alitions. The d’Hondt and other similar calculation methods provide a set of 
straightforward formulas to estimate the number of ministries for each party 
and to draw the sequence with which ministerial positions are chosen. Par-
ticipation is entirely voluntary, but if a party stays out of the coalition, the 
positions automatically go to rival political parties from the same commu-
nity. This means that if hardliners opt out of this voluntary inclusive coali-
tion, positions are assumed by default by others, most likely moderates. 
Inspired by Lijphart’s consociational approach, in Chapter 3, I argue that 
this is the simplest and most inclusive way to share power in a society such as 
Cyprus that is deeply divided in ethnic terms and between left and right. The 
system brought an unprecedented level of stability to Northern Ireland, par-
ticularly after the St. Andrew’s Agreement. This Agreement was unquestion-
ably a turning point for Northern Ireland, as parties fully endorsed the logic of 
the d’Hondt process, even for the key posts of first and deputy first minister. 
Essentially, the St. Andrews Agreement abandoned the concurrent (centripe-
talist) decision- making rule for electing the two premiers stipulated in the 
1998 Good Friday Agreement and expanded the principle of automaticity.
 The evolution of Northern Irish consociational structures has inevitably 
influenced my thinking on mediating power- sharing in Cyprus. A previous 
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coauthored article on this topic (Loizides and Keskiner 2004) supports cross- 
voting as an amendment to the Annan Plan. Inspired by Horowitz’s centripe-
talist logic, this system offers an alternative to Lijphart’s consociationalism. 
In the 2009 Cyprus peace talks, the UN used cross- voting principles to nego-
tiate a mutually agreed- upon compromise between Greek and Turkish Cy-
priot leaders. One of the few major breakthroughs of the Talat- Christofia era, 
the agreement stipulated that two co- presidents (one from each community) 
would be elected through the reciprocal participation of each community in 
the other’s elections. Although historically supported by civil society actors 
in the island, cross- voting failed to catalyze progress in mediations and even 
deepened the stalemate after the election of right- wing Eroğlu. 
In general, because cross- voting usually favors moderates, it might not be 
the best alternative for a divided society seeking political settlement. For one 
thing, moderates are by definition supportive of compromise and do not 
need additional incentives to sign up for the peace process (O’Leary 2010). 
Rather, innovative electoral designs might aim to incentivize support among 
hardliners with moderate tendencies, eager to partly transform themselves 
during the peace process. For another, systems that alienate large national- 
minded constituencies from government could possibly contribute to polar-
ization; if hardliners are already in power, they may take the opportunity to 
turn down proposals favoring moderate opponents. Thus, through cross- 
voting, moderates might become trapped in decisions that limit their options 
in negotiations, including their ability to elicit the support of hardliners. 
Of course, consensus democracy as presented by Lijphart’s seminal work 
has broader advantages (1999, 2012). Inclusive consensus democracies, ac-
cording to his comparative studies, not only are better at managing ethnic 
diversity but run more effective economic policies, particularly in times of 
crisis. But how exactly can a Northern Ireland- style executive be achieved in 
Cyprus and what are the immediate benefits? A consociational d’Hondt ar-
rangement would allow Cypriots to see their elected leaders representing 
them in a broadly inclusive cabinet the day after the settlement. Unlike third 
alternatives presented in Chapter 4, such as the Ohrid Framework Agree-
ment, the strength of the proposal lies in the assumption that a single politi-
cal party from each community cannot address the challenges of reunification. 
Broad d’Hondt style coalitions will allow everyone to participate in demo-
cratic governance and shared responsibility. The formula will discourage 
 exclusions— something to be taken very seriously, as these could become 
permanent, turning significant constituencies against the peace settlement. 
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Going beyond the Northern Irish example, I propose a mixed system for 
Cyprus, one that combines a broad, inclusive “Lijphartian” consociational 
d’Hondt cabinet with “Horowitzian” centripetalist cross- voting for the presi-
dency. This option appears to be a better alternative, if conservatives remain 
in the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community. It would also encourage 
support across all other parties, including AKEL, by incorporating the major 
strengths of the Christofias- Talat cross- voting formula. While working in 
Northern Ireland for five years (2006– 2011), I saw first- hand the multiple 
advantages of the d’Hondt formula, along with its problems. D’Hondt has 
proved to be robust enough to counter the province’s problematic record of 
interethnic cooperation; as a result, consociationalism functions relatively 
well in the province despite the generic obstacles of governance elsewhere in 
divided societies. Yet Northern Ireland’s deadlocks in the first decade of the 
Good Friday Agreement suggest that effective arbitration mechanisms might 
be needed as well. A major critique of d’Hondt is that a government of all 
parties will lack coordination and consensus. While the Annan Plan aimed at 
resolving such disputes through the arbitration of the constitutional court, I 
added in Chapter 3 another layer of arbitration to the reunification structure 
by entrusting future co- presidents with the authority to mediate future con-
flicts by consensus. In other words, I suggest a semipresidential system with 
limited arbitration powers for co- presidents elected through cross- voting as 
agreed on by Talat and Christofias, thereby enticing the support of CTP and 
AKEL for a future compromise.
Overall, I take a revised approach to my earlier endorsement of cross- 
voting that aims at privileging moderates. Following the developments since 
the 1990s in both Cyprus and Northern Ireland, I came to the conclusion that 
a system that is broadly neutral and inclusive of all political parties would be 
more negotiable and durable for divided societies. As stated in previous 
chapters, a root cause for the prolonged Cypriot stalemate is the failure of 
pro- reconciliation actors (e.g., political parties) to form effective coalitions. 
This is the case with TCP- CTP among Turkish Cypriots and AKEL- DISY in 
the Greek Cypriot community. In fact, government formation in Cyprus is 
puzzling, as there have been only a few coalitions of likeminded moderate 
parties in either community. In essence, the d’Hondt formula would not only 
include the hardliners but also entice Cyprus’s reluctant “moderates” in co-
operating for a durable settlement.
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Peaceful Return of Victims of Ethnic Cleansing
Conventional wisdom assumes that victims of ethnic cleansing are less likely 
to return to their former homes with the passage of time, especially if they 
have achieved similar or better standards of living in a secure environment 
next to co- ethnics or in the diaspora. In several cases, however, a peaceful 
reversal of displacement has marked the beginning of postconflict reconcili-
ation and stability (Black and Koser 1999; Leckie 2003). For example, in Bos-
nia, of the estimated 2.2 million people driven from their homes during the 
1992– 1995 war, a million or more had returned home by March 2007, while 
almost half a million had officially repatriated under minority status in areas 
administered by another ethnic group (Belloni 2008; Black 2001). In essence, 
Bosnia has avoided the fate of other postconflict areas such as Cyprus, where 
cease- fire lines have turned into long- term lines of division, hostility, and al-
most zero returns. 
The case of Bosnia offers several lessons for Cyprus and other societies 
facing protracted displacements: persistence, legal specificity, and effective 
foreign arbitration. In the early postwar phase (1995– 1999), attempts to facil-
itate returns were either half- hearted or unsuccessful, and were met with 
strong ultranationalist resistance, including of a set of policies designed to 
solidify the effects of ethnic cleansing: the refusal to implement property 
laws, incitement of riots against returnees, open discrimination in judicial 
systems and employment, and promotion of ethnically intolerant school cur-
ricula for returnees’ children (Stefanovic and Loizides 2011). The ultrana-
tionalists also used “hostile relocation” to create a constituency of co- ethnics 
with a vested interest in the prevention of the returns. 
In Bosnia, trial and error efforts were essential, as it was hard to envision 
the efficacy of incentives before their implementation. After the failure of the 
“Open Cities” program granting reconstruction funds to municipalities, 
the UN was in a position to implement new policies. Of special interest to the 
Cyprus- Bosnia comparison, the UN High Representative for Bosnia intro-
duced a set of laws to facilitate repossession of residential property. The shift 
in approach reframed the issue of returns from a heavily politicized exchange 
of economic aid to municipalities with minimum tolerance for minorities, 
into an ethnically blind exercise of individual property rights and rule of law. 
Other divided societies should note the 2000 decision of the Constitutional 
Court (with the participation of foreign judges) to actively promote reinte-
gration by stipulating that the federal entities could not be considered 
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exclusively Serb, Croat, or Bosnian Muslim. Rather, they must guarantee 
legal equality to all citizens, including minority returnees.
The outcome was a success, surprising many international administra-
tors. Estimated minority returns in a number of municipalities rapidly went 
well beyond 30 percent of their prewar presence. A senior UNHCR officer in 
Bosnia concluded that UNHCR largely met its responsibilities in terms of 
refugee returns in Bosnia (ICG 2002). However, a careful look spots some 
problems in this statement. First, the overwhelming majority of recorded re-
turnees opted to return merely to sell their properties; they then relocated 
with co- ethnics in their own part of Bosnia (Sert 2008, 2010; Adelman and 
Barkan 2011). Second, the majority of actual returnees opted to return in 
predominantly co- ethnic municipalities such as Drvar. These municipalities 
offer some of the most successful cases of return, thus suggesting the option 
of rehousing the internally displaced close to their co- ethnics, if they so wish 
for security reasons. The UNDP/EU commission data from Cyprus point in 
the same direction (Loizides and Stefanovic 2012). 
By extension, the success of the return policies for Greek Cypriots will 
depend on two main factors. First, resources must be available for UN peace-
keeping, along with financial and other material support for the returnees 
and their recipient communities. Experience from its own past and other 
postconflict societies also suggests that Cyprus should not be left to its own 
devices to resolve issues of return. Contrary to the critics’ arguments pre-
sented in Chapter 3, it is of critical importance for Greek Cypriots that exter-
nal (e.g., EU) guarantees are provided for post- settlement Cyprus particularly 
in enforcing the territorial transfers and the right of return. At the same time 
the EU and UN should be willing to make major commitments as to the se-
curity mechanisms in Cyprus and the broader region. These should go be-
yond current lightly armed UN observers; as Fred Ikle said in a memorable 
quote at the beginning of the Yugoslav conflicts in the 1990s, when the Euro-
pean Community dispatched unarmed observers to the Balkans: “binoculars 
are not a good deterrent” (Aybet 2012). At the same time, credible incentives 
are important and could smooth the return process, especially if both sides 
receive guarantees against worst- case demographic scenarios. 
Interestingly, the principles of reciprocity and automaticity (also em-
ployed successfully in the Northern Irish d’Hondt) can help create new medi-
ation formulas for returnees in post- settlement Cyprus. The suggested 
incentive/linkage approach presented in Chapter 4 could offer a starting 
point in current negotiations. A more refined follow- up approach would be 
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for the future Greek Cypriot mediating teams to introduce a comprehensive 
but nonbinding census survey of preferences among all displaced persons (or 
rely on the estimates of the Cyprus2015 representative survey). For potential 
returnees committed to return under Turkish Cypriot administration, the 
Greek Cypriot mediating team could negotiate their numbers and determine 
the most favorable conditions for return, including housing, education, hos-
pitals, and voting rights. For the remaining potential returnees, there could 
be a combination of compensations and restitution. The future right of return 
for them and future generations could be also guaranteed through the princi-
ple of automaticity in incentives and, as discussed in Chapter 4, through a 
self- adjustable linkage stipulating, for instance, that for every additional 
Greek Cypriot returnee, Turkish Cypriots would receive an equivalent in-
crease in naturalization quotas with regard to settlers or future migrants. 
The settler issue is another aspect of the Cyprus problem that appears in-
tractable according to the accounts of critics. The populations transferred 
from Turkey to the northern part of the island after 1974 have often been 
described as settlers or immigrants by rival accounts in the Cypriot conflict 
(Loizides 2011). On the one hand, immigration studies emphasize that new-
comers, particularly migrants, almost never fight civil wars (Laitin 1998, 
2009); on the other hand, studies on settlers in contested territories expect 
inherently unstable relations between settlers and native populations affected 
by colonization projects (Lustick 1993). The Turkish settlers in Cyprus form 
a “hybrid” category. While colonization is a violation of international con-
ventions and a major obstacle to peace, Turkish settlers in Cyprus also meet 
the profile of migrant populations more interested in daily survival issues 
than in expansionist politics. But this hybridity might be temporary, as settler 
politics might evolve in either of the two opposing directions predicted by 
the contrasting immigration and ethnic literatures. Such “hybrid” situations 
are particularly amenable to institutional design to nudge them to the right 
direction. On this point, Chapter 4 suggested various institutional innova-
tions drawn or inspired from elsewhere, such as conditional naturalization, 
asymmetrical citizenship, reserve lands for returnees in majority settler vil-
lages, and various compensation schemes for those willing to repatriate to 
Turkey (e.g., the right to regret). 
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South Africa’s “Yes” Referendum: Can Others Follow?
Successful referendums are described in the peace and conflict literature as add-
ing legitimacy and durability to a negotiated settlement. In the cases of South 
Africa (1992) and Northern Ireland (1998), referendums have been viewed as 
facilitating peace settlements by engaging broader segments of the society in the 
peace process and limiting the role of violent opposition groups (Strauss 1993; 
Guelke 1999; McGarry and O’Leary 2009a). Moreover, successful peace refer-
endums could be viewed as special moments in the development of peace set-
tlements— a litmus test of a society’s capacity to overcome deep divisions and 
bring forward new political dynamics. But in the case of rapid democratic elec-
tions following transitions, premature and “wrongly” designed referendums 
could inadvertently turn into conflict- inducing rather than conflict- mitigating 
opportunities (Paris 2004). Even when they aim to facilitate positive political 
transformation, referendums might have unintended side effects, as in East 
Timor (1999) or more recently in Kyrgyzstan (2010) and Sudan (2011). 
While questioning the broader efficacy of peace referendums, I argue 
they may sometimes be necessary, given the constitutional or normative con-
straints of such cases of Sri Lanka, Canada, Iraq (on Kirkuk), or Cyprus. Rec-
ognizing that popular voting could be unavoidable or, indeed, the preferred 
option of local actors, my alternative design recommendations aim to mini-
mize the negative downsides of contentious voting. The book does not 
wholeheartedly endorse peace settlement referendums; rather, I recognize 
that strong public expectations (as in Cyprus) often make those an absolute 
necessity. More important, public expectations frequently restrict necessary 
debates on alternative or improved ratification processes. 
Nonetheless, I make a distinction between mandate and post- agreement 
referendums. Mandate referendums could help in the early stages of peace 
processes by offering advice and direction to leaders in the negotiations. Such 
a referendum took place in South Africa in 1992; it called on the white mi-
nority to endorse or reject President de Klerk’s reform policies. The referen-
dum was confined to the country’s white minority but aimed at negotiating 
an end to white minority rule through talks with the black majority. Blacks 
were not allowed to participate, but the ANC issued a statement clarifying 
that the referendum could benefit the negotiating process and warned pro- 
apartheid parties against ending the peace process (Strauss 1993: 342). To the 
surprise of even his own advisors, de Klerk’s landslide victory gave him a 
clear mandate to end apartheid. 
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The multiple advantages to de Klerk type referendums could inform Cy-
prus and other divided societies. First, they are less risky for policy innova-
tion. If politicians lose their mandate, they could opt to step down without 
sacrificing the peace process. De Klerk took a risk, but this was a “calculated 
gamble” (Steward 2012; de Villiers 2012; de Klerk 1999: 234). Second, early 
mandate referendums allow communities to prepare themselves for peace 
negotiations. Assigning a mandate to an elected leader balances democratic 
accountability with pragmatism in the negotiations. De Klerk could negoti-
ate a credible end to apartheid without fearing (as do his Cypriot counter-
parts) a risky referendum at the end of the process. Pre- referendums also 
improve leaders’ negotiating strategies and chances of reaching a settlement. 
By providing certainty to the other side, more concessions can be demanded 
at the negotiating table. In addition, internal and informal referendums are a 
better instrument for international mediation. If successful, an informal ref-
erendum could have the same positive effects, but failure has limited conse-
quences because there are no formal international bodies involved in the 
process. Finally, winning a mandate referendum might help in a subsequent 
referendum for the comprehensive settlement in situations where a post- 
agreement referendum is a legal requirement or widely expected by the pub-
lic as in Cyprus. 
These findings on referendums are relevant for other conflict- ridden so-
cieties. Apart from Cyprus, those currently debating holding referendum 
include, among others, Kashmir, Israel/Palestine, and Western Sahara, as 
well as Iraq with respect to the administrative status of Kirkuk (O’Leary 
2012). Yet local actors and international mediators alike are often unaware 
of the advantages and disadvantages of a particular design. The referendums 
covered in this book, particularly in Chapter 5, provide a variety of designs, 
suggesting a number of available, albeit understudied, options for policy- 
makers and mediators. In Cyprus, following Akıncı’s victory a preparatory 
mandate referendum asking the public to endorse the guiding principles of 
the settlement could pave the direction and priorities for future negotia-
tions. And as the name suggests, mandate referendums— when successful— 
 could give leaders a directive to continue and take decisive steps towards a 
peaceful settlement. 
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Following Cyprus’s Path into Recovering the Missing 
As I have argued throughout, addressing issues of justice, reconciliation, and 
amnesty in the aftermath of a conflict might facilitate cooperation in estab-
lishing successful institutional mechanisms at the political level. Yet the com-
plex interplay between institutional incentives for intracommunal 
cooperation and justice initiatives has not been properly theorized in the 
field of transitional justice. The central question is whether justice and truth 
recovery are beneficial for the early stages of federal and consociational 
agreements or whether justice should be delayed until conditions on the 
ground stabilize (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003). 
The relative success of the recent intercommunal exhumations of missing 
persons in Cyprus demonstrates that addressing highly emotional and sensi-
tive issues is possible even in the absence of a federal settlement. The same 
case demonstrates that it is possible to delink issues of transitional justice 
from political settlements and to prioritize the rights of families of victims 
from the broader process of reconciliation. As discussed in Chapter 6, by the 
mid- 1990s the Greek Cypriot side realized that any gains from antagonizing 
Turkey were minimal and even detrimental for the legal standing of the Re-
public of Cyprus. The revised policy combined two basic innovations: delink-
age of the issue of the missing from the wider prospect of a political 
settlement, and unilateral endorsement of exhumations by the Greek Cypriot 
side, combined with strong and credible incentives to the Turkish- Cypriot 
relatives of the missing to cooperate with the Republic. This seemed a sensi-
ble unilateral step; even so, Greek Cypriot “over- cooperation” entailed a cal-
culated risk at both the personal/leadership and community level. 
Yet societies could identify innovative institutions even when confronted 
with sensitive and emotional issues. The experience of the CMP points to the 
merits of delinking sensitive human rights issues from negotiations for a 
wider political settlement in Cyprus and possibly elsewhere. The success of 
the CMP was not aimed at social engineering or transforming the percep-
tions of the “other” (Kovras and Loizides 2011). Rather, both adversarial and 
cooperative frames remained largely intact at the political level, as policy- 
makers delinked the issue of the missing from political competition. More 
important, the CMP avoided antagonizing perpetrators judicially or expos-
ing inconvenient truths for themselves or their families, particularly in the 
island’s smaller communities. Much of the literature in peacemaking has fo-
cused on the role of spoiler groups (Stedman 1997), yet few studies have 
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investigated how innovative arrangements could be sustained despite oppo-
sition from such groups. The case of the CMP (and other innovations such as 
the d’Hondt mechanism) suggests that peacemaking arrangements might be 
more sustainable if they avoid antagonizing potential spoilers; this is also a 
point current literature on spoilers has yet to address. Finally, this example 
suggests that taking calculated risks through unilateral concessions by one 
side in the conflict could initiate a cycle of cooperation by incentivizing oth-
ers to reciprocate. 
The story of the CMP in Cyprus also shows other societies how to address 
issues of victimhood, reconciliation, and trust without necessarily relying on 
ripe moments and comprehensive political settlements. The CMP break-
through came at a moment when actors had minimal expectations following 
the derailment of the peace process. Yet the example suggests that less prom-
ising times for a settlement are also more suitable for introducing gradual 
steps in negotiations, and this could offer the catalyst for later settlement. 
Such periods also allow constructive experimentation and use of innovative 
ideas in the mediations. Carefully designed steps could initiate the positive 
transformation of a peace process and build confidence for subsequent stages 
in the mediation. Instrumentalist approaches generally imply a start from the 
easiest aspects of the problem delinking for instance humanitarian issues 
from the overall settlement. 
Negotiation theorists use the term “salami tactics,” implying that one 
should not expect to receive the whole salami at once; it is easier (and proba-
bly “healthier”) to receive it slice by slice. The logic behind this “salami tactic” 
in postconflict mediations is to delink the most complicated issues from 
those critical areas of convergence where it is easier to reach a compromise. 
Gradualist approaches are more prone to proper division of labor (for in-
stance, having various technical teams suggesting alternative breakthrough 
packages) and experimentation/innovation in design. By contrast, during 
ripe moments mediators can only make careful use of their time, often side-
lining promising options that are nonetheless complex, time- consuming, and 
likely to be at least initially resisted by the conflicting sides. Ripe moments 
are also more prone to miscalculation, as demonstrated by the rising expec-
tations on both sides during the Cyprus- EU accession process, and subject to 
sudden geopolitical shifts. Finally, a large set of innovative ideas are often 
been produced in relevant peace talks which are on the one hand essential in 
bringing sides together but on the other could hardly fit within tough time-
lines of “ripe moments.” 
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A Reunited Cyprus at Last
As argued here, the Committee for Missing Persons in Cyprus, the d’Hondt 
executive in Northern Ireland, the Bosnian refugee provisions, and the man-
date referendum of South Africa represent four conflict- mitigating institu-
tions that have been relatively effective in transforming conflict under “most 
difficult” conditions. The theoretical rationale for transferring such institu-
tions to other societies locked in protracted conflict is their demonstrated 
capacity to overcome difficult conditions, as this suggests their applicability 
in similar or less complicated situations. 
A cautionary note for Cyprus and its immediate region: while the book 
supports and documents a positive view on institutions and their effective-
ness in a future settlement, it also cautions against adverse scenarios in the 
absence of a compromise. Federalism is the only viable option for a negoti-
ated settlement in Cyprus. Other alternatives, such as forced partition or in-
tegration of the Turkish Cypriots into a unitary state, would not result from a 
negotiated process but from coercion or violence. 
Likewise, maintaining the status quo will have equally troubling implica-
tions. For a generation of Cypriots aspiring to a reunified island, it would 
mean a lost homeland and the end of the dream of peaceful interethnic coex-
istence. The reunification of Cyprus and its people would simply not material-
ize. Equally, for a generation of displaced persons across the divide, partition 
would continue to have immense material implications in their daily lives. It 
would mean living permanently in limbo with their current properties dis-
puted by legal owners and being deprived access to their own ancestral lands. 
There is an even bigger threat if the Cypriot problem remains unresolved. 
Cyprus is not located in the heart of Europe but is in a volatile region be-
tween the Balkans and the Middle East. The neighborhood surrounding Cy-
prus, including the two “motherlands,” Greece and Turkey, has a plethora of 
unresolved foreign policy and ethnic minority issues. The post- 2008 sover-
eign debt crisis creates opportunities for conflict resolution, but it also affects 
social cohesion and threatens the escalation of border crises, if leaders in the 
region play the diversionary card during the crisis; especially in confronting 
the rise of the extreme right. 
While emphasizing the endurance of Greek- Turkish confrontation since 
the early stages of the Cyprus conflict in the mid- 1950s, the book points to 
the remarkable changes taking place in the last decades, with the two coun-
tries coming much closer. The improvement in Greek- Turkish relations and 
Can Divided Societies Learn from Each Other? 213
the election of Akıncı and Anastasiades in conjunction with the vision of 
enlarged Europe in the Eastern Mediterranean debated in Chapter 7 offer an 
opportunity for Cypriots and international diplomats to incentivize a peace 
process in Cyprus.
Since the 1950s, Greece and Turkey reached a near- war situation at least 
once each decade. This last decade is a “curious outlier” in the two countries’ 
crisis behavior. In the future, a combination of factors such as the Greek eco-
nomic crisis, the conflict over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and natural 
gas explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the possible derailment 
of Turkey’s EU accession might turn the clock back. For Cypriot federalists, 
this implies a race to fulfill their reunited homeland aspirations before exter-
nal conditions turn partition into an irreversible fact. But the interests in re-
unification extend beyond Cyprus. A settlement in Cyprus and the Aegean, 
particularly if combined with external guarantees for implementation, could 
preclude another regional Greek- Turkish confrontation. It would also im-
prove prospects for broader regional cooperation involving the Balkan coun-
tries, the Arab Middle East and Israel on issues involving energy, trade, and 
regional conflict management. 
In this book, I seek out puzzles, paradoxes, and outlier cases in postcon-
flict societies. Therefore, it is appropriate to end with a question. If the stakes 
are so high for all sides, why have they so badly mismanaged their time, strat-
egies, and institutional choices? Although I cannot answer this riddle, this 
book offers a set of alternative options. In Cyprus and the surrounding region, 
conflict management and power- sharing have yet to demonstrate their poten-
tial. This is partly due to the longstanding belief of the various actors that con-
flict resolution through power- sharing in their societies is uncommon, 
difficult, and paved with unintentional consequences. As the book has demon-
strated, institutional innovation could overcome this enormous roadblock to 
resolution. Institution building for reunited Cyprus is the next important step 
after Anastasiades and Akıncı successfully transformed the symbolic land-
scape of bicommunal relations through confidence building measures in the 
summer of 2015, establishing the foundations for a peace settlement in the 
2015– 2016 era. The main motivation in this book has been to reestablish the 
confidence to peace frequently lost in Cyprus and elsewhere in divided societ-
ies by demonstrating how conflict transformation is achievable and effective. 
In making this statement, Designing Peace challenges dominant perceptions 
and asks stakeholders to take a long hard look at those critical lessons post-
conflict societies could offer to their neighbors and the world.
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country, creating the legal prerequisite for large- scale return (Belloni 2005: 440– 42). The OHR 
was given the power to remove officials who were not fulfilling Dayton’s commitments, includ-
ing the right of return (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005: 586).
13. For a comparable argument on international agreements see Keohane (2006).
14. During the negotiations, UN mediators were confronted with a major discrepancy con-
cerning the actual number of the settlers; the Greek Cypriot side suggested 119,000, while Turk-
ish Cypriots claimed 60,000. In response, the UN suggested naturalizing 45,000 people plus 
everyone married to a Turkish Cypriot, as well as maintaining another 5 percent of the Turkish 
Cypriot constituent state population as immigrants. If the Greek Cypriot numbers were correct, 
the remaining settlers would have to leave Cyprus within five years of receiving a small compen-
sation package of no less than 10,000 euros for a household of four (see Loizides and Antonia-
des 2009).
15. See Cyprus Academic Dialogue (CAD), Proposals by the Governing Body of CAD on 
the Property Issue, http://cadcyprus.org/wordpress/?page_id=125, accessed October 18, 
2013.
16. It was estimated that approximately 30,000 Pontic Greeks lived in Cyprus and another 
25,000 “mainland” Greeks were permanent residents as of 2007: see TO VIMA, “The Campaign 
to the Immigrants: The Pontics of Cyprus and the Suspicion of the Opposition” (in Greek), June 
6, 2007, A42.
Chapter 5. Mandate Peace Referendums: A South African Innovation?
1. For example, Latvia (1998) and Burundi (2005).
2. International and domestic opposition to the referendum forced Papandreou to cancel 
his decision and resign in order to make way for a national unity government. According to 
Papandreou himself, he could not announce the referendum earlier when Greece entered its 
recovery problem because the Greek constitution required a referendum law and Greece did 
not have one. Personal Communication with George Papandreou, Ankara, February 28, 
2015.
3. See interview with Director of “Yes Campaign” in Northern Ireland, Quintin Oliver, on 
advising the EU in the Cyprus referendum (2009); also see interview with leftist intellectual and 
academic Nikos Trimikliniotis (2009).
4. Each province’s approval was needed for formal ratification; thus, the opportunities for a 
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new federal and consociational compromise have been restricted since the referendum’s failure 
(Simeon 2009, 2011).
5. “Guatemala: Voters Reject Constitutional Changes.” Facts On File World News Digest, 20 
May 1999.
6. For work focusing on the South African referendum, consult the African Affairs article by 
Annette Strauss (1993) and the Politikon article by Norbert Kersting (2010). See also Garry 
Sussman’s dissertation at the London School of Economics (2004) and Stuart Kaufman’s forth-
coming work on the topic, https://www.sas.upenn.edu/polisci/sites/www.sas.upenn.edu.polisci/
files/kaufman.pdf, accessed May 12, 2015.
7. During the campaign, the ANC issued a statement saying that the referendum bene-
fited the negotiating process and emphasized that this should be the last occasion on which 
South Africa was subject to the indignity of a racial or ethnic referendum. The ANC had no 
simultaneous referendum to run and therefore felt comfortable intervening to correct the 
opposition’s misinformation campaign (Strauss 1993). See also earlier response to the white 
farmers’ referendum in 1990. ANC Statement on the Referendum of White Farmers, July 4, 
1999 (http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=7163) and landmark debate on the referendum in 
Proceedings of the House of Assembly of South Africa, February 28, 1992, 1962– 1986.
Chapter 6. “Stalemate Theory”: A Humanitarian Breakthrough in Cyprus
1. Author’s communication with Demetriades and Akıncı at the two conferences organized 
by the Forum of Cities in Transition in Mitrovia (Kosovo) in 2010 and Derry/Londonderry 2011.
2. For detailed media coverage and chronology of the events organized by the Bu Memleket 
Bizim movement, see “This Homeland Is Ours,” http://www.stwing.upenn.edu/~durduran 
/yenicag/1eylul/, accessed May 12, 2015.
3. Umut Bozkurt, personal communication, June 29, 2013.
4. See The Elders website: http://theelders.org/article/work- committee- missing- persons 
- cypru, accessed April 2013.
5. According to the official website of the Committee of Missing Persons in Cyprus, a total 
of 502 Turkish Cypriots and 1,493 Greek Cypriots were reported missing by the two communi-
ties (CMP 2013). 
6. See “The Missing Persons of Cyprus: Untold Stories” roundtable by Sevgül Uludağ and 
Andreas Paraschos, Portland State University October 2007 organized by the Conflict Resolu-
tion Program.
7. For updated figures see Committee for Missing Persons, Quick Fact, at http://www.cmp- 
cyprus.org/, accessed May 12, 2015.
8. Kutlu Adali, Uludağ’s brother- in- law, opposed the Denktaş regime on several occasions. 
He was assassinated in 1996, likely by Turkish ultranationalists or criminal groups associated 
with the deep state (i.e., a group of antidemocratic coalitions in Turkey). There has been no ar-
rest for his murder and, according to a landmark ECtHR decision, no “effective investigation 
into the killing” by Turkey or Turkish Cypriot authorities (ECtHR 2005).
9. Most important, the fourth interstate application of Republic of Cyprus v. Turkey, May 10, 
2001, Application no. 27581/94.
10. See 10- Point Agreement of May 19, 1979.
11. UN Security Council Resolution 550, S/RES/550. May 11, 1984.
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Chapter 7, Europeanization and Hydrocarbons: Alternative Scenario Planning in the 
Levant
1. Lillikas’s 2012 slogan, copied from Anderson (2008), stated: “We might be a small in size 
people and not be able to do what we want. But we can do what we must” (see campaign website 
at http://www.yiorgoslillikas.com, accessed October 19, 2012).
2. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that “the Parties agree that an armed at-
tack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, 
in exercise of the right of individual or collective self- defense recognized by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, in-
dividually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such 
armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Se-
curity Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the mea-
sures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” The article is unclear as 
to what happens when a NATO member enters into a military confrontation with another mem-
ber, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ official_texts_17120.htm, accessed March 5, 2014.
3. See UN 2003 doc. S/2003/398, Report of the Secretary- General on His Mission of Good 
Offices in Cyprus, April 1 (21); UN 2004, The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Prob-
lem, March 31 (8).
4. For an analysis of Lijphart’s criteria as they apply to Cyprus, see also Yakinthou (2009).
5. Turkish Cypriots could benefit as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus through grants, 
loans, and social services. If those benefits do not exceed the community’s historical propor-
tional share (about a fifth of total revenues), the remaining amount could be deposited in an 
account to support the future Turkish Cypriot constituent state following the settlement. Alter-
natively, an arrangement could be made as part of confidence- building measures (e.g., financing 
infrastructure in a Famagusta reunited for all its inhabitants).
Conclusion
1. Interview with Jovan Donev, director of Euro- Balkan Institute, Skopje, 2011; interview 
with Donce Tasev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skopje, 2011.
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